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AN ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY
ABSTRACT
Viewing democracy in the light of an ethicophilosophical understanding of human nature and politics,
this study develops a theory of how popular government can
be made compatible with the needs of the ethical life.

The

hypothesis is that constitutional democracy, as distinguished
from plebiscitary democracy, is potentially supportive of
man's moral destiny.
A "procedural" definition of popular rule is rejected,
because it evades the fundamental moral question.

Crit

icism is also directed against an exclusive reliance on
"empirical" evidence in the study of politics.

An approach

is adopted which recognizes politics as essentially a form
of symbolical and spiritual activity calling for methods of
explanation quite different from those employed in the nat
ural sciences.
An ethical philosophy is developed which draws heav
ily on Plato and Aristotle, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer
More.

The notion of plebiscitary democracy is examined

through an analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea of the
general will.

The American Constitution is used to illustrate

the concept of constitutional democracy.

The content and

conclusions of the dissertation may be summarized as follows.
vi

Ethical conscience can be defined as consciousness
of the Good.

It is never identical to particular inclina

tions to act# but orders them from without.

Human life is

a dual awareness of imperfection and transcendent perfection.
To the extent that men affirm the latter by disciplining
their impulsive life, they build into their characters a
certain meaningful purpose attended by happiness, in
Aristotle's sense.

To the same extent, they become capable

of community with others.

The realization of this supreme

value is dependent on assimilation and creative development
of cultural tradition.
Rousseau bans constitutional restrictions on the
majority of the moment.

Basing his theory of democracy on

a belief in the goodness of human nature, he envisions
identity between morality and politics.
through a social contract.

It can be achieved

But he confuses the ethical with

uninhibited spontaneity, a mistake which translates into a
belief in the goodness of the uninhibited popular majority.
Rousseau1s conception of democracy ignores the unavoidable
presence in human life of non-moral motives.

An attempt to

put his teaching into effect would reveal the general will
as something rather different from what he imagines.

An ethically acceptable theory of democracy must
concern itself with the principle of moral restraint.

To

give the popular majority complete freedom would be to max
imize the danger of blatantly partisan politics.

This danger

can be reduced through a system of constitutional checks
which requires something approaching a "concurrent majority"
before government policy can be set.

Such a system makes a

consideration of the wishes of other groups advisable for
those who want to advance their own cause.

A constitution

of this type is recommended by enlightened self-interest.
Ethical conscience, however, is the self-less concern for
the common good of community.

Still, its working material

is the always imperfect reality of politics.

Out of prac

tical necessity it becomes "the spirit of constitutionalism,"
a morally inspired call for institutional checks.

The

demands of ethical conscience, as it applies to politics,
tend to run parallel to those of enlightened self-interest,
but only the former have moral worth.
Plebiscitary democracy is an unrealistic dream, the
attempted realization of which would not have the intended
result.

Only some form of constitutional democracy can be

maintained.

Constitutional checks on the people and its

representatives are a necessary but not sufficient condiviii

tion for community.

To serve the transcendent moral goal,

they must form part of a whole pattern of high spiritual
culture.

I. DEMOCRACY AS AN ETHICO-PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

The prevalent tendency among modern theorists of
democracy is to define it without reference to a transcen
dent ethical standard.

Democracy is more often treated as a

kind of procedural form, neutral in regard to the substance
of the popular will.

It is viewed as a "method" for making

public decision, a modus procedendi in Joseph Schumpeter's
phrase.'*'

This form of government, it is argued, does not

imply a presumption in favor of any particular set of values
beyond that which is necessarily embodied in those rules and
rights which constitute democracy.

In fact, democracy is

sometimes regarded as the form of government which recognizes
the impossibility of demonstrating the inherent superiority
of one scale of values over another.

This view has been

succinctly stated by Hans Kelsen:
■^■For some variations on this general theme, see Joseph
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York:
Harper & Row^ 195U); Henry !
b . Mayo,' An Introduction to Dem
ocratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, I960;
hereinafter referred to as Democratic Theory); E. F. M. Dur
bin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1940); David Easton, The political System.
2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971); David Truman,
The Governmental Process, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1971); Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Anthony Downs,
An Economic Interpretation of Democracy (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1957; hereinafter referred to as Economic Interpretion).
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He who holds that absolute truth and absolute values
are beyond human understanding is forced to look upon a
rival alien opinion as possible at the very least. Rel
ativism is therefore the Philosophy (Weltanschauung)
which the democratic conception presupposes.^
Without passing moral judgment on anyone, except pos
sibly the anti-democrat, democracy provides the framework
for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
This type of reasoning about democracy bears a cer
tain logical resemblance and appears intimately related to
the view of political theory which Arnold Brecht calls
"scientific value relativism."

3

According to that doctrine,

which incorporates the attempted dichotomy between "facts"
and "values," scientific work is ethically neutral.

While

it is recognized by those who adopt this view that devotion
to science and its methods involves some sort of moral commit
ment, they deny that science as such has any ultimate moral
purpose.

It is a way of proceeding, a method of inquiry

which may serve men with very different values.

O

Political

/

Cited in Rene de Visme Williamson, "The Challenge of
Political Relativism," The Journal of Politics IX,(May, 1947).
150.
^The term "scientific value relativism" is used by
Brecht in Political Theory; The Foundation of Twentieth Cen
tury Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton university
Press, 1959). The book contains an extensive explication
of the doctrine.

theory proper does not attempt to establish the moral super
iority of one scale of values over another# for all sci
entific claims have to be intelligible to the community of
scholars, and we do not have access to an objective, commun
icable order of values.

All we have access to by scientific

means, as defined by Brecht, are the subjective preferences
of individuals.
The similarities between the doctrine of scientific
value relativism and much modern democratic theory are thus
apparent.

Both attempt to separate method from ultimate end.

That is not to say that the analogy between the dominant
view of democracy and the mentioned conception of science is
complete— it is not— only that there appears to be consid
erable cross-fertilization.

It can be said about both that

they exhibit a fundamental ambiguity, growing out of a
failure to come to grips with basic problems of ethics.
Although most academic defenders of the procedural view of
democracy and scientific value relativism admit that they
must ultimately justify their preference for democracy and
science by falling back on a value judgment, they claim to
ascribe to their systems no overriding purpose
mined goal.

or predeter

Among the theorists of democracy, this point is

emphatically made by Henry B. Mayo:

4

Democracy sets up no scientifically ascertained "end"
for man, has no all-consuming purpose, no Form of the
Good, no final ultimate to serve. It has its opera
ting principles and their values; it has the values
inherent in the system; and it has a typical character
which it both presupposes and promotes. Within these
limits a democracy may be used to pursue aims which
change from time to time.
. . . The realm of political
and social purposes in a democracy is open and indeter
minate. . . .4
The difficulty with this statement, and any analogous
statement about science, is that we are asked to picture the
good democrat as one how places a high value on certain
procedural rules which together are supposed to form a democ
racy, but who does so with no ulterior motive in mind.

It

is not easy to grasp what meaning there would be in a value
judgment which expresses a liking for democratic procedures
but does not also imply an endorsement of some
ultimate goal, such as the achievement of civilization or
happiness.

The postulation of the existence of this type of

value judgment would seem to involve a distinction between
ends and means of very doubtful validity.

As is forcefully

argued by John Dewey, ends have to be viewed as constituted
by the means chosen for their attainment.
are a partial fulfillment of ends.

Conversely, means

"Ends" and "means," in

other words, are only two ways of looking at the same process
of continuous purposive activity.

In Dewey's formulation:

4Mayo, Democratic Theory, p. 277.

"'End' is a name for a series of acts taken collectively. . . .
'Means' is a name for the same series taken distributively. . . . "

5

The "methods" of democracy, thus, cannot

be distinguished from the consequences, more immediate and
expected or distant and unforeseen, which are implied in and
promoted by those methods.
How else could democratic rules acquire value for a
person than by contributing to what he understands, with or
without justification, to be the final value of life?

It is

of course possible to endorse a certain set of means with
only an incomplete or mistaken view of its effects, but to
the extent that our choice is not completely irrational,
that set of means must be assumed by us to be conducive to
the goal which in the end makes life worth living.

Mayo

admits that democratic procedures promote certain values.
By that token, we might add, they also counteract the real*
ization of other values, notably many of those advocated by
Communists or Nazis.

Can it be argued at the same time that

democracy leaves the final goal of life open?

Conversely,

if it is true that as good democrats we must view the end of
life as completely undetermined, by what logic are we favor
ing certain political arrangements over others?

5John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Mod
ern Library, 1957), p. 35.

To argue in response,

for instance, that democratic

procedures require or imply no ultimate end, but receive the
only justification needed from the fact that they give the
individual a measure of freedom to pursue his own goals,
partly by giving him some control over public policy, is to
have missed the point of this argument, which is that "free
dom," "control," etc., if they are not to be empty slogans,
have to be defined with reference to a value conceived as
ultimate.

Insofar as the procedural means of democracy are

intelligently chosen, that end is implied in, indeed, partial
ly fulfilled by them.

Mayo and other theorists with a sim

ilar view of democracy are assuming considerably more about
the proper goal for man than they are clearly aware of.
Only if we have some idea, however vague or confused,
of the intrinsic worth of things,, can we maintain the sense
of direction and proportion without which existence would
become meaningless, all science pointless.

Science pre

supposes not only order in the universe but the value of
discovering that order.

Instead of facing squarely the pos

sibility that men's ethical concerns, as reflected, for
instance, in an affirmation of democratic rights and the
pursuit of truth, have a common focus; that there is an aware
ness of the good for man which transcends the subjective
biases of individuals and which can be examined scientif-

ically, the scholar who accepts scientific value relativism
establishes residence in a philosophical half-way house.
There he can entertain a certain scale of values, and thus
give some meaning and coherence to his view of life, without
ever having to examine its final tenability, without in a
sense ever having to accept responsibility for it.

By label

ling all statements of "ultimate values" subjective, he ends
inquiry into their validity before it has had a chance to
begin.

And he does not manage to keep science ethically neu^

tral in return, but only makes it easier to introduce value
preferences in an uncritical manner.

Democracy in an ethical perspective
The word "democracy" is both one of the most used and
abused terms in modern Western political discourse.

It may

be argued that the corresponding theoretical confusion is
partly the result of the vast influence of some kind of eth
ical relativism or nihilism.

Having rejected the belief in

a definite, enduring purpose for human life, democratic
theorists have a difficult time establishing a common point
of reference.
vocabulary.

The doors are open for a raid on the democratic
The aim of this study is to contribute to a

restoration of theoretical and terminological clarity about
democracy by relating it to man's quest for the moral life.

In choosing that approach we join the philosophical tradi
tion founded in the West by Plato and Aristotle.

An attempt

will be made to develop an ethical interpretation of democ
racy, that is, one which takes its sense of direction and
proportion from an ethico-philosophical understanding of
man's nature and destiny, and states the implications of
that understanding for popular government.

Rather than start

with a ready-made definition of democracy and then look for
its moral prerequisites, we shall try to decide how popular
self-rule needs to be designed in order to support the eth
ical life.

If the demands of ethics are to be taken ser

iously, this would seem to be putting the horse before the
cart.
Ethics will not be regarded as confined to the study
of inherently subjective claims about the end of human life.
It will be postulated that man is able to go beyond the rel
ative and subjective in morals, and that philosophy
can give an account of this process.

By ethical conscience

will be understood, not some arbitrary, merely private or
conventional principle of conduct, but the awareness,
stronger in some people than in others, that there is a
sacred purpose to human life which transcends the transitory
biases of individuals and peoples, and which can be violated
only at the price of a loss of meaning and worth.

Ethical

9

conscience is that in man which wills, not the private advantage of individuals or groups as an end in itself, but the
realization of the universal good for man.

Ethical philos

ophy seeks to describe the nature of this ordering principle.
To avoid misunderstanding, it should be said that ethical
philosophy is trying to give ever clearer intellectual
expression to a sense of spiritual direction which in the
end defies all specific formulations.

By ethical conscience

we mean a special grasp of reality, dynamically related to,
but transcendent of,ordinary rationality.

What is absolute

about man's ethical life, therefore, is not this or that
standard of conduct which he formulates in response to the
ethical demand

on him, but the moral obligation itself, the

self-justifying goal which the moral man is always trying to
approach more closely.

Some Christians would perhaps prefer

to say that our ethical conscience is the Holy Spirit reveal
ing itself to man.

To use that terminology would have the

advantage of ruling out unfortunate references to the loose
and slippery meaning of the word "conscience" in common par
lance.

It would also make the intended association with

divine purpose clearer.

On the other hand, it would probably

unnecessarily complicate acceptance of our analysis by those
who are unable to accept the specifically Christian notion
of God.

10
I

To state'adequately the reasons for rejecting ethical
relativism and nihilism and siding with the classical tradi
tion in ethics started by Plato and Aristotle and the closely
related Judaeo-Christian tradition would be ample material
for a separate work-

It is necessary here to refer to other

scholars who continue those traditions.

Although this gen

eral frame of reference collides at important points with
some widely held modern beliefs, the writer who regards it
as valid in central respects cannot always begin from the
ground, so to speak, by defending its basic assumptions
against the most recent attacks.

To be able to make his

own contribution to these old traditions by suggesting clar
ifications, revisions, developments, or new applications of
their ideas, he must be allowed to build on the base which
has been laid by others.

At the same time, the value of

scholarly exchange makes it desirable that his arguments be
presented in such a way as to be meaningful and persuasive
also to those with a different frame of reference.

We may

hope that in the course of the proposed inquiry into the
relationship of ethical conscience to popular self-rule a
good case for the postulated view of ethics will also be
developed.
The introduction of an ethical perspective on popular
government will force the rethinking of democratic principles

11

as widely understood by political scientists today.

An eth

ical theory of democracy will not be satisfied with stating,
for instance, that democracy is a form of government in
which public policy rests on the will of the great mass of
the people as opposed to some privileged elite.

While this

principle has something to contribute to a theory of popular
rule, it evades the question whether democracy has to foster
a certain quality of popular will.

An ethical theory of

democracy lookB for more in the celebrated principle of
majority rule than the idea that a numerically superior por
tion of a people is entitled to greater influence over pub
lic decisions than a numerically inferior one.

As stated,

the principle leaves the demands of ethics aside.

The same

type of deficiency marks most influential modern theories of
democracy.

In search of the "basic feature" of this form of

government, Henry Mayo decides upon the following criterion:
". . . a political system is democratic to the extent that
the decision-makers are under effective popular control."6
There is of course more to Mayo's definition of democracy,
but the fact that he regards this as the most "basic feature"
is a good illustration of the tendency in modern democratic
theory to view this type of government as a mere form in

6Mayo, Democratic Theory, p. 60.
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which almost any substance may be put.

There is contained

in this allegedly fundamental criterion no reference to the
quality of will which democracy is supposed to articulate,
but only this formula: The more popular control, the more
democracy.

Once again, we are left with a principle that

does little more than define democracy in terms of more or
less on a quantitative scale.
As soon as the demands of the ethical life are rec
ognized, it becomes necessary to find out how government
could be made to respect those demands.

How can moral

standards be promoted and maintained by a form of government
based on popular consent?

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is

widely regarded as one of the fathers of modern democracy,
finds the answer in his concept of the general will.

The

latter is by definition always moral, and it is the only
legitimate expression of ^he people's will.

To make gov

ernment moral it is necessary to create the circumstances
under which the general will can assert itself.

It is impor

tant to note that Rousseau regards the general will as
incompatible with constitutional restraints on the people.
As will be argued in more detail later, he does so because
he associates morality with uninhibited spontaneity.

The

cause of the good society is not threatened by man's first
impulse, which is always good, but by the artificial motives

with which historical society has imprisoned and perverted
his natural, original goodness.

Constitutional checks on the

will of the people are examples of such vitiating influences.
In order for man's spontaneous sense of right to break forth,
they have to be removed together with all other artificial
restraints which bind his natural goodness,

This, in brief,

is the ethical philosophy behind Rousseau's notion of pleb
iscitary democracy.
Rousseau's view of how morality is to be served in
politics differs fundamentally from the thesis that will be
advanced in this study.

It will be contended here that the

idea of democracy, viewed as a realistic statement of human
potentiality,- is at the same time the idea of constitutional
democracy, that is, of popular rule under legal restraints
not easily changed.

This is so because of the nature of

man's moral predicament.

The argument will be developed

partly through an analysis of Rousseau’s concept of the gen
eral will.

His thought deserves careful examination, for

not only has it had an enormous influence, directly and
indirectly, on democratic theory and political thought gen
erally in the West; it also takes one to the root of problems
which have to be faced and solved before the present oanfusion
in democratic theory can be overcome.

While Rousseau

deserves credit for raising the moral question of popular
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rule, it may be shown
not been beneficial.

that on the whole his influence has
Importantly, he is the great pioneer

in the West for the type of ethics which identifies the prin
ciple of moral good with positive human feelings, a morality
of the "heart" from which the West has yet to recover.

It

is this understanding of ethics which lies at the bottom of
his impatience with inner or outer restraints on man.

We

shall try to show that the general will, for which Rousseau
claims total power and freedom, is not what it is purported
to be, a principle of right above subjective and particular
wills.
It will be argued here that man's ethical conscience
is not adequately defined as a positive force inside our
impulsive life.

It is better described as a principle of

self-examination or censure set apart from particular human
feelings and actions.

Except in a special sense, it does

not order this or that specific line of conduct.
the motive with which action is contemplated.
is never itself the standard of morality.

It alters

Human impulse

It may be said to

partake of that standard to the extent that it advances the
transcendent purpose known in ethical conscience.
This moral principle of self-examination can be shown
to be closely related to the idea of constitutionalism.

A

constitution even more than other laws is a check on human

15
will.

In a democracy where constitutional provisions,

whether written or unwritten, regulate popular voting, rep
resentation, terms of office, divisions of power, legisla
tive procedure, etc., and these rules can be changed only
with difficulty, arbitrariness and whim in the people at
large and in their representatives are restrained.

Such a

state does not give free rein to the people's impulse of the
moment, but requires of public decisions that they be reached
in a certain deliberate way.
In a democracy, constitutional checks may be viewed
as inhibitions imposed by a people and its representatives
on themselves.

But why would a people restrict its own

freedom of action?
government.

Rousseau completely rejects this idea of

Constitutionalism involves a distrust of unham

pered action and spontaneous decision.

These are regarded

as containing an element of arbitrariness destructive of the
spirit of the civilized political order.

One purpose of

constitutional law, and lesser laws, is to purge government
as far as possible of this element and to create the condi
tions for reasoned, well-considered public decisions.

The

attempt to make room for critical detachment in the formula
tion of policy may have an ethical aspect.

Where there is

room for deliberation, there is room for the application of
a moral perspective.

It will be our thesis that constitu

16

tionalism in one of its aspects is the political dimension
of ethical self-restraint and hence the necessary political
condition for the furtherance of the ethical life.

The idea

of constitutional democracy, as opposed to the Rousseauistic
notion of plebiscitary democracy, can be viewed as implying
a recognition on the part of the people that there is a need
to protect ourselves from our own spontaneity in politics.
We need to be on our guard against premature, unthinking
inclinations and the selfish arbitrariness which usually
lurks behind them.

Just as an individual may resolve on the

basis of experience of his own moral weakness not to give
free rein to his impulses in the future, but to make room
for moral scrutiny of his motives before acting, so a people
may recognize the need for putting brakes on its own momentary
will in the interest of the common good.
Nothing in formal logic stops a thinker from advancing
a theory of democracy in which the need for constitutional
checks is denied or discounted.

The question is if it must

not then be regarded as belonging to the realm of futile and
potentially dangerous dreams.

One may argue that such a

theory becomes palatable only when certain traits of human
nature are assumed to be not really a part of man's being.
Specifically, such a theory makes light of man's moral predic
ament, which may be described as the permanent inner tension
between ethical conscience and contrary inclinations.

17

Democracy as a way of life
In the following attempt to give an ethical inter
pretation of democracy it will not be taken for granted that
democracy is inherently superior to all other forms of gov
ernment, as is often done by modern Westerners,

It is well

to remember Aristotle's observation that no one type of gov
ernment is suited to all circumstances.

It is pointless to

argue in the abstract that only democratic governments are
legitimate.

As John Stuart Mill points out# "a people may

be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties which a partic7
ular form of government requires of them." The question of the
legitimacy of different types of rule should not be dis
cussed in isolation from the cultural context to which they
belong.

Democracy may be a realistic proposition in

Europe or North America, but on the African continent most
peoples still seem to lack the special type of political
maturity which is needed to sustain it.

In the West of to

day where democracy has come to be viewed as the normal form
of government, it should be remembered that historically and
internationally democracy, in a meaningful sense of that
word, is not the rule but the exception.

We should be on

7John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism. Liberty, and
Representative Government, intro, by A. D. Lindsay (London:
J. M. Dent & Sons, 1929), p. 178.
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our guard lest we adopt an overly provincial attitude in
regard to the means whereby a society may provide for its
political needs.
At the same time, there are strong reasons why the
idea of democracy must be regarded as a very noble one.

A

good case can be made that in a certain sense it represents
the apex of associated human life.

This argument relates

democracy to the moral end of man, introducing the image of
popular sel.f-government in the cause of community.

Without

assenting to his entire political philosophy, we may quote
these pregnant lines by John Dewey:
Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to
other principles of associated life. It is the idea of
community life itself. It is an ideal in the only
intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and
movement of some thing which exists carried to its final
limit, viewed as completed, perfected.8
Clearly, the word democracy is used by Dewey in a much
broader sense than a set of political institutions and rules.
It refers to the sum of conditions which prevail in a society
where community has been realized.

Certain political

arrangements form only a part of a more comprehensive design.
The word democracy implies that the active involvement of
the whole people is necessary for the achievement of the

8John Dewey, The Public and its Problems
Swallow Press, 1954), p. 148.

(Chicago:
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goal of community.

It should be added without delay that

according to Dewey "democracy in this sense is not a fact
Q

and never will be."

We may understand him to be using the

term in an Aristotelian fashion: something is what it is
potentially.
Dewey's broadening of the democratic concept to
denote a whole way of life with a definite end puts him at
loggerheads with those theorists who regard democracy as a
mere political form without any predetermined, overriding
purpose.

He would seem to be more sensitive than they are

to the fact that government derives its shape, strength, and
direction from the aspirations of the people it serves.

It

will reflect and promote the ultimate goals for life that
are held by that people and its leaders.

One cannot really

define a form of government by abstract principles, such as
universal suffrage, popular control of government officials,
and majority rule, for these take on different meanings
depending on the cultural atmosphere that pervades them.

To

give just one example, universal suffrage means something
quite different in a Communist state and a Western democracy.
By defining democracy in terms of community, Dewey ascribes
to popular self-rule a definite goal with reference to which
its various procedural rules must be understood.
9Ibid., p. 148.

20

Dewey's broad definition of democracy brings up the
artificiality of all sharp distinctions between public and
private life.

The

distinctions along

political scientist needs to make
that line,

for they are useful to him in

organizing his thought and in communicating his ideas to
others.

But while

define the casting

it may be practical for some purposes to
of a vote by a legislator as a public act

and the disciplining of a child by a parent as a private act,
it should not be forgotten that this distinction is, in the
final analysis, arbitrary.

The label "public" i3 tacked on

to the first,not because it is somehow sui generis,but
because it pertains,to "government" as conventionally under
stood and has a direct and powerful effect on the lives of
many other people.

One need only change the example of the

"private" act to one in which the effect on others is both
direct and powerful to find it even more difficult to draw
the line.

It may perhaps be said that an act is public as

opposed to private to the extent that it affects the lives
of other people, but that formula involves no sharp distinc
tion, only a diffuse sliding scale.10

10To avoid misunderstanding it should perhaps be said
that in introducing the notion that democracy implies a
whole way of life we are not also moving in the direction of
the idea that all decisions which have "public" ramifica
tions should be made according to majority rule or some
other principle of "participatory" democracy.
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It is thus in a sense unreal to think of "government"
as something distinct from a surrounding "society."

It is,

or becomes, what the total number of "private" and "public"
acts make it.

It is impossible to determine with any final

ity where the "rules" and "institutions" of democracy end
and the cultural "environment" begins.
related.

They are dynamically

They are parts of one and the same process of pur

poseful human action.
Dewey's idea of community suffers from certain phil
osophical difficulties which make it impossible to adopt
many of the specifics of his view of popular rule.

Still,

his notion that democracy carries within it the idea of
community is an intriguing one.

It suggests that popular

self-government has a built-in moral requirement and logical
end, whose fulfillment would be community, and which cannot
be ignored if this form of rule is to continue in existence.
Although it will not be our purpose to prove that democracy
is "the idea of community life itself," the analysis will
point in that direction.

We shall be trying to show that

the ethical quest to which democracy owes allegiance is at
the same time the quest for community, to borrow Robert
Nisbet's phrase.^

Needless to say, the idea of community

i;1-See Robert Nisbet, Community and Power (New York:
Oxford University Press, Galaxy edition, 1962).

as the goal to which politics should be directed is central
to the classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition.

How this

idea is to be understood and related to the concept of pop
ular government will have to be discussed in some detail.
Ethical conscience, we shall argue, pulls man in the opposite
direction from the centrifugal forces of subjective bias,
arbitrariness, and egotism.

It may be described as a sense

of belonging, of participation in a harmonizing, supraindividual purpose.

Given man's contrary proclivities, the

only type of popular self-rule which can serve that goal in
the political realm is a constitutional one.

Morality and self-interest
The emphasis in this study will be on the ethical
aspect of the problem of democracy.

It would not be surpris

ing if in the course of such an investigation the impression
would emerge that the principle of morality is the principle
of order in a democracy.

To avoid creating that impression,

some cautionary and sobering remarks should be made.
Human nature, as we know it so far in history and in
ourselves, does not give any reasons for optimism about the
triumph of ethical motives over selfish motives in human
affairs.

Respect for the ethical goal of life does not seem

to be the rule of politics but the exception.

Some political

philosophers, Machiavelli and Hobbes prominent among them.

have been so overwhelmed by the element of raw power in pol
itics that they have been able to see almost nothing else.
Hobbes is even led to the drastic step of redefining morals
in terms of the urge for power.

However great their exag

gerations, these philosophers have driven home an important
truth which must not be ignored by anyone who studies politics
and particularly not by anyone who wants to do so in the
light of ethics: politics is primarily an arena of conflict,
of clashing individual wills and group interests.

One may

go a step further and say that life in general has an element
of war, of which military conflicts and other forms of
violence are only one type of manifestation.

A basic role

of government is to provide for the peaceful settlement of
disputes.

Laws, including constitutions, have the function

of steering the perpetual war of all against all into forms
which can make life tolerable.
Of this function of government modern theorists of
democracy are for the most part quite aware.

In the United

States, the Madisonian tradition makes it difficult to for
get that constitutions have as an important aim the checking
and balancing of conflicting interests.

The realism of

Madison's insights are attested to by the success of the
American constitutional experiment.
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'There is thus much to be learned from those who are
sensitive to the clash of wills that forms a part of all
political life-

The trouble with that type of observation

is that it often sees nothing in politics but the war of all
against all.

When government is conceived as based on

nothing but a prudential, pragmatic effort to settle disputes
peacefully, when the ethical perspective is pushed aside or
dropped entirely, the result is a distortion of political
reality.

It is forgotten that while regulation of conflict

may be the first and foremost task of government, citizens
have an ethical conscience which demands moreaspirations, too, are a part of political life.

Man's moral
Although

they may not often triumph over the demands of the powerplay, they are there to give a sense of higher direction to
politics, to smooth the rough edges of the war of wills, at
rare times even to raise government to a level of some moral
dignity.
Man's ethical conscience is not the ordering principle
of politics, not even in a democracy, but it does pull our
will in the direction of worthier political goals, limiting
to some degree their ingredient of mere selfishness.

Insofar

as it gains influence, we may say that the good society is
being realized.

In that society, which we can also call the

civilized society, selfishness has not been uprooted:

One

might say that it has been tamed, bent to the purposes of
the moral life.

Where man’s awareness of the ethical goal

of life recedes, on the other hand, the ever present power
struggle will soon assume uglier forms, giving new support
to a cynically Machiavellian view of politics.
An ethical theory of democracy, then, must not blind
itself to the inescapable non-ethical motives in politics.
These forces must be taken into account by the realistic
theorist, and the prudent politician.

If the politician is

to be successful in attaining his goals, he must try to
adjust to these forces, try to enlist them in his support.
That is not to say that he has to be immoral and opportunis
tic, only that he must not be naive about his working mater
ial.

He may have a deeply moral view of his duty as a

politician, but if he refuses to face up to the degree to
which non-moral motives are among the forces with which he
has to contend, he will be reduced to a futile moralism
which may even produce the opposite of the intended results.
It is not moral, but merely foolish, to ignore the more
unpleasant political drives,

it might even be said that it

is a moral duty for the politician to adjust his means to
the circumstances, that is, to adopt a pragmatic approach, for
this is the only way in which some progress towards the eth
ical goal can be made.

Even the most moral politician has
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to master the type of prudential political calculus which is
sometimes called the art of the possible, or his efforts will
come to naught.
While there is in all political action a purely prag
matic ingredient— a consideration of available means under
given conditions— it does not follow that the whole truth
about politics was told by the author of The Prince.

The

art of the possible, if it is to be complete, must include
considerations of a non-rutilitarian, moral order.

For an

explication of that point we may rely on a philosopher and
statesman with a keen appreciation of the Machiavellian
aspect of politics, the Italian Benedetto Croce.

Recogni

zing that "in political action, in attempts to reach a def
inite goal, everything becomes a political means— everything,
including in certain respects morality and religion,
Croce also warns against the belief that moral norms have no
application to politics.

Man, he argues, is a moral being

as well as a utilitarian creature looking for success in his
dealings:
. . . it may not be imagined that there can exist a
political man entirely devoid of moral conscience.
This would be the same a3 admitting that a "political
man" can exist without being a "man."13
■^Benedetto Croce, Politics and Morals, trans. by
Salvatore J. Castiglione (New York: Philosophical Library,
1945), p. 22.
13Ibid., p. 25.

The human conscience does not abdicate in political affairs.
Against the notion that there is one set of ethics for pri
vate life and another for public life, it cries out that
. . . one cannot do evil in order to attain good, as
though evil and good were merchandise to be exchanged?
that our hands must be kept clean? that the quality of
the means must not conflict with the quality of the
end.14
Politics has its own law of utility and convenience, but it
is not a closed-off, self-sufficient sphere of activity.
Utilitarian skill in attaining ends is a virtue in a pol
itician, but he must never fail to take into account that
men have a moral nature to which the pragmatic calculus must
be adjusted.
The true statesman, we may conclude, has a clear
conception of the moral end of human existence, and he will
always strive to make politics subservient to that end.

He

is also sufficiently a realist to know that morality, in the
strict sense of performing good acts for their own sake, will
never become the law of politics.
conceded that fact.

Even Plato reluctantly

We may infer that Jesus had the same

in mind when he separated between the things of God and the
things of Caesar.

The statesman knows that the best he can

normally hope for is to put self-interest in the service
of moral ends.

He can find some comfort in the fact

14Ibid., p. 3.
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that in most cases enlightened self-interest drives man in
the direction of morality.
constitutionalism.

As an example we may point to

The latter unquestionably owes much to

sophisticated egotism.

Prom a purely selfish point of view

it is better to have rule of law than arbitrary government.15
But constitutionalism also serves an ethical need.

It is

the political condition for the furtherance of the ethical
life.
Lest the influence of ethical motives in politics be
entirely discounted, it should also be noted that in a soci
ety where men are growing insensitive to the demands of the
ethical life, their enlightened self-interest will be
increasingly difficult to discern.

As their ethical vision

is blurred, there is going to be less to restrain their
cruder inclinations.

They will become more indiscriminate

in their choice of ends and means.

The power struggle, which

before was leavened somewhat by the ethical pull, will get
harsher.

Whereas ethical conscience, the will to the common

good, used to give to the constitution and the laws generally
an aura of dignity which made it easier for the citizens to
recognize allegiance to the lawful order as being in their

^Cf. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Ca l 
culus of Consent; Logical Foundations of constitutional
Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

long-term interest, they are now going to look at the laws
with less reverence and not be as predisposed against break
ing them, if it would serve their own immediate goals and go
undetected.

In that sense, it may be said that any civilized

political order is ultimately rooted in ethical conscience.
It should be evident from these remarks that the
proposed attempt to give an ethical interpretation of democ
racy will not rest on some exaggerated view of the influence
of moral motives in politics.

It is clearly understood that

politics has the dimension of conflict which is emphasized
by many modern thinkers.

The fact that references to moral

principle are frequently on the lips of politicians is any
thing but a sure sign that they are propelled by moral
considerations.

One need not be a cynic to see that self-

interest often masquerades in moral garb.

At the same time,

the need that the politician feels to give a moral justifica
tion for his proposals suggests a recognition that his poten
tial supporters would like to feel that the policies they
endorse are sanctioned by a higher court than the selfish
ego.

Why all these moral appeals in politics, now and

throughout history, if there is not at the bottom of men's
endless arguments about the proper political order also some
thing more than a concern for private advantage, a real eth
ical awareness, however vague, that we may not proceed arbitrar

30

ily?

Whether the moral sentiments expressed by politicians

are for the most part genuinely felt or not# they indicate
that there is more to politics than the power-play, be it
crude and violent or modified by enlightened self-interest.
This study is an attempt to supply in broad outline
what is lacking in a theory of democracy which does not look
beyond the clash of wills.
cannot

The needs of the ethical life

be ignored in a society which wants to be known as

civilized.

They remain an unconditional demand on man, a

constant reminder that a political order based on mere self
ishness is not worthy of man's true purpose.

It is incumbent

on the political thinker to come to grips with the role of
the ethical in human affairs and try to answer the question
of how it may be maintained and expanded in political life.
The present study is an attempt to perform that task in
regard to democracy.

Spiritual man and the scientific method
The development of an ethical theory of democracy
comes up against a number of modern preconceptions about
what type of evidence may be accepted by the political sci
entist.

As has already been stated, conscience will be

regarded here as an opening to the transcendent purpose of
human life.

This understanding of conscience forms part of

a general view of human nature, according to which man has a
spiritual existence, a type of self-awareness and freedom
that is lacking in physical nature and in the animal world.
Together with the type of ethical philosophy with which it
is indissolubly bound up, that view has come under attack as
based on "unscientific," non-empirical evidence.
The last two centuries have seen a vast and increas
ing amount of activity in the natural sciences.

The result

ing progress in bringing physical nature under our control
has endowed the methods of experimental science with an
immense prestige, creating a wish in many quarters for their
widest possible application.

They have come to be viewed by

some as the key to more complete and reliable knowledge, not
only of physical and biological nature, but of human nature
and social life.

The distinction between a specifically

human, spiritual order, where freedom and responsibility are
not only meaningful but unavoidable concepts, and a "quant
itative" order of causal relationships has become blurred.
Reflecting this general trend, modern political science is
marked by a certain reluctance to study politics in the light
of a philosophical understanding of man, one which views
life from the perspective of actual human self-experience
rather than in analogy with what is known about physical
nature.

Many political scientists are prone to evade the
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difficult question of the special nature of man and its
implications for the study of politics and proceed instead
according to some version of the acclaimed "scientific method."
It is not possible here to state fully the case against
making empirico-quantitative methods, and theory, viewed as a
set of working hypotheses potentially capable of verifica
tion by such methods, the norm for the study of political
man.

Just enough should be said to show that this approach

suffers from grave difficulties.

The following attempt to

lift the ban on a certain type of evidence and reasoning
will have the additional purpose of making the notion of a
distinctively human, spiritual nature clearer.

It should be

noted that we shall be dealing with a tendency in modern
political science

(and other social sciences) rather than

with individual intellectual positions, such as may be found
among those loosely and often ambiguously described as
"behavioralists."

We are not trying to deny that there are

political scientists sometimes said to be in the latter cat
egory who, especially in practice, go beyond a dogmatic
insistence on empirico-quantitative methods and related
types of theory.

Needless to say, our argument i3 not direc

ted against a general concern with finding support in facts
for hypotheses.

It is difficult to quarrel with the wish to

acquire as much knowledge as possible about a subject, provi-

ded that the subject is not trivial and the collection of
information guided by a sense of proportion.

Our criticism

focuses on the tendency to define "facts" in socio-political
matters with reference to what is so defined in the natural
sciences, to assume, in other words, that the nature of man
and society do not, in any way essential to a meaningful and
reliable understanding of politics, transcend the type of
reality which is investigated by the natural sciences.
Although often mixed with or counterbalanced by less ques
tionable approaches, this inclination remains a considerable
influence.

To the extent that social scientists exhibit this

tendency, our argument applies; to the extent that they are
beginning to question it, it is a reminder of sins past.
In the attempt to achieve the closest possible approx
imation to the principles of natural science in the study of
politics, a premium is put on evidence believed to be quan
titative or susceptible of quantification.

According to one

of the pioneers of this modern orientation, Arthur Bentley,
the statement of social fact that "takes us farthest along
the road toward quantitative estimates will inevitably be
the best statement."

16

In Bentley's view, "ideas" and "feel

ings" are not intelligible social forces but meaningless

^ Ar t h u r F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Bloom
ington; Principia Press, 1935), p. 201.
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abstractions.

The social scientist should try to eliminate

such "unmeasurable elements" from his investigation and aim
for the enviable position of the natural scientist whose
research material is "susceptible of measurement and quantxtative comparison all the way through."

17

One is reminded

of William James's phrase that "you must bring out of each
word its practical cash-value."

18

A more recent but very

similar view of political science is that of David Easton.
Although less hostile to "introspective psychology,"^9 he
emphasizes the great indebtedness of the discipline to
Bentley.

Easton calls for the development of a theoretical

"master plan"

20

to guide empirical research, which might one

day conceivably "reach the stage of maturity associated with
theory in physics, forexample."
the discipline,

21

Discussing his hopes for

he regrets thatthe physicalsciences

are

centuries ahead of the social sciences and that therefore
"all social research cannot yet be conducted with the meth
odological rigor familiar to the natural sciences or in

^Ibid., p. 200.
lO

-^William James, Essays in Pragmatism, ed.byAlburey
Castell(New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1968), p. 145.
^■9Easton, The Political System, p. 177.
^°Ibid.,

p. 61.

^Ibid.,

p. 58.

35

terms of the systematic frameworks resembling the model of
physics. 1,22
In part, the attempted introduction into political
science of methods believed to approach the type of rigor
and precision characteristic of methods in the natural sci
ences may be a reaction against instances of sloppy scholar
ship and extravagant speculation in the past.

But the

proposed cure

has' important features which are probably as

problematical

as the disease.

While it should not be denied,

for instance, that there are political investigations for
which measurability in some sense of that word is a desir
able goal, it can hardly be argued that it should be sought
even at the price of a one-sided or distorted view of polit
ical reality, not to mention triviality in the resulting
findings.

We would seem to be better advised to heed

Aristotle’s dictum that "it is the mark of an educated man
to look for precision in each class of things just so far as
the nature of

the subject admits."2^

One of

the stated purposes of

using"the scientific

method" in political science is to discover "patterns" or

^Ibid., p. 59.
2^Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle,
intro, and trans. by Sir David Ross (London: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1954), p. 3 (1094^).
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"uniformities" in political behavior.

In the words of a

sympathetic explication of the method,
we . . . are assuming that these regularities can be
expressed in generalizations which approximate the
universality of a scientific law or theory in the nat
ural sciences.24
Presumably, this must be taken to mean that the special
nature and complexity of human life is discounted or denied
by political science proper.

Or to state the same conclu

sion in a way that clarifies the word "special": to the
extent that important differences are recognized between man
and thing and between man and animal, they are not believed
to be of the order that different principles of explanation
must be applied to each.

It is hard to see that truth could

be served by such a blurring of distinctions.

To take an

example, it would appear to be only by a facile reductionism
that one can regard the effect of men's social background on
their political actions as belonging to the same general
category of "regularities" as the effect of a lever on
another in a machine or the effect of some stimulus on a
rat.

It belongs to the specifically human sphere of con

scious, purposive action.

It has to be understood from

within that context by methods which recognize the fundamen-

2^M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, Political
Analysis: An Introduction (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1972),
p. 14.
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tal difference in meaning between the word "effect" as
applied to human political behavior and the same word as
applied to a piece of machinery or a biological organism.
The presumption in favor of applying the methods of
natural science, as conceived by their proponents in the
social sciences, to a political subject matter carries more
far-reaching implications than is generally recognized.

It

is sometimes argued by advocates of "the scientific method"
that its application to socio-political reality is not nec
essarily the equivalent of introducing a whole world-view,
but merely an attempt to pursue further a method which has
been found to "work," in the sense, for instance, that it
facilitates prediction.

It must be asked, however, whether

the effort to imitate natural science does not imply that
human behavior is of a certain kind.

If man as a political

being transcends biology and physics in ways essential to
the very definition of political life, exclusive employment
of empirico-quantitative methods and related types of theory
would be unsatisfactory or misdirected.

Their use in polit

ical science could be defended only if the "patterns■' and
"regularities" discernible in political life did not tran
scend the causal order of reality investigated by the natural
sciences.

The conclusion seems inescapable: If "the sci

entific method" is set up as the only way of acquiring reli-
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able knowledge of socio-political reality, the latter is by
that token assumed to conform in respect to its defining
attributes to what we know of the nature of relationships
between phenomena in the physical and biological world.

But

in that case, a certain view of human nature is indeed
tacitly presupposed.
It may be argued in response that it is only by con
centrating on measurable phenomena and aiming for quantifica
tion that we can reach any exact and therefore reliable
knowledge of socio-political reality.

But whence this pre

sumption in favor of'texact” knowledge in the quantitative
sense?

If it has not somehow been determined beforehand

what socio-political reality is like, why is it that only
*

,

"exact" knowledge of it is supposed to be meaningful?
The hidden hypothesis about man and society is always
verified, or at least never contradicted, for all "regular
ities" of political behavior are forced into the Procrustean
bed of "scientific" explanation.

It is assumed that the

lingering element of uncertainty and unpredictability is a
temporary problem whose resolution will only have to await
more extensive research and further refinement of the methods.
An almost Newtonian conception of reality appears to be
implied, one which has been found wanting even in physics.
The humanistic objection that the "patterns" of social life

do not belong to the same category as "patterns" in astron
omy or physics, for example, but are acts of will in a
context of freedom, purpose, and responsibility cannot be
handled on its own ground.

It must either be thrown out as

"unscientific," and thus unworthy of consideration, or
emasculated through a redefinition of the concepts used in
terms of "the scientific method," that is, by a reduction of
them to a predetermined level of explanation.
The point to be made is that the proponents of an
exclusive or primary reliance on empirico-quantitative
methods in political science are exhibiting a fundamental
arbitrariness in their determination of scientific relevance.
It becomes the more glaring if the need for a philosophical
understanding of human nature and society is discounted.
It is difficult to see how one could defend setting up the
methods of natural science as the ideal for social science
before it has been determined through some kind of assess
ment of human nature in its complex wholeness to what extent
these criteria can be applied to the study of man in the
first place.

These are philosophical questions, and very

difficult questions at that.

In order to understand the

role and meaning of politics in human life and what methods
are appropriate to that task, it is necessary to engage in
a type of investigation in which the facts of actual human
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self-experience are allowed to speak for themselves, as it
were.

It will not do for the political scientist to begin

by introducing an inflexible rule of evidence borrowed from
a specialized branch of research.

To deny the primacy of a

philosophical grasp of human nature while insisting on the
universal applicability of "the scientific method" is tanta
mount to setting up that method itself as the final judge of
reality and thus to adopt a rigid metaphysical system.

To

admit the need of philosophy, in the sense of a scientifically
valid examination of the facts of self-experience, is to
have left the confines of empirico-quantitative methods, for
philosophical reasoning is not an application of those
methods or related types of theory, but a comprehensive
assessment of reality logically prior to them.
The varied evidence available indicates that man is
indeed a part of the physical universe, a bodily creature
whose characteristics may be illuminated by the methods of
natural science.

It is quite another matter to proceed as

though all realiable knowledge about human nature belonged
to the same general level of reality.

This is simply to

ignore the whole body of humanistic evidence available to
philosophy: Man as known by us in actual experience is not
locked into some vast, causally determined system.

To be

human is to be engaged in conscious, purposeful activity.

to reflect about and choose between alternative lines of
conduct.

We know ourselves to be interfering to some extent

with the flow of events, shaping it according to our own
intentions.

Our direct knowledge of freedom in the moment

of choice is an emphatic, indeed final, humanistic refuta
tion of the allegation that human behavior may be explained
in analogy with, for instance, some balls on a billiard table
knocking against each other and the walls of the table.
Mechanistic theories of human nature may perhaps have a cer
tain logical coherence when considered in the abstract, but
as interpretations of the concrete reality known to the
living, acting human being, they are wholly inappropriate.
The language of philosophical self-interpretation are
concepts like "experience," "act," "intend," and "freedom."
They are indispensable in an analysis of specifically human
life, but become meaningless if applied to things.
do not "experience," "act," "intend," etc.

Things

Conversely, the

language of "cause and effect," "function," etc., used in
the physical sciences, is alien to the mode of distinctively
human activity, although sometimes used metaphorically to
describe it.

The theory that freedom is but an unscientific

illusion to be progressively dispelled by the discovery of
causal "patterns" in different areas of research remains a
metaphysical allegation, an abstract afterthought doing
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violence to an immediate awareness.

By an illegitimate and

arbitrary inference from our knowledge of physical reality
a confining and distorting explanatory scheme is clamped on
actual human experience.
It may be argued that political research allegedly
conducted according to "the scientific method" is saved by
the constant and unavoidable intrusion of humanistic inter
pretations which recapture for the researcher and the stu
dent of his findings some of the humanistic meaning which is
lost through the attempted methodological reduction of polit
ical reality.

One may indeed question whether the proponents

of strict adherence to "the scientific method" ever come very
close to their stated ideal for the discipline.

We have been

arguing, therefore, not primarily against what these polit
ical scientists are actually doing, although there is consid
erable room for criticism in this area, but against what they
are attemptincr to do.
The "scientistic"temptation does not appear quite as
strong in political science as it once was.

This may well

be a sign of a rediscovery of the specifically human order
of activity.

Perhaps there is then also hope for the recov

ery of a humanistic, philosophical science of politics for
which concepts like "freedom" and "purpose" are not unwel
come complications but a challenge to reflection.
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Human self-awareness
The physicist and chemist have a great deal to tell
us about man.

So does the biologist.

It has not been our

intention to deny that in some ways man resembles the animal.
He has needs which grow out of his participation in the
organic world.

What is of first importance to the political

scientist, however, is that man is not only an organism with
corresponding needs.

He is, to use Ernst Cassirer's phrase,

the animal symbolicum. the being with an intelligence and
imagination which works through symbols. 2 5

The human mind,

Susanne Langer argues, is "an organ in the service of pri
mary needs, but of characteristically human needs."26

What

ever the likenesses between man and animal, the pervasive
ness of symbolization in human thought establishes one allimportant difference.

That difference, which has a direct

bearing on the study of politics, has been extensively
investigated by an important school of modern research,
often called "philosophical anthropology," which has drawn
on and integrated findings from biology, zoology, animal

2^see Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962).
Susanne I. Langer, philosophy in a New Key, 2d ed.
(New York: New American Library, 1951), p. 43 (emphasis in
original).
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psychology, anthropology, and philosophy.

Cassirer and

Langer are two leading contributors primarily known as
philosophers.^7
Philosophical anthropology has shown that what makes
man distinctively human is a unique kind of self-awareness
which is made possible by symbolical thought.

Whereas the

animal appears to have only the perspective on the world
which inheres in its practical need of the moment, man has
the ability, as it were, to step outside of himself and look
at phenomena, including himself, from an unlimited number of

27The following discussion of the difference between
man and animal makes use in a very summary fashion of argu
ments that are presented in detail in the following works:
Cassirer, An Essay on Man? Langer, Philosophy in a New Key?
Max Scheler, M a n ’s Place in Nature, intro, and trans. by
Hans Meyerhoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961); Arnold Gehlen,
Anthropologische Forschung (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1961); Adolf
Portmann, Zoologie und das neue Bild des Menschen (Hamburg:
Rowohlt, 1956); P. J. J. Buytendijk, Mensch und Tier (Ham
burg: Rowohlt, 1958); J. v. Uexkull and G. Kriszat, Streifzuge durch die Urnwe1ten von Tieren und Menschen. Bedetungslehre (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956). Many other works elaborate on
the same theme. Research in this area continues, and it is
of course possible that the views of the philosophical
anthropologists regarding the difference between man and
animal will require seme modification in the future. Our
general argument is not dependent, however, on the precision
with which they have distinguished between the two. Even if
it were established, for instance, that some animals have
more of a symbolical grasp than is recognized by the phil
osophical anthropologists, their understanding of human
nature would still be intact. It would simply mean that
some animals have more in common with humans than previously
thought, and that the methods of animal psychology would
have to be adjusted accordingly.

angles.

He can detach himself from his locus in time and

place by the use of symbols.

Man appears to be the only

creature who can form the idea of a "thing" in the sense of
a distinct and permanent occurrence.

That requires a mind

which endows perceptions with complex and enduring meanings.
In man, any number of images may enter symbolically into the
perception of an orange, so that we are not only aware of
what is immediately present to the senses, its silhouette or
color, but can also "see" its extension in space, its soft
ness, juiciness, meat, taste, possible uses, etc.

Symboliza

tion allows the mind to play around phenomena, to fit them
into contexts of the past, present, and future.

To the

animal, objects do not seem to have this quality of being
separate and permanent entities in a wider world, but instead
receive their content from a present need.

For the hungry

*

dog a bone is "something to eat," for the playful dog "some
thing to play with."
of the moment.

Whatever it is depends on the desire

It can not be imagined apart from an immed

iate urge.
What is sometimes called animal language consists,
not of symbols, which denote meanings detached from a present
perception, but of signs— a bark, growl, or the like, trig
gered by what is in the animal's awareness at the moment, as
for example, a hostile gesture in another animal.

Susanne
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Langer argues that the mind of even a very clever dog is "a
simple and direct transmitter of messages from the world to
his motor centers."
but symptomatic.

OQ

A n i m a l ’language" is not symbolical,

Aristotle was getting at the same dif

ference when he said that "speech is something different from
voice."

29

Human language is an ability to think and talk of

things in their absence, to entertain ideas which need not
have any relation to

a

present practical need.

The point is not that animals lack intelligence.

If

by that word is meant "either adjustment to the immediate
30
environment or adaptive modification of environment,"
many
animals must be said to possess it to a high degree.

The

point is that the animal lacks, or has just the barest rud
iments of a type of intelligence and imagination which
involves detachment from the here and now.
In man, all experience automatically undergoes what
Susanne Langer calls "symbolic transformation."^1

The

stream of perception and impulse is broken up and trans
formed.

Its content is spread out before the eyes of the

2®Langer, Philosophy in a New K e y , p. 37.
^Aristotle, The Politics, intro, and trans. by
T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 28.
^°Cassirer, An Essay on M a n , p. 33.
■^Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 33-54, passim.

47

mind in symbolical form.

Man is not immersed in his own

impulses, but has a perspective on them.

Whether he wants

it or not, he is presented with an opportunity to analyze
and evaluate them.

He is not caught in some chain of stim

ulus and response.

In Cassirer's words:

There is an unmistakable difference between organic
reactions and human responses.
In the first case a
direct and immediate answer is given to an outward
stimulus; in the second case the answer is delayed.
It is interrupted and retarded by a slow and complica
ted process of thought.^2
Reinhold Niebuhr speaks of a specifically human "conscious
ness of consciousness" or "self-transcendence" which "expresses
itself m

terms of memory and foresight."

33

In the inner

monologue which is characteristic of man, present percep
tions, memories/ and projections are freely manipulated to
fit whatever purpose he has in mind.

Whereas the animal

seems forever bound to its peculiar pattern of behavior, man
can imagine himself in new circumstances.
f
The human being is aware of himself as a part of a
greater whole.

He has a world.

tured view of reality.

He is capable of a struc

He can study his environment sci

entifically, and he can build imaginary worlds.

To be

32Cassirer, An E3say on Man, p. 24.
33Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. vol. 1
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), p. 72; see also
pp. 68-74, passim.
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human is to he creative.
is culture.

Where there is human life, there

The process of symbolization which underlies

this activity is an essential part of what we have called
man's spirituality.
being . . .
ronment.

Max Scheler writes:

"The spiritual

is no longer subject to its drives and its envi

Instead, it is 'free from the environment' or . . .

'open to the world.1
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The same aspect of man's spiritual

nature is described by Paul Tillich:
Man has a world, namely a structured whole of innu
merable parts, a cosmos, as the Greeks called it,
because of its structured character which makes it
accessible to men through acts of creative receiving
and transforming. Having a world is more than having
an environment. 5
Symbolization makes man free in a sense in which the
animal is not.

It also presents him with a unique problem.

How is he to guide his actions?

The animal is deeply sunk

in instincts which help direct its behavior.

It is secure

in inherited natural drives that fit it into the environment.
Since man's self-awareness is constituted by a certain
detachment from his own drives, it is highly questionable to
talk about instincts in a human context.

In man, Arnold

Gehlen points out, the steady, stereotyped instinctual

*
•^Scheler, Man's Place in Nature, p. 37.
33Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (New York: Harper
& ROW, 1963), p. 19.
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patterns found in the animal have been torn down.

At the

most, humans may be said to have "instinctual residues."
They are "instinctually insecure."

They must look elsewhere

for guidance.36
Like the animal, man is full of impulses and desires.
But they do not automatically result in action.

They are

absorbed into the human inner monologue where they are
mingled with other impulses.

Symbolization transforms every

thing into infinitely complex combinations.

In the medium

of human consciousness it becomes impossible to distinguish
clearly this drive from that.

To take just one example, it

is not possible to separate the sexual urge in man from such
other influences as a will to power, a sense of beauty, or a
wish to procreate.

There are in man no ready-made guides to

action, and it is not possible to sink back into instinct.
The unique type of self-awareness which is engendered by
symbolical thought makes man subjectto the vagaries of his
own imagination.
The specifically human way of structuring life is for
man to impose rules on himself.

For "instinctually insecure"

man, as opposed to the animal, it is necessary to create

36

These phrases are used by Gehlen in Anthropoloerische
Forschung, where he also shows that in man culture has taken
the place of instinct.
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Sattern

of behavior.

Out of this need for self-discipline,

dictated by his special nature, grow the norms of culture.
These are not the result of blind spontaneity, but of a con
scious intent to escape the chaos which is always possible
in the animal symbolicum.
The findings of the philosophical anthropologists
support the old Aristotelian notion that man is by nature a
social being.

Social life begins with man's ability to step

outside of his here and now.

Because he is not bound to any

one perspective on himself and his environment, but can
enter imaginatively into any number of points of view, he
can put himself in the place of others and share meanings
with them.

Symbolical thought forms the basis for all kinds

of cooperation and organization.

It is the necessary pre

requisite for grasping the idea of a role, and thus the idea
of a society.

As the animal 3ymbolicum. man can think of

himself as playing a part in a greater scheme.

Only a mind

capable of that kind of reasoning can have a conception of
politics, constitutions, and other laws.

Contrary to what

is the case among animals, humans have an elaborate social
awareness.

The difference between herd instinct and social

consciousness is not one of degree but of kind.

It makes

little sense to talk, as does Maurice Duverger, for instance,
of "animal societies" with "politics," "authority," and
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"organized power."

37

These terms have real meaning only in

a human context, that is, a context of symbolical activity.
They can be made to fit animal behavior only after they have
been redefined to the point of almost complete removal of
their original

human content. As John Dewey points out, "no

amount of aggregate collective action of itself constitutes
a community."

38

The human frame of reference
For the political scientist to adjust his methods to
the spiritual reality of human self-awareness and the type of
freedom it involves represents a great improvement over the
attempt to reduce man for purposes of scientific explanation
to a common level with biological organisms or physical
things.

But neither can man be regarded as a mere economical

creature, a skillful organizer with an ability to calculate
how best to satisfy his desires now and in the future, as
some political scientists would seem to contend or imply.39
Symbolical activity permits the discovery of enlightened

■^Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics
Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 6-12, passim.

(London:

■^John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, p. 151.
3^For examples of reasoning that goes in that direc
tion see Downs, Economic Interpretation, and William Riker,
The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale Univer
sity Press, 1962).
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self-interest, but it also makes possible the entertainment
of ethical ideals.

It permits man to evaluate himself

morally by enabling him to contrast his present state with
an

image of what his life should really be like.
If anything stands out in the history of culture,

is

it

that man has used his ability to think in symbols to

express his sense of moral right and his sense of the divine.
Man is an ethical and religious being with corresponding
needs.
God.

Many will deny that there is a moral absolute or a
That does not change the fact that man is forever

struggling with the ethical question of right and with the
religious question of man's relation to the divine.
human is to have these concerns.

To be

They will not go away just

because from time they are pronounced irrational or meaning
less.

One may even doubt that they cease to bother those

who claim to regard them in that way.

It appears to be

human nature to break out of such attempts to restrict the
process of self-interpretation characteristic of man.
It should be sufficiently clear from the above argu
ments that what is specifically human about man, a certain
kind of self-consciousness

involving a trans-subjective

sharing of meaning and with an ethical and religious dimen
sion, is not accessible by the same kinds of methods which
are used to investigate physical things or organisms.
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Inasmuch as man's spiritual nature is the very mode of social
life, empirico-quantitative methods, understood as an approx
imation of the principles of natural science, will serve the
social scientist poorly.

What is needed is a humanistic

approach, one which puts a premium on familiarity with and
respect for the facts of the living reality of distinctively
human behavior.

As has already been argued in different

ways, human action must be examined "from within," that is,
from within the highly complicated conceptual structure
whereby man understands his own existence and guides his
behavior.
That does not mean that what is loosely called "empir
ical facts" can be ignored.

They provide indispensable

information about political man.

Many types of speculation

and hypothesis need verification by reference to them. What
should not be forgotten is that the nature and importance of
such facts can be known only in the light of a general phil
osophical understanding of human nature which deals with
human meanings on their own ground.

Drawing on our discus

sion about the symbolical character of consciousness, we can
see that the term "empirical fact" is a highly ambiguous one.
In socio-political life, what is such a fact?

The word

"empirical" supposedly refers to phenomena which are perceived
by the senses.

According to Frank Sorauf, political science

54

is "committed to the proposition that knowledge of social
behavior and institutions must come from experience, from
sense perception of events in the real world."

40

Such a

view of the source of knowledge reveals a basic vagueness.
To the extent that man is aware of phenomena, they have
already been taken up in the medium of symbolical thought.
That means that they have been endowed with complex meanings.
The fact that an impression is received through the senses,
whatever that means, does not make the phenomenon present
itself to man in no uncertain terms.

As a part of human

consciousness it is fitted into and understood through a
complicated pattern of preconceptions, memories, taboos,
ideals, and prejudices.

A so-called "empirical fact" is

pregnant with symbolical content.

Par from being self-

evident with respect to its own reality, it has to be deci
phered.

Only after philosophical reason has determined the

nature of the "fact," that is, its place in the vast concep
tual structure which constitutes man's knowledge of reality,
is it possible to know by what method it should be investiga
ted.

Even "empirical" political reality turns out to be

much more complex and unpredictable than is allowed for by

^°Frank J. Sorauf, Perspectives on Political Science
(Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1965), p. 22.
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"the scientific method" in the strict empirico-quantitative
sense.
An ethical theory of democracy, then, regards gov
ernment as belonging to a specifically human, spiritual order
of activity with a definite ethical end.

Such a theory

draws on what we may call humanistic evidence, facts about
man illuminated by philosophical self-knowledge.

As we have

already hinted, that does not mean that the scholar is thrown
back on his own subjective experience.
has a dimension of universality.

Human consciousness

The process of symboliza

tion that pervades human experience makes few meanings rad
ically inaccessible to men in general.

In fact, social life

must be viewed as a trans-subjective existence.

Symbolical

thought allows the individual to transmit his own experiences
to others and make the experiences of others his own.

Art

in its many different forms is a striking recognition of
that fact.

Evidence about man’s ethical conscience and its

normative authority is available from all those who have
taken it seriously and tried to determine its role in the
structure of human existence.

Self-knowledge is a dynamic

process in which the testimony of others, reflected in part
in the cultural traditions of mankind, is tested against
direct personal insight, made possible to a large extent by
that testimony.

It is doubtful that one can really distin

guish between that in one's knowledge of the self which comes
out of one's own private experience and that which has been
contributed by others.

Private and trans-subjective are

dynamically and inextricably related.

Paradoxically, self-

discovery is a social, cultural process.

It will be argued

in particular later that the pursuit of the ethical life is
a supra-individual task.
To give an ethical interpretation of democracy is to
appeal to the commonality of moral experience.

Unless men

have available to them, potentially at least, a common frame
of reference grounded in reality itself, arguments about the
human condition could never convince, but only flatter.
Needless to say, men are likely always to have differences
of opinion regarding the precise nature of ethical conscience.
But arguments about it assume that a certain view comes
closer to the truth than other views.

The fact that the

individual has to decide for himself what to believe does
not mean that truth about the form of ethical deliberation
is subjective.

Truth is a universal commanding acceptance,

because it refers to reality.

To speak of ethical exper

ience as inherently and exclusively subjective is to rule
out agreement on what is moral.

An overlapping of individ

ual preferences in some particular case does not by itself
constitute moral agreement, for it need not involve a shared
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understanding of the essential meaning and purpose of human
life.
Those are many today who deny that there is a com
monality of moral experience.

They maintain that arguments

about the normative validity of ethical judgments are sci
entifically pointless.

It is contended that as social sci

entists we must keep "facts" and "values" separate.

It is

not possible here to give a full-fledged refutation of this
attempted dichotomy.

A criticism of it has been implied and

will be implied in the following chapters.

We have to limit

ourselves at this juncture to the suggestion that the "factvalue" distinction becomes plausible only when a "fact" is
conceived as some sort of independently existing, static
phenomenon, and not as a part of, and means in, man's effort
to achieve a comprehensive graBp of reality.

The symbols by

which a "fact" has meaning set it in this wider context and
are thus reminders of the totality to which it belongs.
That totality becomes what it is partly because of man's
conceptual structuring of experience.

But experience is

already guided by and understood through this continuous
process of interpretation, so that reason and will, intellec
tual and moral activity, are in effect developing together
in a dialectical fashion.

They are indissolubly intertwined.

To try to extract from a "fact" its "value" component is
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only to conceal from view that what is designated a "fact"
is simultaneously and unavoidably assigned a positive or
negative role in the achievement of the comprehensive goal
whose value is necessarily affirmed whenever the designa
ting activity is performed.
When men differ in matters of theory, it is not
always the result of divergences in formal logic.

Our way

of interpreting reality, our sense of proportion and value,
is the result of innumerable acts of will and related concep
tual adjustments in the past.
Thus, in the sciences of man . . . there can be a valid
response to "I don't understand" which takes the form,
not only "develop your intuitions," but more radically
"change yourself." This puts an end to any aspiration
to a value-free . . . science of man. A study of man
is inseparable from an examination of the options
between which men must choose.41
Such an examination requires not only an intellectual
absorption of abstract ideas, but an orientation of the
whole personality which connects the symbols with exper
ience.

Obviously, intelligent choice presupposes a standard:

"The superiority of one position over another will. . . con
sist in this, that from the more adequate position one can
understand one's own stand and that of one's opponent, but

^Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences
of Man," The Review of Metaphysics XXV, (Sept., 1971). 47-48.
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not the other way around.

It goes without saying that this

argument can only have weight for those in the superior
position.Par

from indicating moral or intellectual

arrogance, this statement, which expresses an ancient and
fundamental insight, simply points out that a view of reality
is superior to another by virtue of its conceptual comprehen
siveness and intrinsic worth.

The quoted passages emphasize

the close relationship between ethical and intellectual
activity and raise the question whether those who embrace the
•fact-value" distinction are doing so because in the given
sense they have mastered the opposing older view, inspired
by the classical and Judaeo-Christian experience, and found
it wanting, or because they have failed to do so.

Philosoph

ical scholarship aims at the most complete understanding of
reality.

The modern attempt to separate "facts" and "values"

and the related tendency to accept only so-called "empirical
facts" as a source of reliable knowledge, we may venture to
say, represent a contraction in the interpretation of exper
ience.

The proper remedy for extravagant claims and pre

mature certainty in moral matters is not a refusal to inquire

42Ibid., p. 47. For other arguments against the
"fact-value" dichotomy see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and
History (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1953), espec
ially chap. 2; and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), especially the
Introduction.
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into the validity of statements about the good for man, but
VP"

a more scrupulous analysis of moral experience as it relates
to various aspects of life.
To those who embrace the dominant modern view, the
notion of an ethical interpretation of democracy will seem
subjectivistic and presumptuous.
moral?"

"Who is to say what is

But is it really presumptuous to suggest that

arguments about man's ethical life can be tested against
objective reality, to submit that our feelings of moral
obligation are not just impenetrable enigmas of subjectivity,
but have a trans-subjective, trans-temporal origin and focus
which can be illuminated by philosophy?
total knowledge can safely be ruled out,
imply an eventual cessation of argument.

Since perfect and
this view does not
The belief that an

objective principle of morality exists does not end, but
gives rise to inquiry.

In point of fact, is it not less

presumptuous to say that the good for man is a matter about
which we may profitably argue, than

to refuse to entertain

the idea that reliable knowledge in this

area is possible?

The latter attitude, although allegedly expressive of
intellectual humility, would actually seem to have in it a
considerable measure of dogmatism.

An attempt to interpret

democracy in the light of a serious consideration of man's
sense of higher destiny, we may at least hope, should help
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to diminish rather than increase the threat of intellectual
capriciousness,

it places a central part of human exper

ience and its relation to basic problems of politics under
the purview of critical examination.
The next step in our development of an ethical inter
pretation of democracy will be to try to discern the general
form taken by ethical awareness and activity.

In what way

does man grasp and affirm his transcendent goal?

Since we

are postulating the intrinsic worth of the structuring
influence of ethical conscience, such a "formal" approach
is at the same time necessarily a study of the substantive
content of morality.

We shall be arguing, for instance,

that ethical conscience is experienced as a restraint on
impulse.

That is another way of saying that a certain type

of self-restraint has moral worth.

Having analyzed the pro

cess by which moral order is realized, we shall be looking
for its implications for the organization of popular rule.
Our ethical philosophy will be clarified and related to the
institutional questions of democracy through a careful exam
ination of Rousseau's theory of popular government.

This

analysis will help to demonstrate the close relationship
between ethics and politics and, more specifically, the
serious moral difficulties with the concept of plebiscitary
democracy.

By way of elimination, our argument will move

in the direction of a more tenable position.

We shall con

clude with a consideration of the concept of constitutional
democracy.

The purpose is not to develop some sort of moral

"casuistry" of democracy tied to an elaborate set of
institutional prescriptions.

Our investigation is best

described as a search for the general principle for the
reconciliation of the needs of the ethical life with popular
self-rule.

We shall just barely begin the important and

very difficult task of applying this principle to the var
ious practical problems of democracy.

II. THE ETHICAL LIFE

It has been argued in a preliminary fashion that pol
itics has a transcendent moral end and that a truly civ
ilized society is possible only where the demands of the
ethical life are recognized and respected.

A treatment of

the implications of that relationship for democracy requires
a more extensive explication of the ethical philosophy which
is being postulated.

More detailed answers must be given to

these questions: What is the nature of the ultimate standard
by which the quality of social and political life has to be
judged and to which democracy, like other forms of governmsnt,
must be adjusted?

How does the structuring principle of

m a n ’s ethical life order his actions?

Before that principle

is related to democracy, it also needs to be related to the
more general ideas of community and culture.
Man's ethical conscience has been described earlier
as a sense of sacred purpose.

The latter term lends itself

to a religious interpretation.

For some Christians, we have

said, it might seem preferable to speak of the guiding
presence of the Holy Spirit.

Although it is not the inten

tion here to introduce a theological perspective, it is
doubtful that man's ethical life as understood in the fol
lowing discussion could be sharply distinguished from
63
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religion.

Even if not bound up with a certain theology, a

life centered in the recognition of a transcendent spiritual
goal for man would appear to come very close to it.'*' Alle
giance to an ethical end conceived as an ultimate of mean
ing and worth could involve a spiritual commitment similar
to that which is ordinarily associated in the West with the
worship of a personal God.
The view of the ethical life which will be developed
here is deeply colored by the Christian tradition, but it
also draws on the classical teaching of Plato and Aristotle
whose theology is quite different from that of Christianity.
Our purpose is to give an. account of moral experience while
staying short of theological claims about the nature of the
divine reality in the direction of which man is pointed by
ethical conscience.

Ethical philosophy does not have to

compete with theology.

It leaves the possibility open of

putting the elements of the ethical life in a broader con
text. It does not necessarily deny the claim that the facts

^"Paul Tillich is prepared to use the word "faith"
even about those who do not believe in transcendent reality,
those he calls "humanists." Their lives may still center
around an "ultimate concern," and "if faith is understood as
the state of being ultimately concerned about the ultimate,
humanism implies faith." Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 62. We are dealing
here with a "faith" that does have a transcendent object.
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of the ethical life take on additional significance when
viewed from the privileged perspective of revelation.

At

the same time, if the structuring principle of man's ethical
life is a manifestation of divine reality, it is evident
that what philosophy can say about it has theological ram
ifications.
We are proceeding on the assumption that up to a cer
tain point, which probably can not be clearly defined, the
ability to grasp the facts of man's ethical life is not
dependent on accepting a particular theology.

A Christian,

a Buddhist, a Platonist, and an Aristotelian, for example,
all recognize the presence in man of a transcendent spir
itual awareness and a tension between that sense of higher
destiny and contrary inclinations.

Their differing theolog

ical views do not necessarily preclude far-reaching agree
ment
on the basic nature of man's moral predicament.
t
But what about the person who claims to have no ink
ling of a transcendent goal for man?

Will he be without

referents in personal experience for the following account
of the ethical life?

It should be stressed in response that

the term ethical conscience is not intended to signify some
unique, specialized reality revealed only to a privileged
few.

To be sure, some must have a less confused conception

of it than others, as is true of any subject; varying degrees

of insight are implied in the recognized need for philosoph
ical scholarship.

While it can not be ruled out categor

ically that there are actually individuals who completely
lack what we call ethical conscience, few would flatly deny
that they have any "conscience" at all.

It is hard, if not

imposible, to imagine a human being who does not have his
moments of moral guilt, remorse, and reassurance.

Many will

hasten to point out, however, that their "conscience" is of
course "nothing but" internalized social norms, "merely" a
mask for their own selfish interest, or the like.

They will,

in other words, admit having a "conscience," a recurrent
sense of moral censure or approval, but attempt to explain
away whatever moral authority it wields over them by
introducing an explanatory theory which rules out the pos
sibility of objective moral judgments.
To find referents in personal experience for our
account of the ethical life it is not necessary to give up
the idea that "conscience" in the loose, day-to-day sense of
the word, is a veil before subjective and possibly even
blatantly selfish intentions.

It would be difficult to dis

pute that men's purported ethical motives are usually
mingled with morally dubious content.

Perspicacity regard

ing the influence of such elements on human action must
indeed be considered an asset in the ethical philosopher.

It is necessary, however, for those who depreciate "con
science" to make room for the possibility at least that what
little moral authority is carried by it may be more than
arbitrary.

What has to be given up, to put the same thing

differently, is dogmatic relativism or nihilism.

The facts

of the ethical life must be allowed to stand without the
restrictive interpretation put on them by relativistic or
nihilistic theory.

This may be too much to ask, for such a

concession would involve more than just a suspension of
judgment.

What is needed is a measure of that ethical in

sight whose existence is the very subject of controversy.

The duality of human nature
Central to the ethical philosophy that informs this
study is the idea of the duality of human nature.

Since the

term "dualism" has been used by different philosophers in
different ways, its meaning here needs to be delineated with
considerable care.

It goes almost without saying that we

cannot hope to establish conclusively the validity of the
concept of dualism which is being advanced.

That would

require lengthy philosophical arguments far beyond the scope
of this investigation.

What can and should be done is to

present the concept with some thoroughness and to locate it
roughly within the Western philosophical tradition.

68

The following discussion of some aspects of the dual
ity of human nature will combine independent reflection with
reliance on the ideas of other thinkers.
Plato and Aristotle will be apparent.

The influence of

Much use will also be

made of the thought of Irving Babbitt (1865-1933) and Paul
Elmer More

(1864-1937), two important American philosophers

. .
2
and literary critics.

Whatever their differences on the theological level,
the classical Greek philosophers and the leading Christian
thinkers who together laid the foundation for the traditional
Western view of man are at one in asserting that man is a
creature of two worlds.

He partakes of two intimately rela

ted and yet distinct orders of reality, one immanent and

2

Irving Babbitt taught most of his life at Harvard.
He was a professor of French literature, but his works deal
as much with philosophy and ethics. Paul Elmer More was
partly an academician, teaching at Princeton, for instance,
partly a literary journalist, in which capacity he was
editor-in-chief of The Nation. His numerous philosophical
and literary works include books on Plato. Together, Babbitt
and More were the main source of intellectual inspiration
for the cultural movement called the New Humanism, whose
influence was most powerfully felt in the 1920s and 1930s.
Among those who can be said to have belonged to it or
absorbed many of its ideas are T. S. Eliot, Norman Foerster,
Austin Warren, and, more tangentially, Walter Lippmann.
Our interpretation of Babbitt's and More’s ideas
owes much to Folke Leander’s philosophical study. The Inner
Check. A Concept of Paul Elmer More with Reference to
Benedetto Croce (London: Edward Wright Ltd., 1974; herein
after referred to as Inner check).

finite, one transcendent and infinite.

For Plato, the cen

tral and most glaring fact of human existence is the paradox
of the One and the many, the coexistence in life of Unity
and multiplicity. Order and disorder.

There is thrust on

the philosopher, the simultaneous awareness of a Purpose of
being, an End of Meaning and Worth, and of an opposing real
ity tending by its own nature towards nothingness.

Perhaps

the most persistent of all philosophical themes is summed up
in these words: "Man is a strange mixture of being and nonbeing."

3

Human life is a perpetual and ever-changing flow

of thoughts, impressions, feelings, and actions, yet amidst
this endless variety and motion, man is able to retain an
image of human identity and perfection.
a chaos of multiplicity.
it together.

He is not lost in

His world has a center which holds

There is in our consciousnes, Irving Babbitt

observes, "an element of oneness somewhere with which to
measure the infinite otherwiseness of things."^

Disorder is

modified by the mysterious presence of a principle of order.
In ethical terms this fundamental dualism of human existence
can be defined as a tension between the universal Good and
all that thwarts its purpose in the world.

•^Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 11.
^Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership (New Yorfc:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 9.
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Before continuing, it should be made clear that the
present discussion is concerned with the element of ethical
order in life.

We are interested in that aspect of the par

adox of tie One and the many which Plato himself regards as
fundamental.

While it is not necessary for the purpose of

this study to explore at length the types of order that do
not have a distinctively ethical origin, the existence of
that complication must be remembered.
The paradox described here by the word "dualism"
should be understood as prior to all theoretical undertakings,
as the very starting-point of philosophy.

It is the primor

dial given of man's immediate awareness of reality.

The

paradox of dualism is the category in terms of which philos
ophy may attempt to describe reality but beyond which it
cannot go, because it is itself constituted by it.

The same

thought is expressed somewhat differently by Irving Babbitt:
"Life does not give here an element of oneness and there an
element of change.
ing.

It gives a oneness that is always chang

The oneness and the change are inseparable.”5

Man does

not somehow fluctuate between the two poles of his being,
living then in the one, now in the other.

To be human is to

5Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism (Cleveland:
World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1964), p. 7.
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live in both at once, to know order and disorder by each
other.
The concept of dualism which is being developed needs
to be distinguished from other attempts to deal with the
same basic paradox.

Few philosophers fail to recognize in

some form the tension within man's awareness of reality, but
many are led to interpret it in terms of a single principle
which supplants the paradox and denies its essential reality.
The attempt to go beyond the dualism which is directly given
in human consciousness results either in a denial of
transcendence, as in various naturalistic philosophies, or
in a deification of immanent reality, as in the case of Hegel.
Hegel is more sensitive than most to the dualism of being,
but by trying to subsume it under the categories of an
idealistic monism, he comes close to denying the existential
reality of the tension which his dialectic logic is supposed
to comprehend.
The classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition with
which we are identifying has for the most part resisted the
temptation to resolve the paradox by some such metaphysical
means.

As against naturalistic denials of a transcendent

order of morality it has affirmed on the basis of concrete
human experience man's ability to know that reality.

As

against attempts to identify man with the divine it has
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insisted, likewise on the basis of concrete human experience,
on the finitude of all human achievements.
Neither should our conception of dualism be mistaken
for the distinction between body and soul which has played a
considerable role in Western philosophy.

The tension of

concern here is that between the totality of finite human
reality and the infinite demand placed on that reality by
ethical conscience.

To the realm of the finite belongs not

only our bodily characteristics, but elements of the human
self which may be said to be a part of the "soul," such as
our sensate feelings, emotions, imagination, and reason.
Body and soul, then, are not to be regarded as separate,
distinct entities, but as an organic unity which stands over
in its totality against man's transcendent sense of perfection.
In spite of some lingering ambiguities in both tradi
tions, the Platonic body-soul dichotomy and the related
Christian flesh-spirit dichotomy should be viewed as only a
symbolical rendering of a tension which is actually between
man as an organic whole of body and spirit and the sense of
higher destiny which is both immanent in and transcendent of
the human self.

"The body" and "the flesh" express symbol

ically the disruptive, destructive, evil inclinations of the
human will as diverted from its true end.

The logic of participation
The task of grasping philosophically the coexistence
in life of order and disorder is not made easy for the modern
Westerner whose mind is steeped in the iogic of natural sci
ence.

He will be prone to view the elements of human con

sciousness as "things."

Our explication of the paradox of

dualism will seem a strange assertion of the compatibility
of incompatible substances.

Philosophical terms like "unity,"

"multiplicity," "finite," "infinite," and "dualism" are
likely to acquire a mathematical coloring.

The result will

be a mental picture drastically opposed to the meaning which
the various terms are intended to convey.

Reifying logic

will miss the poiht of this discussion, for its natural ten
dency is to reduce reality to a single level of spatial
entities, whereas we are actually considering an irreducible
spiritual paradox.

The idea that the human self is at the

same time and in the same respect changing and remaining the
same, an ordered unity and a locus of disorder, will appear
incomprehensible.
But this notion of simultaneous order and disorder is
perfectly reasonable to another type of thought, the kind we
use when we recognize our own enduring identity as moral
subjects in the midst of a perpetually changing inner and
outer life.

Every new moment in a person's life is unique,
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and he is therefore never the same, yet he knows himself to
be the same as he has always been.

In grasping this fact

about ourselves and others we use a type of logic which is
suited to the data of spiritual experience as we are con
scious of them, not indirectly through mechanistic, quantita
tive analogies, but directly in our immediate awareness of
reality.

It is a dialectical, humanistic logic which does

not try to explain away, but simply reflects the existential
tension in man between immanent and transcendent.

g

Only if reifying thought-processes are set aside for
humanistic philosophy, is it possible to grasp the idea of
participation fmethexis) by which Plato gives conceptual
form to the paradox of dualism.

According to this idea,

finite man participates in, shares in the infinite.

The per

son who acts with a view to realizing the goal of ethical
conscience becomes a part of the transcendent purpose of
existence.

By striving to embody it in his personal life he

brings into the finite world a measure of harmony and order.
Human activity always remains in the realm of the imperfect,
but in individuals, peoples, and civilizations inspired by
the universal Good it is enlisted in a higher cause and
raised to a new dignity.

^The logical problem of dualism is discussed in Leander, Inner Check.
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While man's ethical life is never completely ordered
or disordered, he tends to gravitate in either direction.
Some men will have but a vague conception of the moral goal
for man or lack the strength of will to adjust to its demands.
To them, more than to others, life will appear meaningless,
disjointed, absurd.

Others will recognize ethical conscience

as pointing us towards life's fulfillment and try to live up
to it.

While such men will not escape all feelings of mean

inglessness, life is likely to impress them more with its
element of meaning.

Employing the Platonic terminology, it

may be said that they are participating in the Good.

The higher and the lower self
The mysterious dualism of human life has been
described by Babbitt and More as an opposition in man between
a higher and a lower self.

The latter term refers to the

human will not guided by ethical conscience.

The former

term, which is synonymous with ethical conscience, refers to
that in our being which pulls us in the direction of our own
true humanity, that is, towards the realization of our highest
potential as defined by a universally valid standard.

Man

is not merely a set of impulses striving towards their
fulfillment.

There is in him this constant stream of drives,

emotions, impressions, and ideas; as unaffected by ethical

discipline and propelled by the mood of the moment it is
also called by Babbitt the "temperamental" self.
also has a special kind of self-awareness.

But man

Not only does he

have the ability to examine analytically the contents of his
own consciousness, which is a rational process that does not
go beyond the "lower" or "temperamental" self.
capable of an ethical assessment of himself.

He is also
At the back of

his mind the individual carries a sense of what his life
should really be like.

With reference to it he passes judg

ment on his present state and on his plans for the future.
Man's ability to view life from a moral perspective is
precisely what is meant by the "higher self" or, in our ter
minology,

"ethical conscience."

As a result of moral self-examination the individual
may repudiate even strong inner drives in favor of what he
has determined to be an ethically acceptable course of action.
In his better moments he lets his own deepest insight into
how he ought really to live prevail over the ethically
unstructured inclinations of his lower self.

Against the

limitless possibilities for imperfection and disorder open
to the individual stands the spiritual force of ethical con
science, which holds out the hope of a truly meaningful exis
tence .
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It is crucial to understand that ethical conscience
is not an impulse among others.

Babbitt and More express an

important insight when they refer to it as the "inner check, "
thereby indicating that it brings order by restraining the
flow of human intentions.

Morality is never an easy yield

ing to the impulse of the moment.
of will.

It demands the exercise

Because it frequently requires the interruption or

holding bach of strong drives, it may involve considerable
pain.

Neither is the discovery of one's own moral short

comings, which is the necessary prelude to

a moral reorienta

tion of action, a pleasant experience. It

is not a coin

cidence that when the word "conscience" is

generally used,

it is most often the painful element of censure that is
emphasized: "I have a bad conscience," "my conscience bothers
me," "my conscience won't let me."
The point here is not that the occurrence of ethical
conscience is always accompanied by pain; we shall be arguing
later that allegiance to it is attended by a sense of hap
piness.

What should be noted is that the tension within man

that is introduced by ethical conscience is of a special
kind.

It must not be confused with the internal conflicts

that grow out of the multiplicity of human drives and desires.
These are frequently at cross purposes with each other, and
this may indeed cause anxiety and other forms of internal
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strain.

Tensions of that kind are not an example of moral

struggle or guilt, but are contained within the lower self.
The tension in man which is ethically significant is that
between the infinite variety of human drives, on the one
hand, and that special will in man which always wills the
same end, the universal, moral End, on the other.

In rela

tion to the multiplicity of inclinations which make up the
lower self it is experienced as a restraining, censuring
influence.

7

Ethical conscience in one of its aspects is man's
true humanity revolting against the outreaching of arbitrary
impulse.

Babbitt and More are severely critical of those

who tend

to invest the unstructured expansiveness of the

human will with moral authority.

"As against the expan

sionists of every kind," Babbitt writes, "I do not hesitate
to affirm that what is specifically human in man and

7

Sigmund Freud, by contrast, attempts to account for
the existence of moral standards within a monistic, natural
istic framework. His notion of the super-ego forms part of
a theory of the self-regulation of instinctual energy. What
ever the strengths or weaknesses of particular points in his
psychological theories, his failure to make room for a
transcendent source of morality ("We may reject the exis
tence of an original, as it were natural, capacity to distin
guish good from bad." Civilization and Its Discontents tNew
York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962], p. 71) and thus rec
ognize the essential duality of human nature is of a reductionistic variety which limits severely the value of his
ideas to ethical philosophy.
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ultimately divine is a certain quality of will, a will that
is felt in its relation to his ordinary self as a will to
refrain.
It should be repeated that we are dealing with the
ethical origin of order.

We have opposed to it the "impul

ses,11 "spontaneity," and generally undisciplined nature of
man's lower self.

As has been indicated before, there is in

human life not only order of an ethical kind.

There may be

a certain order or consistency even in the life of the most
unconscionable person, who in our terminology would be ruled
predominantly by his lower self.

He may pursue his morally

questionable goals with a high degree of efficiency and
skill, giving thereby a kind of structure and coherence to
his existence.

In relation to the ultimate standard of human

action, the ethical End, his life is disordered and undis
ciplined.

Although in a sense not just impulsive— they are

organized by the motive of efficiency— his actions are eth
ically unrestrained.

Still, one speaks of the impulsiveness

or temperamental drift of the lower self with less danger of
being misunderstood when considering a life-style which,
after the fashion of romantic and vitalistic philosophies,
exults in spontaneous feeling and action.

The fundamental

^Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 6.
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distinction to be kept in mind, however, is that between a
life tending towards immersion in the lower self, be it
rationalistic or romantic, and an ethically disciplined life.
When using the word "impulse" we are employing it in
the wide sense of positive human energy, as a name for the
power which carries human action, mental and physical.
"Impulse" is not understood as being necessarily blind or
unthinking.
The human self, then, is a mysterious unity of two
opposing wills, one of which tends to predominate.

That man

is repeatedly drawn into disharmony and destructivity, or
sin, to speak religious language, is a glaring fact of his
existence.

But his very awareness of moral evil points out

the duality of his will.
good will.

He could know evil will only by

We have not only a self which left to itself

pulls us in the direction of selfish and transitory goals,
but a self that wants what is universally good and enduring.
The higher and the lower self together form the human person.
Still, by the paradox of dualism only our higher will is
recognized by us as our true nature.

It carries a special

authority, the defiance of which has special consequences,
namely feelings of moral guilt.
One of the striking features of modern ethical thought
is a tendency to declare that various human experiences are

81

not really what they are felt to be.

"Conscience," it is

said, does not represent any objective principle of morality.
It can be only a manifestation of subjective norms.

The

trouble with this and similar allegations is that they do
not cover the facts.

They lay claim to universal validity,

but they do not explain or account for the compelling nature
of the sense of moral duty experienced in conscience.

If as

intelligent human beings we must recognize that conscience
is in actual fact "nothing but" the workings of "internalized
social norms," why do we continue to behave nevertheless as
if conscience had a moral authority of its own?

Why do

people feel guilt and self-contempt when they go against
their innermost notion of how a human being ought really to
live?

If the modern allegations about conscience are accep

ted as true, those reactions can only be put down as irra
tional.

To argue, for instance, that men respect moral

norms only for fear of punishment or losing the approval of
their fellow humans is simply to ignore that ethical con
science is known precisely by the fact that it compels the
individual in a certain direction regardless of what the
social expectations happen to be.
It should perhaps be repeated at this point that the
nature and direction of the moral authority of conscience is
not, and could not be, as readily apparent to everyone.

Ethical conscience cannot be described as a distinct voice
in each man which states mechanically and without ambiguity
the moral course of action in each and every situation to a
passively waiting individual.

It is a sense of direction

which acquires a more definite form, that is, becomes asso
ciated with a certain type of life, and reveals more of its
compelling nature only as the individual makes an active
effort to guide his behavior by it, a process which carries
over also into his intellectual, conceptual grasp of reality.
In the person, on the other hand, who is more inclined
towards a life of sensual gratification, emotional indul
gence, or ethically uniformed rationality, it is entirely
possible that the strong onrush of desire or ambition will
almost drown out the "still small voice" of ethical con
science.

To the extent that a person in the latter category

does have moral qualms about his life, moreover, he may well
be prevented by his relative lack of ethically structured
experience and knowledge from identifying the root cause of
his uneasiness.

The nature of ethical conscience cannot be

adequately grasped in isolation from a notion of the type of
life which is already ordered morally and intellectually.
Moral guilt can be properly recognized as such only within
this ethical and conceptual frame of reference, supplied
partially by traditions which incorporate a long process of
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culture.

This is another way of saying that the nature of

ethical conscience is revealed only very imperfectly and
ambiguously to the person who is morally confused, as defined
by ethical conscience itself.

In the extreme case of a per

son who is also mentally disordered, the problem would be
compounded.

The removal of confusion, then, is not a simple

matter of deciding to "listen to conscience," for ethical
conscience becomes known to man through a whole orientation
of will and reason.

Ethical insight must be viewed as the

crowning achievement of an entire cultural tradition.®
Man's actual experience of ethical conscience, whether
in the form of a sense of censure or approval, makes a non
sub jectivistic interpretation highly palatable, even unavoid
able.

By its very nature, moral guilt would seem to be a

sense of having done violence to a norm that is not merely
arbitrary.

If the norm that has been defied were indeed

only subjective, and recognizable by man as only subjective,
the feeling of guilt would be a mystery.

Categorical rel-

ativistic or nihilistic assertions about conscience come up
against this difficulty: In the moment of guilt itself at
least, men are not able to convince themselves of the truth
of that view of morals.

The guilt is there.

The feeling is

®The important role of tradition in man's ethical
life will be explored later in this chapter.
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a sense of having violated a sacred purpose? the latter is
compelling precisely because it makes subjective wishes
irrelevant or unimportant.
tion

No amount of abstract explana

which may later be tacked on to the experience can

change the sense itself.

The allegation that conscience is

in reality a mere code-word for subjectivism of one kind or
another leaves its moral authority unexplained.
Moral self-contempt and reassurance shows up the
duality of the self and the existence of a true human iden
tity.

We are not just playing with words when we think and

speak of ourselves in a dualistic manner: "I am not myself,"
"I betrayed my own conscience," "I pulled myself together."
By a certain abstract type of logic this use of the word "I"
is blatantly contradictory, but by the logic of actual human
self-awareness it presents no problem.
wills.

We are beings of two

In More's formulation:

We do not know the flux by the inner check, or the inner
check by the flux, or either of these by some other
element of our being, but we are immediately and inexplic
ably conscious of both at once— we are both at once.-*-®
At the same time, only the inner check can be said to be
man's true sel f . ^
^-®Paul Elmer More, "Definitions of Dualism, " Shelburne
Essays, vol. 8 (New York: Phaeton Press, 1967), p. 249.
i^-Cf. Romans, 7:19-23.
"For the good that I would I
do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I
do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin
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Ethical conscience as a principle of censure and a sense of
purpose
Morality points man beyond the flux of changing cir
cumstances.

Although finite, he is aware in ethical con

science of a transcendent destiny.

Adjusting his life to

this lasting goal of human existence he reproduces in this
world a measure of that order which he 'knows as the essence
of life.

We need to look closer at the process whereby

moral order is brought into the finite world.

How does the

individual come to participate in the Good?
Let it be suggested that moral choice begins in a
doubt.

The idea of an alternative line of action is not

going to occur to a person as long as he has no question
about the rightness of his present course.

All of a sudden,

however, there may come to him the feeling that what he is
doing or about to do is fraught with moral danger.

Where

before there was unquestioning activity, there is moral
uncertainty.

He is confronted by an internal inhibition, an

uneasy sense that performance of the intended act would
violate a sacred principle.

A tension has appeared between

that dwelleth in me.
I find then a law that, when I would
do good, evil is present with me.
For I delight in the law
of God after the inward man:
But I see another law in my
members, warring against the
lawof my mind, and bringing me
into captivity to the law of
sinwhich is in my members."

what he is planning to do and what he ought to do.

It has

struck a pause in the flow of impulses embodying his orig
inal plan.

Instead of steady, uninterrupted activity there

is a doubt.

The halting of outgoing impulses allows the

person an opportunity to scrutinize and reevaluate his inten
tions.

A new perspective has been opened up in the light of

which he may contemplate alternative lines of action.

The

essential fact about the inner monologue which is triggered
by the stirring of moral doubt is that it is guided by this
principle: a moral course must be sought.

The inhibition

which sets him deliberating consists precisely in the rec
ognition that this motive was lacking in or unsuccessfully
applied to his original plan.
The person who acts on the opportunity afforded him
by moral doubt will, if he is lucky, come up with a course
of action which is not censured, as was his old one, by nag
ging moral dissatisfaction.

He will feel morally reassured.

A new determination will fill him.

Action is released.

The

set of impulses which embody his new plan are felt by him to
be in consonance with his true purpose as a human being.

He

has not acted arbitrarily, but with a view to the universal
good for man.
A present act or plan of action is thus censured by a
pang of moral doubt.

This interference with outgoing impulse

is what Babbitt and More call the "inner check."

It estab

lishes a spiritual contrast between ethically unordered
activity and the higher goal intended for man.

There is,

let it be repeated, considerable significance in saying that
this end is apparent to man in the form of a "check, "
"inhibition," or "negation."

These terms indicate that eth

ical conscience is not just a human drive among others which
sometimes manages to overpower competing impulses.

It is

not possible to explain ethical order as the self-regulation
of impulse.

Such an attempt would ultimately end up in

clearly unsatisfactory notions of instinctual guidance,
which ignore the human reality of* conscious intent.

Ethical

conscience is an interference "from without" with positive
human energy.

It can order action, because it transcends it.

Belonging to the realm of the infinite, it is experienced by
man with reference to the endless variety of finite human
emotions, ideas, and desires as a principle of censure; it
wills not the multiplicity of imperfect human acts but the
Perfection of the ethical End.
Nothing could be more tempting than to believe that
one's own inclinations carry the authority of divine command.
Different theories which tend to regard man's spontaneous
wishes as the voice of God have the double attraction of
flattering the individual and relieving him of the need to

exert the will.

Not only is ethical conscience not to be

identified with impulse.

It is doubtful that it can be

identified with positive human intentions at all.

Human

actions and plans are finite, ethical conscience an expres
sion of infinite will.

For that reason it cannot really be

said, except in a very special sense, that ethical conscience
gives specific commands.

The person who thinks that he is

positively ordered to perform this or that act needs to
remember that while his motive may be that of ethical con
science, concrete human acts fall short of perfection. Man's
higher self points him in a definite direction, that of the
moral End, but it does not assure attainment of the goal.
Ethical conscience makes us aware that we must not
act arbitrarily, pursuing selfishly our own interests or
those of our own group, but that we must instead act morally,
seeking the common good which transcends all particularistic
wishes.

It wants our every action to advance that purpose.

The ethical course, however, is not revealed to us in the
form of concrete, detailed prescriptions for particular cir
cumstances.

What is moral in the particular situation may

require considerable deliberation.

Even the person who is

truly inspired by the motive to act morally may fail in his
purpose, for the successful planning and execution of action
involves not only a motivating principle, but pragmatic
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reason together with a factual grasp of the pertinent cir
cumstances.

As Aristotle points out, "goodness in itself is

not enough; there must also be the power to translate it
into action."

12

However powerful a man's reason or plentiful

his knowledge, he can never predict with certainty the con
sequences of his actions.

To be able to achieve at least

some success in finding the moral course a person must not
only have the right motive, but wisdom and prudence regard
ing ends and means.
Strictly speaking, then, ethical conscience only
reveals the spirit in which we must apply our mental and
physical resources.

Moral behavior is a human creation

conceived under its guidance.

That does not mean that the

standard of morality itself is subjective.

Ethical con

science always wills a definite course of action, the moral
course, and motivates man to seek it, only man has to dis
cover its concrete form in the particular case.
Ethical conscience is not only a principle of censure.
If it were, it would be a mere negation of human life,
demanding ascetism or even death.

As already indicated, it

is also felt by man as a sense of spiritual purpose.
does not always manifest itself as a check on impulse,

^Aristotle, The Politics, p. 263.

It
it
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gives a kind of approval to certain actions by withholding
its censure.

Having first bothered an individual with a

moral doubt, a sense of threat to his higher destiny as man,
it may then suddenly lift its ban when a new course of action
is contemplated.

That is another way of saying that it gives

a kind of sanction to it.
in man's moral purpose.

The action is felt to participate
A set of impulses are, as it were,

endowed with the tacit endorsement of the higher self.

In

this special sense, and then only if it is remembered that
the action may not in the end produce the intended result,
it may be permissible to say that ethical conscience
"commands" certain actions.

The idea of a moral command

need3 to be understood in conjunction with the idea that
ethical conscience is also that in man which predisposes
against premature certainty regarding the morality of speci
fic acts."^
The paradox of moral freedom
We are approaching the very center of the paradox of
dualism: moral freedom.

Man must act to realize his sacred

-^Our notion of ethical conscience, then, should not
be confused with a type of moral "intuitionism" which
ascribes to specific moral judgments a self-evident, incon
trovertible character. What can be said to be 'feelf-evident"
according to our theory is not ordinarily the morality of
thi3 or that act but the obligation to seek the moral course.
Cf. Mary warnock, Ethics since 1900 (London: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1960), pp. 56-78.
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destiny, but the freedom to do so both is and is not of his
own making.
Going about his business a person is suddenly aware
that he is free to repudiate his present intentions.

Myste-r

riously, out of the clear blue, there is a recognition that
he is now moving towards a morally questionable goal.

An

ethical perspective on what he is doing is opened up.

He is

presented with a moral choice.

Where there was smug compla

cency or a blind pursuit of ethically unworthy ends, there
is an opportunity to reevaluate and reconstruct.

In one

sense, the freedom to recover one's moral purpose is not of
man's own making.
reject.
grace.

It is there, a free gift to accept or

It seems appropriate in this context to speak of
It should be noted that this opportunity to choose

is indissolubly bound up with a sense of moral direction.
The moment of ethical choice is not an open-ended predic
ament.

Whenever we say moral freedom, we also say moral

duty or responsibility, for its origin is the interruption
of impulse by ethical conscience.

Man can perhaps be said

to be "on his own" in that he does not any longer have to
follow his previous immoral plan.

But the stirring of eth

ical conscience is by its very nature a call to respond
affirmatively.

The individual is invited to act morally.

His freedom consists in being able to take advantage of the

opportunity-

To resign it is merely to revert to the tyranny

of spiritually destructive actions and their necessary con
sequences.

That means giving up freedom.

In the most pro

found sense of the term, moral freedom is to act in accor
dance with the true end for man.

The term does not signify

that man is somehow left to carve out his own destiny in a
morally undetermined universe.
is sacred and compelling.

The end of ethical conscience

Its authority can be defied, but

not repealed.
The paradox of moral freedom has another aspect.

The

moral person does not passively wait for ethical conscience
to interfere with those of his impulses which embody an
unethical plan.

Although transcendent of finite human real

ity, ethical conscience should not only be viewed as order
ing life from the "outside."
ing human persons.

It is the higher self of act

The moral man is striving to be moral.

Although he knows that he may be censured when he least
expects it, he proceeds on the premise that by trying to act
morally he will actually come closer to the goal.

In Chris

tian language, one might say that he believes that those who
seek shall find.
The moral man does not act at random.

Prom ethical

experience he knows that man's true humanity lies in one
direction rather than another.

He has a memory of being
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internally censured or reassured when acting in certain ways.
As a result of innumerable choices in the past his personal
ity has been aimed in such a direction as to avoid some of
the more obvious pitfalls.

Also, he is dependent in his

search for the moral not only on private experience.

He has

access to the general experience of mankind as reflected in
long-honored ethical norms.

These sources of moral insight

form the basis for the development of habits which build a
certain ethical momentum into his character.
But what does it mean to try to act morally?
not to go ahead before having asked the question,
plan moral?"

It means

"Is this

It means to put oneself in the frame of mind

where the voice of ethical conscience will not be drowned
out by the onrush of strong impulse.

But the very opportun

ity to scrutinize intentions from this higher point of view
before letting them pass into action presupposes a reprieve
from the flow of ethically unstructured impulse.
the occurrence of the inner check.

It requires

When we talk of trying

to act morally, therefore, we are actually already talking
about man acting from inside his higher self.

By the par

adox of dualism, a person's sincere wish to act morally is
already an opportunity to do so.
ifestation of ethical conscience.
tion cannot be commanded.

The wish itself is a man
In a sense, moral inspira

It is there, or it i3 not.
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But, by the paradox of dualism, it will come to him who seeks
it.

Morality as happiness
The preceeding argument has been an attempt to des
cribe man's moral predicament.

It has focused on the nature

of ethical conscience and sought to show how it orders human
life.

Since the discussion has been largely formal, nagging

questions of this kind will be lurking in the background:
"But what, in substantive terms, is the Good?"

"What,

specifically, is a moral and immoral principle of conduct?"
These questions raise an inexhaustible subject.

To even

begin to answer them it would be necessary to relate our
notion of ethical conscience to the moral traditions of man
kind.

The Westerner is particularly indebted for his know

ledge of what is moral to the classical and Judaeo-Christian
body of experience and speculation.

The Oriental has availr

able to him sources of insight of similar depth and penetra
tion.

What we are exploring here, however, is not so much

the normative content of ethical conscience as its way of
operation.

Morality may be described as a progressive

discovery, resulting from a dynamic interplay of ethical con
science, as experienced directly by the individual, and the
moral insights of humanity, as reflected in long-respected
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ethical norms.

We have been trying to describe the process

whereby ethical conscience reveals man's transcendent destiny.
But the workings of ethical conscience are indistin
guishable from the intrinsic worth of its operation.

We

have hinted throughout at the positive content of its
effects in our use of such words as "meaning," "harmony,"
and "worth."

We shall try to show later in this chapter

that ethical conscience is the origin of social community.
Even with much longer explications of these terms than can
be given here, it would not be possible to show what the
Good is in itself.

That issue can be dealt with up to a

point by philosophical argument, but has to be settled
ultimately by direct moral experience.

It is recognized

that without eliciting referents in the reader's personal
experience what little has been said and will be said on the
subject here aan only seem thin and abstract.

Our primary

objective is to describe the form taken by ethical activity.
However, some additional remarks regarding the positive
worth of moral activity may help shed more light on the
nature of ethical conscience.
Man's higher will is in one of its aspects a sense of
spiritual direction.

In the person who is continually try

ing to order his life by it, it may be described as a sense
of happiness.

The latter word has been cheapened by assoc
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iation with romantic sentimentalism and by the general vul
garization of terms.

It is used here in the sense given it

by Aristotle.
There are innumerable standards by which one may
assess the quality of life, such as economic production,
personal freedom, security, and sensual satisfaction.
of these can be regarded as measures of good.

All

The central

concern of ethical philosophy is the ultimate principle with
reference to which the relative goodness of everything else
may be judged.

Aristotle observes that all human activity

aims at some good.
rank.

All goods, however, are not of the same

Among ends available to man that is superior to all

others which is sought for its own sake.

". . . w e call

final without qualification that which is always desirable
in itself and never for the sake of something else."

14

Aristotle clarifies by adding:
. . . honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we
choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted
from them we should still choose each of them), but we
choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that
by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the
other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor in
general, for anything other than itself.-1-5
Set above competing goods there is thus a standard,
definable in one of its aspects as happiness, in terms of

14Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 11 (1097a ).
15Ibid., p. 12 (1097k).
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which everything else must be evaluated.

Something is good,

in the strict sense of the word, to the extent that it
contributes to happiness.

It is essential to point out that

happiness as Aristotle understands it is not simply a feel
ing of well-being among others.

It is a special kind of

awareness beyond particular acts and their respective sat
isfactions.

The successful completion of action always

results in some sort of pleasure, just as the interruption
of action always causes some pain.
moral acts.

That is true also of

The pleasure that follows upon their completion

is not happiness, but only a passing feeling of satisfaction.
Happiness is the awareness of the unvarying element in moral
ity, the Good itself, in which individual moral acts are
only participating.

It is the sense of meaning and worth

which attends a whole life orientation, marked by continuous
effort to seek, not transitory, particularistic, selfish ends,
but the enduring, universal, ethical End known in ethical
conscience.

The happy man is not an Epicurean skillfully

maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain.

Neither is he an

ascetic who renounces all pleasure.

He is the man who finds

pleasure in the right things: " . . .

those things are both

valuable and pleasant which are such to the good m a n . " ^

16Ibid., p. 262 (1176b ).
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In accordance with this important distinction between
happiness and pleasure it is quite possible for a moral per
son to be deprived of success in his dealings and thus also
of pleasure, and still be happy, because of the intrinsic
value of the orientation of his character.

Plato describes

the lot of the true philosophers who in a decadent age are
denied the influence which is their due:
. . . they'll find no ally to save them in the fight for
justice; and if they're not prepared to join others in
their wickedness, and yet are unable to fight the general
savagery single-handed, they are likely to perish like a
man thrown among wild beasts, without profit to them
selves or others, before they can do any good to their
friends or society.
In spite of the fact that the good life is thwarted around
them, happiness is not beyond their reach, for their own
commitment to the Good is not diminished by their lack of
success in influencing their contemporaries.

Having sought

to keep themselves "unspotted from wickedness and wrong in
this life," they will "finally leave it with cheerful composure and good hope."

17

The most extreme illustration of the

same idea, perhaps, would be the martyred saint.

Conversely,

a person may be highly successful in realizing his plans and
thus live a life of pleasure, and yet be unhappy, because of
the low moral quality of his goals.

It should be added that

i7Plato, The Republic, intro, and trans.byH. D. P. Lee,
rev. 2d ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 292.
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according to Plato and Aristotle a life of pleasure and hapiness tend to go together under normal circumstances.
To counter a possible misunderstanding it needs to be
made clear that Aristotle does not regard happiness as some
sort of passive state.

"We must," he says, "class happiness

as an a c t i v i t y H i s view of the proper end for man can
be summed up by saying that it consists in a special type of
activity which makes man happy.

". . - to each man there

comes just so much happiness as he has of moral and intellec
tual goodness and of performance of actions dependent thereon.

19

Such activity, in other words, is its own reward.

", . . it is something final and self-sufficient, and is the
end of action."

20

Because Aristotle calls the very culmina

tion of this activity "the contemplative life," the modern
student used to a non-classical conception of reason stands
in danger of underestimating its ethical element.

The activ

ity of the good man is first and foremost a process of moral
betterment.
The ascent to happiness is a difficult and protracted
one.

It requires a steady commitment to virtuous action.

^Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethic3, p. 261 (1176**).
•^Aristotle, The Politics, p. 257.
^Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 12 (1 0 9 7 ^).

"For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day;
and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man
blessed and h a p p y . A r i s t o t l e distinguishes between three
levels of human life.

The lowest, which is preferred by

"men of the most vulgar type,"22 does not aim beyond the
pursuit of pleasure.

Superior to it is what he calls the

"political" life, which presupposes considerable moral
attainment and enlists prosperity and other goods as means
in the cause of the good life. Higher still, too high, indeed,
for all but a very few, is the contemplative life,

that

in which happiness is achieved to the fullest, as far as it
is humanly possible.
goods.

It requires only a minimum of worldly

This highest level of life has many important points

of contact with the Christian notion of saintliness.
It should be emphasized in conclusion that happiness
is conceived by Aristotle as a social, communal value.

It

is self-sufficient, not in th$ sense that it is "sufficient
for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but
also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his
friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizen
ship."^

Aristotle's idea of happiness cannot be distin-

2llbid., p. 14 (1098a ).
22Ibid., p. 6 (1095*3).
23Ibid., p. 12,

(1097^).
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guished from his idea of true friendship, which may be defined
as community in the good life and possible only between men
of virtue.
The Aristotelian notion of a self-justifying higher
activity, which is a realization of life's true end and
accompanied by happiness, is closely analogous to the Chris
tian notion of love.

It is the Good for the sake of which

all other goods are, or ought to be, sought.

It is manifes

ted in man's life "in so far as something divine is present
in him."24

At this point the religious person will want to

put his own theological interpretation on the terms.

We

shall refrain, however, from taking up a theological line of
argument.

The ethics of community
Man is by nature a social being, said the classical
Greek philosophers.
ian thinkers.

They were joined in that view by Chris-

It has been a fundamental tenet of the tradi

tion they started that social life aims beyond cooperation
for the attainment of material well-being and social peace
to the realization of the good life.

Against the background

of the above analysis we are better able to understand the
process by which this goal is approached.

24Ibid., p. 265 (1177b ) .
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We have argued previously that man is capable of
cooperation because of his ability to think symbolically.
This ability makes possible the planning and organization of
activity which is a necessary prerequisite for all social
life.

Indeed, we have indicated that symbolical conscious

ness, which is the distinctively human mode of thought, is
in essence a social faculty; symbols are not private posses
sions but detached meanings usable in isolation from the
experience to which they refer.

It has also been observed

that social cooperation has as one of its origins the purely
selfish human wish to escape the grimmer aspects of the war
of all against all.

To that argument we added the important

point that without the recognition of an ethical, that is,
self-justifying, goal above competing selfish interests,
social peace will be highly precarious and ultimately
succumb to the centrifugal forces of partisan wills.
remains to discuss how man realizes the good life.

It
It is of

man's capacity to achieve that goal that the classical and
Christian political philosophers are primarily thinking
when they assert that man is by nature social.

Because they

are concerned not simply with social living, but with the
good life, - the role of ethics takes precedence.
Social life may be viewed as promoting a wide array
of activities and corresponding values.

They can be classed

as ethical, intellectual, aesthetical, and economical,^
defining politics as cutting across these lines.

By a civ

ilized society we mean one where these pursuits have attained
a high level.

Since the worth of everything must ultimately

he judged by its contribution to the final purpose of life,
civilization first and foremost signifies ethical attain
ment.

The intellectual, aesthetical, and economical life of

a society may be said to be truly civilized to the degree
that these activities serve the ethical goal.

While their

respective values of truth, beauty, and economy (efficiency),
may have their own organizing principle or intrinsic standard
of perfection, they fulfill their proper role only as they
advance the purpose of the Ethical.

By this definition, a

society which has reached a high level of efficiency in
attaining its goals, but whose efficiency does not measurahLy
serve the realization of moral ends, would not be civilized
in the full sense of the word.

The point is vividly illustra

ted by the early success of the Nazi war machine.

Similarly,

a society which exhibits a high degree of intellectual activ
ity, but which is only marginally concerned with discovering
the truth about the ethical life would be only marginally
civilized.

The moral goal for society to which all other

^Thi3 way of categorizing human activity is sugges
ted by Benedetto Croce.
2
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goals are subservient and of which they are ideally suppor
tive we may call community.
We have argued that man is torn between spiritually
disruptive and unifying inclinations.

In a social context,

the disintegrative pull of a person's lower self will put
him in conflict with his fellow men.

His own particularis

tic wishes will clash with those of others.

An uneasy soc

ial peace may be maintained through the restraint suggested
by enlightened self-interest, but to the extent that men
lead ethically undisciplined lives, community in the real
sense of the word will be impossible.

Community can emerge

only in a society where the centrifugal forces of egotis
tical interests are tempered by concern for the common good.
By disposing us against what is merely arbitrary and
selfish, ethical conscience disposes us against what sep
arates us from others.

It wills, not what is in the private

interest of certain individuals or groups, but what is good
for its own safce.

That end is at the same time the good for

the individual and the good for all.

To the extent, there

fore, that men are ruled by ethical conscience, they are
unified with others.

Just as in the individual moral dis

cipline produces a self-justifying integration of the per
sonality, in society it produces a self-justifying belonging.
Community is human association under the guidance of ethical
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conscience.

Man's true humanity is realized by being shared.

It should be understood that community is experienced between
those who order their lives with reference to the same
universal moral authority.

A moral person who refuses to

participate in immorality around him may well become isola
ted or separated.

The opposite of separation in this case,

however, would not be community.
In one sense, man's effort to achieve the good life
can be said to be an individualistic undertaking.

It is

centered in a moral authority of which the individual is
directly aware in himself.

It is felt to be so closely

associated with his own essential identity that it may be
called his higher self.

He realizes his true purpose by

heeding the Socratic admonition to "know thyself."

Also,

moral betterment can come about only through personal acts
of will.

But the type of individualism we are describing

has nothing to do with an atomistic view of man and society.
The process of spiritual development always points beyond
individual personality.

Man's higher self is not some pri

vate reality, but the potential for true humanity shared by
all.

Its authority is by its own nature universal, that is,

non-individualistic.
all men.

It is binding on and has effects on

This argument connects with Aristotle's teaching

about true friendship, which in his view presupposes some
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moral elevation among the participants. Because ethical con
science wills the same ultimate end in all men, it can be
said with Aristotle that the moral individual "is related to
Of*

his friend as to himself."

The individual person is unique, not by virtue of his
higher self, but by the meeting in his being of the infinite
as known in ethical conscience and the finite as manifested
in his particular mental and physical characteristics,

since

men live under different circumstances and have different
capabilities, ethical conscience does not call men to iden
tical lives.

The professor will be able to advance the

cause of m a n 's true humanity in other ways than the priest
or the businessman, to take just three examples having to do
with the individual's occupational situation.

What should

be carefully noted is that the higher self enlists the
uniqueness of each person in one and the same moral cause,
as far, that is, as that uniqueness is compatible with the
cause.

Whatever the particular circumstances, the goal is

always this: extending the influence of the ethical will.
Community, then, is experienced, not between skill
fully calculating egotists, or, for that matter, between

^6Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 228 (1166a ).
Aristotle's theory of friendship is developed primarily in
books VIXX and IX.
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mere "lovers of humanity" lacking in understanding of man's
spiritual nature and destiny, but between individuals who
are trying to rise above whatever is separative and disrup
tive in their characters to what is highest in each of them.
The life they attain is not based on subjective whim, but on
the supra-individual authority of ethical conscience.
are ordering their
ment

lives with reference to a "centre of judg

set above the shifting impressions ofthe individual

and the flux of phenomenal nature."
each
men.

They

27

They are unified with

other through loyalty to a self which is the same in all
In religious terminology, they are unified in God.
In the context of community, the common good is not

merely a code-word for successful compromise between clash
ing selfish interests.

It refers to the element in human

interaction which transcends private advantage.

Such is the

nature of a living together at a level of some ethical nobil
ity and general cultural elevation.

This type of life,

although personally satisfying to the individuals comprising
it, does not need to be defended by arguments of selfinterest.

It is its own justification.

Whatever contributes

to it can be supported, not because it happens to serve the
interests of this or that individual or group, but because
it fulfills an intrinsically valuable existence.
^Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 9.

It is the

108

societal end for which the civilized man knows that he is
intended.

In community, men have heen brought together at a

common center of values.

In Aristotelian terminology that

center is happiness, in Christian terminology, love.
It should be added that while community is the ethical
goal of society, it will never be completely attained.

That

would presuppose the disappearance of selfish motives from
the face of the earth.

To the extent that it is realized,

community will have to coexist with egotism.

Drawing on our

previous discussion of the relationship between morality and
self-interest, 28 we can say that although the pursuit of
private advantage is not morality, it can to a certain extent
be bent to fit the purposes of the moral life by the ethical
forces of community in the surrounding society, which submit
selfishness to a degree of control.

To take an example, a

businessman concerned only with his own well-being and pleas
ure and trying to make a profit to further that end may
under certain cultural circumstances still help to advance a
higher goal.

Provided that the market demand to which he is

responding is itself cultured and at least partially growing
out of a wish on the part of the buyers to realize moral
ends, the businessman's desire to make a profit, which is

^®See chapter 1, pp. 23-30.
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the reward for having served the consumer efficiently, may
actually give some support to the ethical life.

In spite of

the low moral quality of his own ultimate motive, higher
goals are served by his economic risk-taking and imagination.
Or consider a power-hungry democratic politician who has no
motive for his participation in politics than to enhance his
own personal influence.

In spite of himself, he may in his

opportunistic pandering to the voters actually serve moral
ity, provided that the wishes of his supporters have some
ethical content.

2Q

The ethical life and tradition
In the course of man's search for his own true human
ity there slowly emerges a general sense as to what types of
activity contribute to the goal and detract from it.

In a

society which takes that search seriously, mankind's histor
ical experience regarding the preconditions of a civilized
existence will be a valued source of insight and guidance to
be drawn upon in the development of specific norms of up
bringing and education, of intellectual, artistic, and polit
ical activity.

All of these will help to buttress the kind

of humane social interaction which is ultimately dependent on

29jjeedless to say, the inference here is not that
businessmen are necessarily embodiments of greed or politic
ians the personification of an all-consuming lust for power.
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individual efforts of will.

In such a society tradition

becomes both an expression of and support for the good life.
It helps direct man's will and imagination towards his endur
ing spiritual purpose.
checking

It is a moulding,

formative force

the spontaneous growth of premature, misguided

opinion and behavior.

One might say that in encouraging

in the individual a certain steadiness of action, tradition
serves to make the good life habitual.
Aristotle,

And according to

"moral virtue comes about as a result of habit."30

It should be carefully noted that although invaluable
as a guide to the good life, tradition never gives final
expression to man's higher destiny.

Sound tradition grows

out of an effort to give positive content to man's sense of
spiritual destiny, but that sense ultimately transcends all
specific human forms.
of tradition.

The good life is unthinkable outside

Imperfect man is capable of attaining civ

ilization only because he is born into a cultural context
which incorporates the experience and insight of his pred
ecessors.

The good life is a communal creation, not only in

the sense that it entails cooperation of the living, but
because it involves the efforts of previous generations.
Still, because of the imperfection of all human accomplish-

30Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 28 (1103a ).
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ments and changing circumstances, tradition must not become
an unbending insistence on the status quo.

Attempts to put

the spirit of civilization in a cultural strait-jacket will
stifle and perhaps even kill it.

Conventional beliefs and

norms must be continually evaluated with reference to man's
direct knowledge of the purpose that they are supposed to
advance.

That is not to say that new circumstances and

insights are likely to require basic revisions in the cen
tral principles of life, moral norms among them, which are
found at the core of mankind's cultural traditions.

That

would imply that human nature is undergoing fundamental
change over time, a contention which is hardly supported by
historical experience.

Certain other aspects of tradition,

those having to do with the application of central principles
to new circumstances are more likely to stand in need of
alteration or amendment.
It is not contradictory, but philosophically entirely
consistent, that those who come to value cultural tradition
the most are frequently the same who stress the need for an
imaginative and critical assessment of contemporary society.
Among them is Edmund Burke.

His combination of a respect

for ancient custom and willingness to challenge the ways of
present society is apparent in his classical statement of

the primary qualification of a stateman, "a disposition to
preserve, and an ability to improve."

31

The same outlook is

reflected in Burke's statement that "a state without the
means of some change is without the means of its conservation."

32

Similar views are expressed by one of Burke's

leading American disciples, Russell Kirk.

He writes: "In a

healthy nation, tradition must be balanced by some strong
element of curiosity and individual dissent."

33

It must not

be ignored that "the world does change; a certain sloughing
off of tradition and prescription is at work in any vigorous
society, and a certain adding to the bulk of received opinion goes on from age to age."

34

It should be added that particular societies may well
come into sharp conflict with the cultural traditions that
originally created and sustained them.

The problem then

becomes to determine whether the break with long-respected
principles is indeed the result of new, superior insight or

^^-Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in
France {London: Everyman's Library, 1964), p. 153 (herein
after referred to as Reflections).
32Ibid., p. 19.
33Russell Kirk, A Program for conservatives (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1954), p. 305.
n

i

Russell Kirk, "Prescription, Authority and Ordered
Freedom," in Frank S. Meyer, ed., What is Conservatism? (New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 31.
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III. ROUSSEAU'S "GENERAL WILL":
MORAL FACT OR UTOPIAN FICTION?

Having developed with some care the idea of the dual
ity of human nature and the relation of ethical conscience
to community and culture, we are in a position to examine in
depth the implications of man's moral predicament for the
theory of democracy in a more narrow political sense.

We

need to apply our ethical reasoning to the difficult ques
tion of what institutional arrangements can make popular
rule compatible with the promotion of the ethical life.

Our

moral framework established, we shall turn to a consideration
of one of the most influential answers to that question in
Western political thought, that given by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau in the Social Contract.

An analysis of Rousseau's

argument is suggested by the fact that he is widely regarded
as a founder of modern democratic thought and by the fact
that, directly or indirectly, his ideas form an important
part of the hidden assumptions of much political theory in
the twentieth century.

Our examination of the doctrine of

popular majority rule propounded by this seminal thinker is
intended to bring some of those assumptions into the open
and to expose certain central ethical problems with them
which are usually blurred or evaded in modern thought.
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The following analysis of Rousseau's theory of pop
ular rule will help to develop a fundamental distinction
which, although crucial to democratic theory, is only vaguely
recognized and understood by the more influential theoretic
ians of democracy today.

In his effort to reconcile ethics

and politics Rousseau becomes the champion of a form of pop
ular rule which may be termed "plebiscitary democracy," one
which gives maximum freedom and power to the momentary
majority of the people by leaving no legal obstacles which
cannot be easily removed in the way of emerging popular
wishes.

This type of democracy may be defined in contra

distinction to "constitutional democracy," a form of popular
rule designed to promote, not the instant and complete pub
lic implementation of the most recent will of the people,
but the articulation of the "deliberate sense" of the commun
ity, to use a phrase from the American constitutional tradi
tion.

Popular majorities are subject to constitutional

restraints whose removal would require an elaborate proce
dure and not only persistent but overwhelming popular
support.

The purpose of such a form of government is to

filter out what is merely transitory or premature in the
various expressions of popular will and to enhance the
implementation of what is lasting and well-considered. These
definitions, it may be argued, refer to two essentially dif

ferent conceptions of democracy with vastly different eth
ical implications.

They delineate what may well be the fun

damental theoretical alternative available to the proponents
of popular rule.

Intelligent choice between them requires

a choice between conflicting answers to central questions of
ethical philosophy.

To be able to evaluate the validity of

Rousseau's germinal theory of plebiscitary democracy we must
carefully examine its ethical foundations.

It is our pur

pose to analyze later the concept of constitutional democracy.
An analysis of Rousseau's ideas about popular rule is
the more appropriate here since his thinking involves a few
important concepts and terms which bear a certain resemblanae
to some of those advanced in our previous discussion.

We

have used the idea of a higher and a lower self in man, hint
ing at the possibility of applying it to a whole people.

We

have indicated that the higher self, or ethical conscience,
is not a merely private, subjective will, but a will common
to all men.

Rousseau, by way of comparison, distinguishes

in the Social Contract and elsewhere between the general
will

(la volonte generale), which he defines as the intrin

sically moral will of the people, and the will of all (la
volonte de tous), which is a mere aggregation of their self
ish interests.
(moi commun).

He also speaks of a people's common self
It needs to be determined whether these

I
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similarities are substantive or just terminological and super
ficial.
Rousseau's argument for plebiscitary popular rule in
the Social Contract turns on the notion of the general will.
It will be our task to decide if this concept gives an
accurate account of the possible meeting of politics and
morality in a democracy.

Is the general will the absolute

principle of right that it would have to be in order to
justify the total freedom and loyalty that Rousseau claims
for it?

On the answer to this question depends the adequacy

of the institutional arrangements for popular rule which he
suggests.
We hope to show that there are grave objections to
accepting Rousseau's general will as a guiding principle of
democratic theory.

It is not to be mistaken for the higher

will in man which we have called ethical conscience and to
which popular rule should properly be adjusted.

The thrust

of Rousseau's writings is the rejection of the type of
dualistic philosophy we have outlined and the affirmation of
the essential unity and goodness of human nature.

Morality

in his thought is synonymous with uninhibited impulse.

His

idea of the general will and his endorsement of majority
rule without constitutional restraints, we shall be arguing.
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tences which point beyond and even contradict the normal
tendency of his philosophy.

Although recognizing this

strain, we shall be arguing that in the main the concept of
the general will exemplifies the movement away from a trans
cendent standard of ethics and towards the identification of
morality with politics.

Rousseau himself admits to basing

the Social Contract on the belief that "everything is rooted
in politics and that, whatever might be attempted, no people
would ever be other than the nature of their government made
them.'

His emphasis on the importance of politics might

seem to put him close to Plato and Aristotle, but there are
crucial differences stemming from very different views of
human nature.
The concept of the general will is developed by
Rousseau with the most thoroughness in the Social Contract,
and our analysis will be centered in that text.

It should

be said that we will not be able to give anything like a
comprehensive examination of this work, brief though it is.
It contains a wealth of ideas, and also ambiguities and con
tradictions, which can only be dealt with in part and to the
exclusion of important points.

It may be argued, on the

^Jean-Jacque Rousseau, The Confessions, intro, and
trans. by J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1953),
IX: 377.
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other hand, that an analysis focused on the general will
takes one to the very heart of Rousseau's political thought.
While the Social Contract will be our primary point of ref
erence, it is not possible to understand fully its line of
argument without also consulting some of his other works.
The general will needs to be put in the proper philosophical
context.

This requires a somewhat roundabout approach to

the basic text, including some extensive introductory remarks.
Rousseau insisted to the end on the basic philosoph
ical unity of his writings.

He is supported in this regard

by .numerous commentators who at the same time point to
inconsistencies and tensions inside this larger unity.

The

underlying theme of his works is described by Rousseau him
self in Rousseau Judges Jean-Jacques, where his interlocutor,
surveying Rousseau's books, sees "everywhere the development
of this great principle that nature made men happy and good,
but that society depraves him and makes him miserable."^

In

the Social Contract, which is actually devoted to the prop
osition that there is one type of society that does not have
this effect on man, the same theme is developed with a twist.
The basic unity of Rousseau's works is indicated in
other ways.

In one passage among many where he asserts the

^Quoted in Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy
of Rousseau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968),
p. xiii (hereinafter referred to as Rousseau).

close ties between our central text and other books, he
writes that "all that is challenging in The Social Contract
had previously appeared in the Essay on Inequality.”^

In

the Emile one finds a summary of the arguments that were
later to be published in the Social Contract.

Of the latter

Rousseau writes that it "should be considered as a kind of
appendix" to the Emile and that the two works "together make
g
a single whole."
It becomes still more difficult to regard
the Social Contract as breaking in central respects with the
rest of his thinking, when one considers'that under the
preliminary title of Political Institutions he worked on it
for over ten years, during which time he wrote other major
works.

Far from regarding it as some sort of deviation from

his normal philosophical path, he thought of it as the
treatise that would "put the seal" on his reputation.^

Rou s s e a u the m a n

a n d the t h i n k e r

It is possible to shed light on Rousseau's arguments
in the Social Contract by drawing on his autobiographical
writings as well as his formal treatises.

It has been often

commented upon that it is difficult, or even impossible, in

^Confessions, IX: 379.
^Quoted in Masters, Rousseau, p. xiii, n. 26.
^Confessions, IX: 377.
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the case of Rousseau to distinguish between these two types
of writing.

His frank descriptions of his "private" life

and thoughts must be regarded, in part at least, as state
ments of his philosophy of life.

According to Judith Shklar,

for instance, the Confessions are of "utmost significance"
in understanding his thought, because he regarded it as "a
Q
public act and an integral part of his moral position." The
same can be said of other biographical or semi-biographical
texts, such as the Reveries of a Solitary, which is called
g

by Rousseau an "appendix" to the Confessions.

Many of his

private letters are also philosophically highly informative
and illuminating.
That Rousseau's own character, temperament, and gen
eral attitude towards life are frequently held up by him as
representing an ideal is apparent from the texts themselves,
but becomes easier to understand when one considers in what
high regard he holds himself.

Self-assessments of this kind

are implicitly or explicitly given in many places: "I . . .
believe, and always have believed, that I am on the whole

®Judith N. Shklar, Men and citizenst A Study of
Rousseau's Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969), p. 219.
^Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of a Solitary,
intro, and trans. by John Gould Fletcher (New York: Lennox
Hill, 1971), I: 39 (hereinafter referred to as Reveries).
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the best of men. . . .nl®

Even more specifically and cat

egorically, he claims to be "quite persuaded that of all the
men I have known in my life none was better than myself."11
He admits having vices too, but does not quite blame himself
for them, since he is aware that they are "due much more to
my situation than to myself."12

it is not surprising that a

person who takes this highly favorable view of himself and
who, moreover, is so convinced of his own uniqueness as to
believe that nature had to break the mould when it formed
him,

13

should also judge his private life to be of general

interest and worthy of emulation.
Another self-assessment by Rousseau which should be
kept in mind when interpreting the Social Contract and other
works is the penetrating recognition that "it is as if my
heart and my brain did not belong to the same person."

14

By

the "heart" he means his "passionate temperament, and lively
and headstrong emotions.

15

In innumerable places he draws a

10Confessions, X: 479.
^Letter to Malesherbes, January 4, 1762, Charles W.
Hende1, Citizen of Geneva: Selections from the Letters of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New York: Oxford university Press,
1937), p. 206 (hereinafter referred to as Citizen).
^Letter to Malesherbes, January 12, 1762, Hendel,
Citizen, p. 209.
^ S e e the famous introductory paragraphs of the
Confessions. I : 17.
14Confession3, III: 113.
15Ibid., Ills 112-13.
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picture of himself as a person who always wants to act on
impulse, is moved by his passions, and is frequently
engrossed in feelings and imaginings, ranging from pastoral
dreaming to pantheistic revery and "dizzy ecstacy."^
Rousseau's obsessive impatience with everything that tends
to restrain his inclinations of the moment is too well-known
to require elaboration.

The tendency is summed up in his

statement that "it is hardly in me to subject myself to
restraint." 1

In the Emile the theme of removing checks on

man's spontaneous self is developed into a program of educa
tion, one principle of which is that "the only habit the
child should be allowed to contract is that of having no
habits."

17

Inextricably intertwined with this yearning for

18
unbridled freedom is the view that "man is naturally good."
Rousseau gives this highly instructive key, not only to his
personality, but to his philosophy:

15

Letter to Malesherbes, January 26, 1762, Hendel,
Citizen, p. 214.
•^Confessions, IX: 391.
17

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile,trans. by Barbara Foxley,
with an Introduction by Andre Boutet De Monvel (London:
Everyman's Library, 1969), I: 30.
1O
°Quoted in Masters, Rousseau, p. 3 (emphasis in
original).
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I give myself to the impression of the moment without
resistance and [even] without scruple? for I am per
fectly sure that my heart loves only that which is good.
All the evil I ever did in my life was the result of
reflection? and the little good I have been able to do
was the result of impulse.
The "heart" gives to Rousseau's thinking a pronounced
utopian and romantic slant.

Radically dissatisfied with

society and seemingly constitutionally incapable of coming
to terms with it, he is inclined instead to people the world
by the help of his "creative imagination" with beings more
after his own "heart."

20

But this tendency to escape from imperfect reality
into "an ideal world" believed by Rousseau to be more"worthy
of my exalted feelings,"
of sobriety and realism.

21

is sometimes checked by moments
Speaking about a period of his

life particularly given to romantic revery and worship of
nature, he writes: "However, in the midst of all that, I
confess that sometimes the emptiness of my chimerical dreams
suddenly came to my mind and saddened me."

22

it is striking

1Q
•^Quoted in Ernst Cassirer, The Question of JeanJacques Rousseau (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1963), p. 127 (hereinafter referred to as Question).
2QConfessions, IX: 398.
21Ibid.
22

Letter to Malesherbes, January 26, 1762, Hendel,
Citizen, p. 213.
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how Rousseau's “head," his reason guided by a sense of real
ism, will catch up with his "heart" and force qualifications
of or additions to remarks in a more dreamy vein. It revives
in him an awareness of the imperfection of life.

In his

various writings one comes across perspicacious, piercing,
hard-nosed comments about the human condition remarkably
free of the romantic-utopian slant of the particular work in
which they appear.

These flashes of realism, however, are

seldom more than a temporary counterweight to a strong wish
to let the "heart" speak.
An analysis of the romantic-utopian tendency in
Rousseau's thought is complicated by the fact that his
"heart" does not always crave the same thing. His works are
full of the glories of an idyllic, pastoral, and anarchic
existence, but in some of them, like the First Discourse, the
Social Contract, and the book on the Government of Poland, there
are also examples of what may be termed Rousseau's Spartan
mood, under whose influence he extolls the virtues of polit
ical discipline, nationalism, and soldierly life.

Both in

clinations, it should be carefully noted, incorporate a pre
occupation with freedom in the sense of an absence of
restraint. The anarchic bent reflects this propensity in the
case of the individual person; the spartan bent projects the
same yearning on to the collective level where freedom is inves
ted in the general will, which is subject to no checks.

For good reasons the Social Contract is widely regard
ed as one of Rousseau's most sober, least romantic works.
It does have less of an emotional and impressionistic flavor
than some of his other books.

Rousseau gives as his inten

tion in the Social Contract "to employ solely the power of
reason."

23

That remark, on the other hand, is not made in

any attempt to depreciate the "heart."

Since the Social

Contract is a treatise on political morality, it is impor
tant to be aware of Rousseau's reminder that "by reason
alone, unaided by conscience, we cannot establish any nat
ural law, and that all natural right is a vain dream if it
does not rest upon some instinctive need of the human heart.'
Not even the Social Contract can be regarded as a
treatise of moral and political realism.

As will be dem

onstrated, it is shot through with utopianism.

It might

perhaps be viewed as representing an effort to fuse the
"head" and the "heart," the latter predominantly Spartan in
this work.

The attempt is closely related to what we may

regard as Rousseau's basic purpose in the Social Contract:
to state the conditions for the recreation in a social con
text of the natural goodness and freedom which belongs to
man in the state of nature.

Reason, Rousseau believes, is

2^Confessions, IX: 378 n.
24Emile, IV: 196.
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not fully developed in that primitive but happy 3tate, but
can achieve its true role and potential in civil society
under the right circumstances.

The problem is to make sure

that it does not remain an instrument for the depravity of
conventional society, but takes its inspiration from man's
true nature.

This attempted bringing together of the "head"

and the "heart," it is interesting to note, cannot be said
to involve an ordering principle transcendent of both.

A

careful reading of the Social Contract suggests that there,
too, it is the "head" that has to catch up with the "heart"
rather than the other way around.

The tendency to hide dif

ficulties and blur distinctions, which is largely attrib
utable to Rousseau's utopian bent, is frequently checked but
seldom supplanted.

The state of nature

In order to put the idea of the general will in the
proper context Rousseau's concept of the state of nature
needs to be examined.

It is evident that it is central to

his political thought and philosophical doctrine in general.
In the First Discourse Rousseau argues that civilization has
degraded and corrupted man.

Deeply alienated from society,

he identifies with the plight of the descendants of his own
century who will beg "Almighty God" to "deliver us from the
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enlightenment and fatal arts of our forefathers, and give
back to us ignorance, innocence, and poverty, the only goods
2R
that can give us happiness and are precious in thy sight."*3
This and many other passages in his works raise the muchdebated question whether Rousseau wants a return to a prim
itive, pre-civilized existence.

It is doubtful that it can

ever be answered with finality.

Rousseau himself appears

not to have reached a definite conclusion, but wavers depend
ing on his mood and the subject at hand.

Especially in cer

tain autobiographical passages he seems to be longing for
some sort of pre-societal, anarchic life:
. . . I have never been truly accustomed to civil soci
ety where all is worry, obligation, duty, and where my
natural independence renders me always incapable of the
subjections necessary to whoever wishes to live amongst
men.
But in other places he rules out the possibility of actually
returning to a primitive existence.

In Rousseau Judges Jean-

Jacques he claims to have shown in his works that humanity
was happier in this "original state," but he goes on to say
that "human nature does not turn back.

Once man has left it,

he can never return to the time of innocence and equality."27
^6jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Disr
courses, ed. by Roger D. Masters and trans. by Roger D. Mas
ters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1964), First Discourse, p. 62.
26Reyeries, VI: 132.
27
Quoted in Cassirer, Question, p. 54.
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Even in the Emile, which displays more of an individualistic
and anarchistic tendency than the Social Contract. Rousseau
denies that when he sets out to "train a natural man" he
wants to "make him a savage and to send him back to the
woods."

28

But the clearest indication that he does not

envision, or even hope for, a return to pre-societal condi
tions is the following passage in the Social Contract:
And although in civil society man surrenders some of the
advantages that belong to the state of nature, he gains
in return far greater ones; his faculties are so
exercised and developed, his mind so enlarged, his sen
timents so ennobled, and his whole spirit so elevated
that, if the abuse of his new condition did not in many
cases lower him to something worse than what he had left,
he should constantly bless the happy hour that lifted
him for ever from the state of nature and from a narrow,
stupid animal made a creature of intelligence and a man.
Rousseau never makes it entirely clear if he con
ceives of the state of nature as an actual historical state,
or as an analytical tool, or both.

He gives a somewhat dif

ferent impression depending on his line of argument.

The

ambiguity is apparent in his description of it as "a state
which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which
probably never will exist, and about which it is neverthe
less necessary to have precise notions in order to judge our

28Emile, IV: 217.
29jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, intro,
and trans. by Maurice Cranston (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1968), bk. I, ch. VIII: 64-65.
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present state correctly."
question here.

We do not have to resolve the

It is certain that whatever else it is, the

state of nature is a normative and analytical concept.

In

Rousseau's own words, it is employed in an effort of "hypo
thetical and conditional reasonings better suited to clarify
the nature of things than to show their true origin."3

It

is an attempt to isolate that element in human nature which
is not the product of the degeneracy of historical society.
When he writes about separating "what is original from what
is artificial in the present nature of man,"

32

he is con

cerned with distinguishing the depravity of civilized man as
he now exists from his true, essential nature by virtue of
which he can be said to be happy and good.
Rousseau points to two fundamental driving forces in
man in the pre-societal state of innocence.

The most impor

tant is self-love (amour de soi) which is essentially a wish
for self-preservation.

He differs from Hobbes in believing

that "since the state of nature is that in which care of our
self-preservation is the least prejudicial to the selfpreservation of others, that state was consequently the best

30

The First and Second Discourses

31Ibid., p. 103.
32Ibid., pp. 92-93.

(Second), p. 93.
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suited to peace and the most appropriate for the human
race."33

Rousseau also criticizes Hobbes for not having

noticed in the state of nature a second "principle":
. . . pity is a natural sentiment which, moderating in
each individual the activity of love of oneself, contrib
utes to the mutual preservation of the entire species.
It carries us without reflection to the aid of those
whom we see suffer? in the state of nature, it takes the
place of laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage
that no one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice . . . .
These primordial drives together form the core of
man's true nature and are the source of human goodness.
In his quasi-chronological account of the emergence
of social life in the Second Discourse, Rousseau writes with
longing of ’’man in his primitive state . . . placed by nature
at equal distances from the stupidity of brutes and the
OC

fatal enlightenment of cxvrl man.'
was the "happiest" and "best for man."

This state, he thinks,
"...

the human

race was made to remain in it always," and man "must have
come out of it only by some fatal accident, which for the
36
common good ought never to have happened."

In this blessed

state, man's natural inclinations of self-love and pity made
possible both complete individual freedom and independence
and a harmonious living together with others, a life of

33Ibid., p. 129.

34Ibid., pp. 132-33.

33Ibid., p. 150.

36Ibid., p. 151.
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"peaceful anarchy" in Durkheim's phrase.

37

There came a

time, however, when because of the pressure of circumstance
men started to apply themselves to tasks that a single per
son could not perform by himself.

Individual independence

gave way to relations of dependence.
. . . from the moment one man needed the help of another,
as soon as they observed that it was useful for a single
person to have provisions for two, equality disappeared,
property was introduced, labor became necessary. . . . 38
By this process, which created social relations, man's nat
ural freedom was destroyed and "the law of property and
inequality" established.

39

selfish love (amour propre).

Self-love was transformed into
Before, under conditions of

natural equality and lack of interdependence among men, selflove and pity had combined to produce a benevolent iden
tification with others.

Now, aided by the development of

reason, awareness of inequality gives rise to vanity, snob
bishness, contempt, and competition.

No longer is the

individual able to identify with others, he compares himself
to them.

3?Emile Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rousseau (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 135.
38The First and Second Discourses (Second), p. 151.
39lbid., p. 160.
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Existing society, thus, has perverted man's natural
goodness and stifled the natural freedom from which it is
indistinguishable.
does not turn back.

And according to Rousseau human nature
What, then, could men hope for?

Rousseau is opting in the Social Contract for a new type of
society and culture, one of Spartan simplicity and in the
service, not of conventional artificiality and vanity, but,
as far as possible, of man's true nature.

Cassirer states

the problem in this way: "How can we build a genuine and
truly human community without falling in the process into
the evils and depravity of conventional society?"4®

The

goal is to recapture in a social existence, from which there
is no escape, man's original goodness, and to inspire this
existence, including the sciences and the arts, with the
guiding forces of man's natural inclinations.

For Rousseau,

Leo Strauss observes, "the good life consists in the closest
approximation to the state of nature which is possible on
the level of humanity."4-1'
The theoretical task of the Social Contract is antic
ipated in the First Discourse where Rousseau complains of
the lack in contemporary societies of a virtuous devotion

4®Cassirer, Question, p. 54.
^Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 282.
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to the "fatherland.'*

"We have physicists, geometers, chem

ists, astronomers, poets, musicians, painters; we no longer
have citizens. . . .
social cohesion.

What is needed is a new type of

Rousseau sets out to show in the Social

Contract how man's natural freedom can be recreated in civil
society by attaching each individual to a common goal.
"How to find a form of association which will defend the
person and goods of each member with the collective farce
of all, and under which each individual, while uniting
himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and
remains as free as before." This is the fundamental
problem to which the social contract holds the solution.4^
Rousseau claims to have viewed his task in this light:
"What is the nature of the government best fitted to
create the most virtuous, the most enlightened, the
wisest, and, in fact, the best people, taking the word
'best' in its highest sense?" I believed that I saw a
close relationship between that question and another,
very nearly though not quite the same: "What is the gov
ernment which by its nature always adheres closest to the
laW ?-44
The law, it becomes clear in the Social Contract, is
the general will, described by Rousseau as a law that a
people, meaning each member, gives to itself.

This is the

answer to his rhetorical question, "By what inconceivable art

4^The First and Second Discourses (First), p. 59.
4^The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI: 60.
44Confessions, IX: 377.
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has a means been found of making men free by making them
subject. . .?"4J*

Morality or slavery
The analysis of the general will is complicated at
almost every turn by the abstract, utopian nature of much of
Rousseau's thinking.

His proneness to speculate in isola

tion from imperfect reality is illustrated by the concep
tion of slavery which is implied in his famous remark that
"man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains."46
According to Rousseau's definition, slavery entails
"absolute dominion for one party and absolute obedience for
the other."

It means that "you take away all freedom of the

will" from the weaker party.47

On 'the basis of this def

inition, one may ask if there has ever been a genuine case
of slavery.

Is there in the real world an example of a

relationship in which one person has total power over
another?

The subjugated person, it would seem, never, short

of death, completely loses the freedom to defy his oppressor

46Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Political
Economy in The Social Contract and Discourses, intro, and
trans.by G. D. H. Cole (New York: E, P. Dutton & Co., Inc.,
1950), p. 293 (hereinafter referred to as Political Economy).
46The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. Is 49.
47Ibid., bk. I, ch. IV i 55.

137

in thought or deed.

In the extreme case, he can accept

death rather than submission to another will.

Where slavery

is concerned, the master has got only limited power.

If he

wants to get any work out of the slave or avoid his hatred,
he must be willing to give some consideration to his needs
and wishes.

In the real world, in other words, there is

even in a slave-master relationship an element of "reciproc
ity" and "mutual obligation," a recognition of "rights,"
something which Rousseau rules out by definition:

A

q

"The

words 'slavery' and 'right' are contradictory, they cancel
49
each other out."
The same abstract way of thinking marks Rousseau's
criticism of "the right of the strongest."

Surely, that

principle cannot be the basis for obedience to political
authority, he believes.

Such authority, if it is to be

legitimate, must be based on the free consent of the gov
erned.

"Force," he argues, "is a physical power? I do not

see how its effects could produce morality.

To yield to
C Q

force is an act of necessity, not of will. . . .

one of

the many problems with this statement is Rousseau's artific
ially narrow conception of what constitutes "force" in human
^ T h e social Contract, bk. I, ch. IV: 55.
49Ibid., p. 58.
50Ibid., bk. I, ch. Ill: 52.
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relationships.

He ignores such intangible but nevertheless

very important sources of power as intelligence, beauty, and
"charisma."

We have already questioned the idea that yield

ing to force is ever a "necessity."

Implied in this discus

sion of right, however, is a notion of even greater impor
tance, namely that all legitimate political authority must
rest on pure morality.
says Rousseau.

Right has nothing to do with force,

Morality is what it is regardless of the

power of disputing individuals.
But Rousseau is discussing the basis for a lawful
political order.

What about actual legal rights as we know

them in society?

Are they not, in part at least, the result

of a balancing of political power, a result of compromise
under the guidance of more or less enlightened self-interest?
It would seem that an adjustment to "force," in the expanded
sense of non-moral influence, is an almost unavoidable
ingredient in all legislation.

In his discussion of polit

ical right Rousseau simply rules out that laws might derive
some legitimacy from compromise between the various powers
that be.

For political authority to be acceptable it must

rest on morality alone.

This, he believes, can be achieved

by a social contract which is entered into freely on a basis
of equality.

It substitutes "a moral and lawful equality

139

for w h atever physical inequality that nature m a y h a v e
on mankind."

51

Rousseau defines

"right" a n d

"force"

unrealistic w a y that no really legitimate
t o h a v e e v e r existed,

a n d so t h a t t h e

in such a n

s t a t e ca n b e

an ideal which

the

Political

face of h i s t o r i c a l experience.

v i e w s as s y n o n y m o u s w i t h m o r a l i t y ,

state

flies

in

legitimacy he

as h e u n d e r s t a n d s

i t .1

"head" m a k e s R o u s s e a u a d m i t t h a t e v e n in th e

f o u n d e d on the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t

i m m o r a l p o p u l a r will,
b a s e d on m e r e
will.

said

true state he e n v i s 

ions m u s t of necessity be a utopia,

The

Imposed

t h e w i l l o f all,

"force," w i l l

But the

"heart"

prevents Rousseau

it is p o s s i b l e t h a t an

sometimes

which

is p r e s u m a b l y

challenge

the g e n e r a l

d o e s n o t r e l i n q u i s h control.

It

f r o m s e e i n g t h a t as a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r

it

m a y b e necessary to gi v e some p o litical recognition to w h a t
h e d i s m i s s e s a s the w i l l o f all.
of a popular will which
a n d as

the existence

is a n e x p r e s s i o n o f p u r e m o r a l i t y ,

such it alone deserves any consideration.

argued before
of mere

He assumes

t h a t n o c i v i l i z e d s t a t e c a n b e b u i l t on m o t i v e s

selfishness,

human nature

We have

as

however sophisticated.

it is k n o w n

in r e a l

life,

Yet,

given

it a p p e a r s

inescapable that a balancing of conflicting

interests will

53The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. IX: 68.
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always be a fundamental need in politics.

Rousseau is

relieved by his utopian frame of mind from confronting and
dealing with this important issue.

The choice for him is

clear-cut: morality or slavery.

The rebirth of natural freedom
But a utopian slant does not automatically render an
idea in political philosophy worthless.

It may still offer

a valid standard for judging imperfect reality and thus a
sound inspiration for political change.

We need to decide

whether Rousseau's concept of the general will falls in that
category.
The general will is the result of an act of associa
tion, in which each individual voluntarily gives up his nat
ural freedom.

The articles of association, Rousseau writes,

"are reducible to a 3ingle one, namely the total alienation
by each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole
community."

Rousseau is emphatic in his point that "every

individual gives himself absolutely" so that he can no
longer claim any rights whatever.^2

Through the social con

tract his rights are transferred to the collective as epit
omized in the general will.

The latter becomes the inalien

^2The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI: 60.
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able and indivisible sovereign.

Rousseau speaks of the

appearance of "an artificial and collective body" which
"acquires its unity, its common ego [moi commun], its life
and its will."

53

He calls this organism, "resembling that

of man,"^4 "the public person."^5

It is

. . . a moral being possessed of a will; and this gen
eral will, which tends always to the preservation and
welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the
source of the laws, constitutes for all members of the
State, in their relations to one another and to it, the
rule of what is just or unjust. . . .56
By his participation in this will the individual
attains social freedom.

"The public person," Rousseau con

tends, is completely free, for "it would be against the very
nature of a political body for the sovereign to set over
itself a law which it could not infringe."

57

The sovereign

is itself the Law.
Through the ingenious postulation of a "public per
son, " made up of each of the citizens and governed by a will
which is by definition moral and free, Rousseau has recreated
in a social cast the natural freedom which man has lost.
53Ibid., p. 61.
^ Political Economy, p. 289.
^ The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI: 61.
^ Political Economy, pp. 289-90.
57The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VII: 62.
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should be noted that in their international relations each
*

»

«

"public person" is in the state of nature.

C Q

By his partic

ipation in the collective will of the people, the individual
is at the same time totally subjugated to a unifying polit
ical authority and his own master, for the general will
grows out of a will in each person, and "obedience to a law
one prescribes to oneself is freedom."

59

The individual

need not fear a misuse of power by the sovereign, for a body
i

cannot wish to injure one of its own members.
In the civil society which is established by the soc
ial contract, Rousseau argues, human actions become guided
by justice and acquire "the moral quality" they did not have
in the state of nature.

Where before man was ruled by mere

instincts, primary among them self-love and pity, he now has
the use of the developed faculties of man as a creature of
society, including reason.

These together make for a social

consciousness previously lacking.

Through the social con

tract, so we may interpret Rousseau's thinking, these fac
ulties are put at the disposal of man's natural inclinations
to produce a general elevation of the spirit.
a sense of duty and right.

There appears

In the words of John Charvet,

58Political Economy, p. 290.
59The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. vllls 65.
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"the new social consciousness is founded on nature, but at
60
the same time completes it."
It should be injected that also in the Social Contract
Rousseau is vacillating between a chronological and concep
tual analysis, without ever removing the ambiguity.

In his

discussion of the social contract he claims to be speaking
of "the passing from the state of nature to the civil society."

6X

Yet, he is positing that the contracting individ

uals already possess the social consciousness which is also
alleged to be the result of a social existence.
What is it about the social contract that makes it
possible to avoid the degeneration that has afflicted histor
ical societies?

A crucial factor is that it is based on

equality:
. . . the social pact, far from destroying natural
equality, substitutes, on the contrary, a moral and law
ful equality for whatever physical inequality that
nature may have imposed on mankind; so that however
unequal in strength and intelligence, men become equal
by covenant and by right.62

60

John Charvet, "Individual Identity and Social Con
sciousness in Rousseau's philosophy," in Hobbes and Rousseau,
ed. by Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1972), p. 476 (hereinafter referred to as
"Rousseau's Philosophy").
^•*"fhe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VIII: 64.
62Ibid., bk. I, ch. IX: 68.
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It will be remembered that according to Rousseau it
was the appearance of inequality through the idea of prop
erty that gave rise to the perversion of natural self-love
into vanity and other hinds of depravity.

These are symp

tomatic of a lack of identification with others.

This may

be avoided in society, Rousseau believes, by creating the
circumstances under which self-love, which i3 "always good.
63
always in accordance with the order of nature,"
can, as it
were, come into its own again.

"Extend self-love to others

and it is transformed into virtue, a virtue which has its
root in the heart of every one of us."

64

Under the social

contract self-love becomes a powerful moral force, for the
citizens "all pledge themselves under the same conditions
and must all enjoy the same rights."

These conditions of

equality, including an absence of relations of dependence,
make possible the identification of each citizen with all
others.

Together with natural pity, so we may interpret

Rousseau's meaning, self-love inspires a strong sense of
social belonging.

This new type of identification, which is

made possible by the development of man's faculties and
associated by Rousseau with morality, can be said to be
63Emile, bk. IV: 174.
64Ibid., p. 215.
65The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV: 76.

145

"founded on nature insofar as the love of others follows
from and is a completion of one's natural self-love (amour
de soi).1,88
It is important for the proper understanding of the
general will to be aware of the role that Rousseau ascribes
to self-love.

The love of mankind is "nothing but the love

ft7
of justice within us," he points out in the Emile.

This

love of justice, let it be carefully noted, is rooted in
man's primordial instincts.

In an illuminating footnote

essential to grasping Rousseau's conception of morality, he
writes: "The love of others, springing from self-love, is
the source of human justice."

68

The same idea is expressed

in the Social Contract;
How should it be that the general will is always right
ful and that all men constantly wish the happiness of
each but for the fact that there is no one who does not
take that word "each" to pertain to himself and in
voting for all think of himself?
Morality, in other words, is a social version of pri
vate self-love by way of an identification with others. When
one remembers that self-love in the state of nature is
essentially a wish for physical self-preservation, it is not

88Charvet, "Rousseau's Philosophy," p. 478.
67Emile, bk. IV: 215.
68Ibid., p. 197 n.
k^The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV: 75.
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surprising to find that in several places in the Social Con
tract and elsewhere Rousseau formulates the goal of the
state in terms of mutual protection.

If you look for the

motives which make men unite themselves in civil societies,
he writes, "you will find no other motive than that of assur
ing the property, life, and liberty of each member by the
protection of a l l . W e

shall return, however, to the

moral implications of his notion of self-love.
While there is abundant evidence for viewing the gen
eral will as a collective,

"extended" version of man's nat-

utal inclinations, it is clear that it is not simply some
enlargement of self-love and pity as they appear in the
state of nature.

The general will emerges in a social con

text, where man has been transformed from a "narrow, stupid
animal" into a "creature of intelligence and a man."

It

benefits from conditions under which man's different faculties are "exercized and developed."

71

We may view the

general will as the result of putting these faculties at the
disposal of man's true nature.

Deriving their propelling

force from man's original inclinations, they are rescued
from becoming the tools of degeneracy and instead become
constitutive elements of a wholly moral political will.

^Political Economy, p. 293.
7Lfhe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VIII: 65.
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Not only does the general will occur in a social
environment, it speaks about social problems.

Projected

through the prism of social life, man's original inclination
towards what is good is applied to a whole new range of con
cerns and possibilities.

To Rousseau falls the task of show

ing what is conduct according to nature under these circum
stances.

About that subject we shall have more to say.

Individualistic collectivism
It is assumed by Rousseau that the general will is
not some sectional, particularistic, arbitrary expression of
opinion.

On the contrary, it is .the very principle by which

morality is defined.

In spite of that, Rousseau frequently

speaks of the general will as a mere aggregation or harmony
of "private interests."
It is what is common to those different interests which
yields the social bond; if there were no point on which
separate interests coincided, then society could not
conceivably exist. And it is precisely on the basis of
this common interest that society must be governed.72
Speaking of the "individual desires" of the citizens,
Rousseau asserts that "if we take away from these same wills,
the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, the sum
of the difference is the general will."73

72Ibid., bk. II, ch. I: 69.
73Ibid., bk. II, ch. Ill: 72-73.

The same emphasis

on numbers marks his contention that for the general will to
be truly general "all the votes must be counted."

74

Referring

to the proposals of the lawgiver, but laying down a general
principle, Rousseau maintains that "there can be no assur
ance that an individual will is in conformity with the gen
eral will until it has submitted to the free suffrage of the
people."75

In another context he states without equivoca

tion: "Any law which the people has not ratified in person
is void; it is not law at all."75

The clear implication is

that the general will does not exist apart from an actual
vote in the popular assembly.

The element of egalitarian

individualism in Rousseau's thought becomes even more
evident in his example of the state with ten thousand cit
izens.

In this state, he argues, each person has got only

a "ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority.1,77

These

and similar statements in the Social Contract and other
works would seem to indicate that the general will results
from some sort of cancelling, out of extreme or abnormal
opinions and an addition of the remaining private interests

74Ibid., bk II, ch. II: 70 n.
75Ibid., bk. II, ch. VII: 86.
76Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XV: 141.
77Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. I, 103.
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of the citizens.

But if the general will is transcendent of

all particular wills, one may ask, why all this talk of pri
vate interests, numbers, and ratifications in person?
While it is evident that there is a strong connection
between Rousseau's egalitarian individualism and his idea of
the general will, he concedes that absolute authority cannot
be claimed for just any numerical majority.

It should be

clear, he writes, that "the general will derives its gen
erality less from the number
interest which unites them."

of voices than from the common
78

And although he never devel

ops the idea with consistency and clarity, he hints at a
basic opposition between private interests and the general
will in his distinction of the latter from
".

thewill

of all:

..the general will studies only the common interest

while the will of all studies private interest, and is
indeed no more than the sum of individual d e s i r e s . T h i s
passage, however, is immediately followed by the sentence
previously quoted, which describes the general will as the
result of a process of cancelling out and addition of partic
ular wills.
Rousseau is trying, on the one hand, to present the
general will as an absolute standard and, on the other hand,

78ibid., bk. II, ch. IV: 76.
?9lbid., bk. II, ch. Ill: 72.
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to make it somehow dependent on the assent of the individual
as a separate entity.

The closest he comes to joining these

two perspectives, it may be gathered from his partially con
tradictory statements, is the belief that under certain cir
cumstances majority assent serves to confirm a will that is
somehow latent in the people, but actually manifested as the
general will only in a vote by the popular assembly.

Such a

rendering of his thought does not remove, but only restates,
the basic ambiguity.
One important cause of Rousseau's difficulty is that
he does not conceive of man as by nature a social being.
Man by himself, he believes,
itary.The

"is entirely complete and sol

general will, therefore, could not be the

structuring principle of man's essential nature.

It must be

some kind of addition, extension, or merging of individual
ity.

Man's social nature has to be created from this core.

Rousseau writes: "The constitution of a man is the work of
nature; that of the state is the work of artifice."

81

Elab

orating on this theme, he argues:
If it is good to know how to deal with men as they are,
it is much better to make them what there is need that
they should be. The most absolute authority is that
which penetrates into a man's inmost being, and concerns

80Ibid., bk. II, ch. VII: 84.
81Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XI: 135.
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itself no less with his will than with his actions. It
is certain that all peoples become in the long run what
the government makes them. . . . Make men, therefore,
if you would command men: if you would have them obed
ient to the laws, make them love the laws, and then they
will need only to know what is their duty to do it.®
The general will, we are forced to believe, is not a
pre-existing, universal principle or even a sense of polit
ical direction somehow derived from such a principle, but a
standard that is made.

As Rousseau says in the Social Con

tract, it is a law that man gives himself.

What rescues

Rousseau from the accusation of complete arbitrariness is
his attempt to base the general will on what is good by
nature.

It has moral authority, he believes, because it

springs from the individual's original inclinations.

The general Will and representation
One of the most noteworthy elements of Rousseau's
argument in the Social Contract is the sharp distinction
between the legislative and executive function in the state.
According to him all legislative authority belongs to the
general will which "must be general in its purpose as well
as in its nature . . . and should spring from all and apply
to all."

83

82

The general will "cannot relate to any partic-

Political Economy, pp. 297-98.

83The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV: 75.
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ular object."

The application of general rules to specific

cases falls to the executive power, which Rousseau variously
calls the government, the magistrates, or the prince.

The

executive function is completely subject to the sovereign
general will.

While the legislative power must be exercised

in a democratic fashion with all the citizens participating
in the vote, executive decisions can be entrusted, depending
on the circumstances, to a single magistrate, which Rousseau
calls monarchy, just a few, which he names aristocracy, or
the citizens as a whole, which is what he gives the name
democracy.
Rousseau's insistence on a sharp distinction between
the executive and legislative, it may be argued, is syptomatic of a basic philosophical confusion involving an attempt
to set up as absolute a political standard which is in fact
much less than universal.

We may expose some of that confu

sion by analyzing his view of representation.
As far as the legislative function is concerned
Rousseau flatly rejects the idea of representation.
ruled out by the very nature of the general will.

It is
"Sov

ereignty cannot be represented, for the same reason that it
cannot be alienated; its essence is the general will, and

84Ibid., bk. II, ch. VI: 81.

will cannot be represented— either it is the general will or
xt is something else.

. . ."

85

And he goes on to say:

"Since the law is nothing other than a declaration of the
general will, it is clear that there cannot be representa
tion of the people in the legislative power. . . ."86

in a

famous illustration of his meaning Rousseau disputes the
claim of the English people to be free.

In reality, he

points out, it is free only when it elects members of the
Parliament.

. . a s soon as the Members are elected, the

people is enslaved. . . ."87
Rousseau's hostility to representation is further
evidence of the view that the general will is inseparable
from actual popular decisions.

If it did transcend them and

could be known by men individually, there would be a pos
sibility of legislators representing the citizenry.

Having

ruled this out, Rousseau still does not face the problem
that each single person can hardly be present for every vote
in the assembly.

Also, those who are yet too young to be

members will be affected by laws that are passed by it.
this apparent violation of Rousseau's rule that laws must

85Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XV: 141.
86Ibid., 142.
87Ibid., 141.
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"spring
actual

f r o m a l l a n d a p p l y t o a l l "8 8 is n o t t o n u l l i f y a l l
legislation,

it w o u l d s e e m t h a t t h o s e

t i n g in t h e v o t e m u s t s o m e h o w b e

not participa

represented b y those pres

e n t in t h e a s s e m b l y .
Curiously,

Rousseau drops his emphatic

opposition to

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f th e e x e c u t i v e
o f t h e state:

" . . .

there m a y and

t i o n in th e e x e c u t i v e power,
for a p p l y i n g the

l a w . 1,88

should b e

which

f u n ction

such representa

is o n l y t h e

instrument

T o u n d e r s t a n d the i m p o r t a n c e to

R o u s s e a u ' s t h o u g h t o f the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
a n d e x e c u t i v e w e n e e d to look c l o s e r a t h i s

legislative

idea of general

laws a n d p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n s .
R o u s s e a u ' s n o t i o n of g e n e r a l
t i o n s o f t h e g e n e r a l will,
down.

laws,

i.e., o f m a n i f e s t a 

is e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to pi n

T h e r e a s o n is t h e t e n s i o n p r o d u c e d in h i s

thought b y

his a t t e m p t to join together to the point o f identification
w h a t c a n n o t b e j o i n e d comple t e l y ,
absolute

s t a n d a r d o f mo r a l i t y ,

sions o f p o l i t i c a l w i l l ,
the ultimate principle

i f a t all,

n a m e l y the

on t h e one h a n d ,

on the o t h e r .

V a g u e l y a w a r e that

of r i g h t a n d w r o n g c a n n o t

identified with specific political

acts,

88Ibid., bk. II, ch. IV: 75.
89Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XV: 142.

and expres

simply be

b u t a t t h e same

155

time anxious to present the will of the majority of the
people as the final standard of morality, he is led to con
ceive of the laws passed by the general will in a highly
abstract manner.
For a legislative act to be truly a law, Rousseau argues,
the matter it deals with must be "as general as the will
90
which makes it.11

The idea is explained further in his

statement that
. . .every act of sovereignty, that is every authentic act of
the general will, binds or favours all the citizens
equally, so that the sovereign recognizes only the whole
body of the nation and makes no distinction between any
of the members who compose it.9-*As if this standard were not difficult enough to
apply to real political life, he points out that "the law
considers all subjects collectively and all actions in the
abstract."

92

Negatively stated, the general will "loses its

natural rectitude when it is directed towards any particular
and circumscribed object."

93

It may be asked what a-law would be like which does
not favor or disfavor any citizen, but deals identically

90Ibid.,

bk. II, ch.

Vis 81.

91Ibid.,

bk. II, ch.

IV: 76.

Ibid.,

bk. II, ch.

VI: 82.

93Ibid.,

bk. II, ch.

IV: 75.

92
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with all of them.

It should be noted that Rousseau is not

just talking about a law that is inspired by a selfless,
sincere commitment to the common good, but about one that
actually "binds or favours all the citizens equally."
such a piece of legislation be imagined?

Can

Barring the pos

tulation of complete equality, including removal of all
individual uniqueness and differences of circumstance, it
would seem to be impossible.

Not surprisingly, whenever

Rousseau offers concrete examples of genuine laws, he
appears to compromise his principle of generality rather
severely.
According to Rousseau the sovereign does not have the
right to "impose greater burdens on one subject than on
another."

94.

That would seem to rule out even broadly for

mulated laws of the type that "all able-bodied men shall be
liable to induction into military service," or that "all
shall be taxed according to a certain rate."

Clearly, even

such laws would be more of a burden on some people than on
others.

Still, in regard to taxes Rousseau lays down the

basic rule that they should depend on "a general will,
decided by vote of a majority, and on the basis of a propor
tional rating which leaves nothing arbitrary in the imposi-

94Ibid., bk. II, ch. IV:77.
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tion of the tax."®®

Whether arbitrary or not, it is any

thing but self-evident that the principle of proportionality
affects "all the citizens equally."

Indeed, it is difficult

to see how any one rate of taxation could accomplish this
goal.

It is worthy of note that Rousseau even gives his

support to the idea of taxes as a "fine."

Heavy taxes

should be laid, he thinks, "on all that multiplicity of
objects of luxury, amusement, and idleness, which strike the
eyes of all."®®

Although it is not entirely clear whether

he regards punitive taxes as a matter of legislation or just
an executive application of legislative authority, the exam
ple only makes explicit the unavoidable element of discrim
ination in all actual laws.

So long as no two individuals

are identical and live under identical circumstances,- laws,
however "general" in formulation, will affect them dif
ferently.

Not only that, no two members of a popular assem

bly will be able to conceive of the meaning and consequences
of a proposed law in the same way.

Generality in the strict

sense is threatened from both directions.
In a discussion of actual pieces of legislation
Rousseau cannot but infuse his concept of generality with
Economy, p. 320. In the Social Contract
Rousseau has some reservations about taxation, preferring
instead "compulsory service." Bk. Ill, ch. XV:140.
^

Political

^ Political Economy, p. 328.
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various kinds of particularity.
cannot affect all equally.
certain state of affairs.

By definition, a civil law

It discriminates in favor of a
To speak of a law without any

bias for or against individuals or groups is to speak of a
pure abstraction, which does not become any more meaningful
because allegedly a manifestation of pure morality.

In its

implied disregard for the uniqueness of individuals and cir
cumstances, Rousseau's notion of the generality of law calls
to mind Kant's famous ethical rule that we should always act
in such a way that the principle of our action could become
the standard for universal legislation.

Both have a dis

embodied quality growing out of abstract egalitarian assump
tions at odds with infinitely diverse human reality.
We are arguing, then, that all legislation is adjusted
to special circumstances and directed towards a particular
end.

When Rousseau writes, for instance, that some laws in

the state will have to be designed specifically to meet the
needs of a certain country, he is revealing an element of
particularity which is necessarily present in some form, not
only in every law, but in every human act.

The generality

of law, in other words, is not a distinct philosophical cat
egory, but a matter of more or less on a continuum.
But if legislation has in it always a measure of
particularity and application to special circumstances, it
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cannot be sharply distinguished from executive acts.

The

philosophical artificiality of this division becomes the
more apparent the more one considers concrete examples. Take,
for instance, a popular assembly which appropriates money
for some public project.

Is it exercising legislative

authority, or has it assumed an executive function?

Needless

to say, one could give examples of decisions with more of a
"legislative" slant and less of an "executive" slant, and
vice versa.

The point is that it would not involve a jump

from one philosophically distinct category of political
action to another, but only a movement along a sliding scale.
Rousseau's purpose is to establish the absolute
authority of the general will of the people.

To accomplish

that he needs to keep it untainted by all apparent arbitrar
iness and particularism.

He is sufficiently under the

influence of the classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition
not to make an easy identification of pure morality, even as
he understands it, with specific political acts.

He sug

gests a fundamental difference between the general will as
such and the multiplicity of particular applications.

Hence

his distinction between the sovereign and the "government."
. . . executive power cannot belong to the generality of
the people as legislative or sovereign, since executive
power is exercised only in particular acts which are
outside the province of law and therefore outside the
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province of the sovereign which can act only to make
laws.97
The introduction of this distinction places Rousseau
in an impossible position.

In so far as he wants to preserve

the generality, and thus the morality, of the general will,
he is forced to make of it a meaningless abstraction, and in
so far as he wants to present it as a real, positive force
in politics dealing with concrete matters, it loses its gen
erality.
Rousseau is not satisfied, as is Plato and Aristotle
and their Christian counterparts, with envisioning the pos
sibility of politics as participation in the ethical purpose
of life.

He wants morality to be manifested to the full in

the state, in the sovereign people.

The theoretical result,

his notion of the general will, must be regarded as an adul
teration of the genuine standard of morality and the absolutization of a political principle which is far from univer
sal.

If a law is truly general in the strict sense of

transcending all particular circumstances, it cannot also be
a civil law or a political will, be it legislative, however
"general,*1 or an executive application of legislative author
ity; and if it is a manifestation of immanent reality, it is
that much less than universal and absolute.

Rousseau1s wish

97The Social Contract, bk. Ill, ch. 1:101.
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to invest the collective will of the people with unlimited
authority and freedom prevents him from seeing that with
reference to the real standard of morality tooth legislative
and executive acts could only be imperfect applications to
particular circumstances.

Proceeding on the premise that

man is naturally good, neither is he held bach toy a recogni
tion that the ability of the state to play a moral role is
severely circumscribed toy the inherent weakness of human
nature.
Rousseau's hostility to the idea of representation is
directed not only against the narrowly political concept. It
derives from his unwillingness to accept an ethical principle
which might restrain political authority and leave men an
appeal beyond the decisions of the state.

As will toe dis

cussed further, his notion of morality in the Social Con
tract is indistinguishable from a wish to secure the com
plete unity of the political order.

This unity would be

threatened by the admission that politics is at best only an
attempt to represent a standard above all particular soci
eties and particular wills.

The moral authority of the

state, he thinks, must be under no suspicion.

The rejection of constitutionalism
The same unwillingness to place politics under a high
er law is reflected in Rousseau's emphatic denunciation of

162

constitutionalism.

11. . . the supreme authority can no more

be modified than it can be alienated; to limit it is to des
troy it.

It is absurd and self-contradictory that the sovQQ
ereign should give itself a superior. . .
using the
analogy of an individual person he asserts that "it is
absurd that anyone should wish to bind himself for the
future."

99

The same holds true for an entire state:

. . it

would be against the very nature of a political body for the
sovereign to set over itself a law which it could not
infringe.

Rousseau's usual abhorrence of constraint

translates into the idea that the people should always be
completely free to alter its laws.
binding today," he writes.'1'0^

"Yesterday's law is not

He even goes so far as to say

that if the people chooses "to do itself an injury', who has
the right to prevent it from doing so?"

102

So concerned is

he with laying down the absolute freedom of the sovereign
that he forgets that he has already defined the general will
in such a way that it could not yield an injurious decision.
According to Rousseau, it is an advantage from the
standpoint of securing respect for laws if they acquire the
"ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XVI:144.
"ibid., bk. II, ch. 1:70.
100Ibid., bk. I, ch. VII:62.
101Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XI:135.
102Ibid., bk. II, ch. XII:99.
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dignity of age.

Still, constitutional rules which cannot be

as easily changed as other laws are expressly forbidden.
Setting down what would appear ironically to be a more rigid
and fundamental provision than any constitutional require
ment, he proclaims that at the opening of each assembly the
people must be asked if it pleases them to maintain the
present form of government.

"...

there is not in the

state any fundamental law which may not be revoked, not even
the social pact.

..."

101

•

It is difficult not to suspect a

strong connection between this view and Rousseau's pervasive
autobiographical theme, "I love liberty? I hate embarrassment, worry, and constraint."

104

We have already noted that there is in Rousseau's
thinking a pronounced majoritarian tendency.

What is right,

he claims, becomes revealed by majority vote, provided that
those voting be properly informed about the issue at hand,
that they make up their own minds and are not affected by
any sectional interests.

When the majority has spoken, the

minority cannot legitimately persist in its views and try to
convert the majority, for it has now been proven wrong.
Presumably, it should immediately give up its mistaken, self
ish opinions.

Indeed, since there is in politics only a

103Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XVIII:148.
^•^Con fess ions, bk. 1:46.
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wholly right and a wholly wrong, there would seem to be no
reason why the state should tolerate opposition.

In view of

Rousseau's prohibition against all "sectional associations,"
it is difficult to see how any effective, organized opposi
tion could exist.
Rousseau makes no allowance for the possibility that
even under the most favorable conditions of abundant informa
tion and public-spiritedness the majority might only imper
fectly express the general will.

'That recognition would

point to the need for constitutional provisions designed to
bring out the best in its opinions and restrain what is not
worthy of public implementation.

But Rousseau does not, and

cannot if he is to preserve his concept of the general will,
concede the existence of any political shades or nuances.
". . . either the will is general or it is not. . . . "

105

Differences of opinion in the state must fall in a blackand-white category.
Rousseau's sense of realism does interfere with the
easy flow of his thought.

He admits that in practice the

majority may not always be right.
ity is not always wrong.

By inference, the minor

In the face of the danger that the

will of all dethrone the rightful popular will, one might

^ ^ T h e Social Contract, bk. II, ch. 11:70.
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expect that Rousseau would give at least some serious
thought to placing constitutional restrictions on the
momentary freedom of the majority.

If the general will does

indeed express the permanent, common interest of the people,
it would seem that its public implementation would not be
hurt by having the wishes of the

majority filtered through

a system of institutional checks

by means of which

could prove their quality as the

enduring popular will. It

would appear logical that Rousseau should

they

also lay downsome

practical guidelines for restraining a powerful minority,
which, claiming to speak for the general will, might try to
usurp the role of the majority.

But he speaks only of an

"obligation on the minority to accept the decision of the
majority."

106

That, in the absence of any constitutional

guarantees supported by a tradition of constitutional moral
ity, is scant protection against the possibility of tyranny.
That this type of threat is real enough is evidenced by
innumerable examples in world history, and particularly
well, in modern times, by communist parties which claim to
embody the true will, not only of a particular people, but
of mankind as represented by the proletariat.
Some further examples in Rousseau's thinking of a
seemingly inexorable movement in the direction of constitu-

106Ibid., bk. I, ch. V:59.
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tionalism which is never completed but suddenly reversed
might be cited.

"By themselves the people always will what

is good, but by themselves they do not always discern it,"
Rousseau writes.
multitude."

107

He also speaks of the people as a "blind
This assessment would seem to point directly

towards putting some legal checks on their will and having
popular representatives articulate theii interests.

But

these rather deprecating remarks describe the people only
i

prior to the establishment of the new political order.

Yet,

also in the state founded on the social contract, as we have
seen, Rousseau envisions some difficulties.

He is deeply

concerned about the danger that the executive might usurp
the authority of the sovereign.

To protect against such

abuse, Rousseau prescribes "fixed and periodic assemblies
which nothing can abolish or prorogue. . . . "

108

But

although this and other institutional provisions in the
Social Contract would appear to be unconditional and more
fundamental than any law, they are never coupled with sugges
tions for constitutional protection of the arrangements in
question.

Not even the laws provided by the lawgiver, which

found the new political order, are to receive any such sanc
tion.

In a passage which brings Rousseau perilously close

107Ibid., bk. II, ch. VI:83.
108Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XIII:137.

to the forbidden idea, he writes:

"It is true that . . . one

should never touch an established government unless it has
IQQ

become incompatible with the public welfare.

. . .

as

though aware of the constitutional implications of this
position, Rousseau hastens to add that "such circumspection
is a precept of politics and not a rule of l a w . " ^ ®

Nothing

must stop the people from making whatever changes it wants
at any time.

Significantly, Rousseau is assuming that it

would never occur to the citizens of the new state to pro
tect the general will against the immoral will of all by
means of constitutional rules.

Apparently the sovereign

needs and wants complete freedom of movement.

Even an

attempt to restrain illegitimate political wishes would dan
gerously circumscribe the ability of the general will to
manifest itself.
To the extent that there lingers in Rousseau's
thought echoes of the old western dualistic view of human
nature with its rather pessimistic assessment of man's
capacity to rise above his lower inclinations, he is pushed
in the direction of accepting some form of constitutionalism.
But always the basic utopian thrust of his thinking reasserts

109Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XVIII:147.
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itself.

Inspired by his "heart," he takes it for granted

that somehow, without any constitutional guarantees, the
institutional arrangements which he prescribes will not only
be established but respected and the general will actually
expressed by the majority.

This assumption goes contrary to

what Rousseau himself recognizes as the historical record.
It is little more than a hope.

Indeed, the importance that

Rousseau ascribes to propaganda and other forms of moulding
public opinion does not indicate that even in the state
based on the social contract the articulation of the general
. HI
will is going to be automatic.

The spontaneity of the moral will
Rousseau's refusal in spite of the mentioned complica
tions to subject the will.of the majority to any form of
restraint is finally explained by his belief that what is
good in man is manifested spontaneously.

The problem with

which he deals in the Social Contract is how the circum
stances can be created under which this impulsive goodness
will be released.

Man needs to be liberated from all

U l s e e Rousseau's discussion of the fourth kind of
law in The Social contract, bk. II, ch. XII and bk. IV, ch. VIH.
The need for propaganda and careful supervision of public
opinion is discussed also in Politics and the Arts: Letter
to D'Alembert on the Theatre, trans. with notes and intro, by
Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968) and in
The Government of Poland, trans. with notes and intro, by
Willmoore Kendall (NewYork: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1972).
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artificial motives which pervert and lock in his true nature.
Wherever necessary he must "be forced to be free."

119

But

while constraint may sometimes be required to unfetter m a n 1s
natural inclinations, no limits must be put on that spon
taneity once it has been restored to its rightful place as
the guide of human behavior.
According to Rousseau the citizen who is to vote in
the assembly should "make up his own mind for himself
n 113
Cn'opine que d'apres luij."

We may interpret this to mean

in part that he should shut himself out from all alien
influences and listen only to his own heart.

Open to his

natural inclinations he is in a position to respond morally
to the issues that are put to him.

The general will, adding

or merging the spontaneous wish of all individuals so
inspired, also becomes directed towards what is good by
nature.
The view that man's first impulse is good is affirmed
over and over again in Rousseau's writings.

One of his most

appreciative commentators, Ernst Cassirer, observes:
. even the ethical conscience remained for Rousseau a
kind of 'instinct'— for it is not based simply upon reflec
tive cogitation but springs from a spontaneous impulse.

H 2 >rhe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VII:64.
H 3Ibid., bk. XI, ch. II±:73.
il4Cas sirer, Question, p. 109.

X70

In the Emile Rousseau writes that "the first impulses of the
heart give rise to the first stirrings of conscience.11 He
goes on to say that
. . .justice and kindness are no mere abstract terms, no mere
motal conceptions framed by the understanding, but true
affections of the heart enlightened by reason, the nat
ural outcome of our primitive affections. ^ 5
His belief in the spontaneous goodness of man is evidenced
also in his autobiographical writings:
. . . I am perfectly sure that my heart loves only that
which is good. All the evil I ever did in my life was
the result of reflection; and the little good I have
been able to do was the result of impulse.116
The examples of his identification of morality with spon
taneity, and of vice with constraint and second thoughts,
could be multiplied.

This is hardly surprising.

If one

believes, as Rousseau does, that man is good by nature and
evil somehow alien to his essential being, it is only log
ical to believe that what issues forth from man without the
interference of moderating prejudice or reflection is also
good.
According to a principle of civil law which Rousseau
cites,

"no man is bound by a contract with himself."11^

Expanding on this idea he puts it down as "absurd that any-

116Emile, bk. IV:196.
116QUOted in Cassirer, Question, p. 127.
117<phe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VII:62.

one should wish to bind himself for the future."

118

Using

his notion of the state as a public person he insists that
neither can the state be bound by any promises to itself,
such as constitutional laws.

We are confronted here by a

basic flaw in Rousseau's political philosophy.

Is it really

true that a person is not bound by a contract with himself?
It is of course always possible for an individual simply to
disregard such promises.

The ability to do so, however,

does not change the fact that he might be morally bound to
respect it.
kind?

Do we not repeatedly make promises of that

Contrary to Rousseau's ideal for both individual and

collective life, it would seem that we are continuously
binding ourselves for the future.

It appears that our

steadiness as moral beings is largely the result of personal
commitments to behave or not to behave in a certain fashion.
"I shall not again act in that way!"
tually honest."

"I will be intellec

"I have to restrain my selfishness."

The

list of possible promises could be expanded indefinitely.
Although in a sense free to disregard them, we are often
morally obligated to respect them.

The result of abroga

ting them is ethical self-condemnation.

In an analogous way,

is it not possible for a people to make promises to itself,

H S l b i d . , bk. II, ch. 1:70.
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in the form of a constitution,for instance, which it is
morally obligated to respect?
Under the philosophical theory we have previously
developed, respect for internal promises in furtherance of
the goal known in ethical conscience are a necessity, if man
is to become a reasonably moral being.
neously move in that direction.

He will not sponta

On the contrary, he needs

to put checks on his inclination to act selfishly and
arbitrarily.

Morality is bought at the price of often dif

ficult self-discipline.

Rousseau, by contrast, postulates

the ontological unity and goodness of human nature.

Man

divided against himself is for him not an irrevocable fact
of human life, but a crime perpetrated against man by
conventional society.
It should be remembered in this context that when
Rousseau talks about virtue and justice, he is referring to
phenomena rooted in self-love

(amour de soi).

The latter

phrase in itself does not invalidate his ethical standard.
The "self" in question might be, not some egotistical will
in man, but a higher, moral principle known by man and at the
same time transcendent of him.

Such a dualistic conception

of human nature, however, is in sharp contradiction to
Rousseau's philosophy.
illustrated by this

His rejection of such a view m a y be

important passage,

quoted

in p a r t
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before, which takes one to the very center of his ethical
thought:
. . . i f the enthusiasm of an overflowing heart iden
tifies me with my fellow-creature, if I feel so to speak,
that I will not let him suffer lest I should suffer too,
I care for him because I care for myself, and the reason
of the precept is found in nature herself, which inspires
me with the desire for my own welfare wherever I may be.
Prom this I conclude that it is false to say that the
precepts of natural law are based on reason only; they
have a firmer and more solid foundation. The love of
others, springing from self-love, is the source of human
justice.
All morality is thus derived from a concern for the
private ego.

And there is in this illuminating statement

not even a hint to the tension in man between a higher and a
lower self.

There is no recognition that love belongs prop

erly only to that in ourselves and others which has ethical
worth, not to the whole of man but to our potential for
spiritual growth.
criminate sympathy.

Rousseau is describing a gush of indis
He sees no need to ask whether the self

from which it emanates and the self with which the bearer
identifies in the other person is morally uplifting or
degrading.

It is quite possible, for instance, to sym

pathize with the wish of a criminal to escape from a prison
or the wish of a drug addict to get a shot of narcotics, but
normally such feelings of pity would have nothing to do with

^•^Emile, bk. IV: 197 n.
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morality, but actually stem from and attach to a self which
is contrary to it.

Unwilling to accept moral depravity as

an inherent human characteristic, Rousseau does not rec
ognize the urgent need for a discrimination both hard-headed
and subtle between various inclinations of the human "heart.”
His view of human nature is monistic, and he regards moral
ity as

immanent in impulse.

He assumes that it is defined

by the

spontaneous gushing forth of warm feelings, warm

ultimately out of concern for the private ego of the bearer.
To do one's moral duty, the old classical and JudaeoChristian tradition teaches, is frequently a painful, labor
ious task.

It requires repeated interference with our

spontaneous inclinations.
ferent view.
duty."^®

Rousseau takes a sharply dif

He speaks of "the pleasure of fulfilling one's

In the Emile he lets the Savoyard Priest glorify

the enjoyment of yielding to
. . .the temptation of well-doing. . . . This temptation is
so natural, so pleasant, that it is impossible always to
resist it? and the thought of the pleasure it has once
afforded is enough to recall it constantly to our memory.
According to the priest "there is nothing sweeter than vir
tue."

How much real ethical insight is contained in these

effusive admonitions to "follow the inclinations of our

^^Reveries, VI: 124
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heart"?

121

They lack an awareness of the division in man

between a higher and a lower and a recognition that the eth
ical course of action is usually anything but easy and
pleasant.

Rousseau's notion of the effortlessness and

pleasure of moral behavior may be contrasted with that of
Aristotle who argues that to do good man must often do what
is painful.

". . . it is on account of the pleasure that we

do .bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain
from noble o n e s . " ^
When one considers that Rousseau identifies morality
with particular human impulses, it is not difficult to
understand his despairing of a happiness which lasts.

"I

doubt if it is known," he writes towards the end of his
life.

123

Aristotle's teaching, by contrast, is directed

precisely towards securing a happiness which endures.

Iron

ically, Rousseau's belief in the intrinsic goodness of human
nature does not give him the deeper sense of harmony des
cribed by philosophers less flattering of man.
Just as Rousseau will not hear of an unavoidable divi
sion in the human soul which makes morality frequently
dependent on a difficult effort of will, he will not hear of

121Emile. bk. IV:255.
122Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 32 (1104b ).
123Reveries, V:112.
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any corresponding ineradicable tension in society which
threatens political unity.

"Everything that destroys social

unity is worthless," he writes, "and all institutions that
set man at odds with himself are worthless."124

In this

statement, which is primarily directed against historical
Christianity, he is oblivious of the old insight that to be
at odds with oneself is the very essence of the human predic
ament.

The classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition, too,

aims for unity and harmony in the individual and society.
It insists, however, that what limited progress is possible
towards that goal requires continuous moral self-discipline
by the individual and the support of a strong cultural
tradition.

The unity of the state
While Rousseau's egalitarian individualism leads to
the endorsement of universal suffrage, it does not involve a
recognition of the uniqueness of the person and of that
uniqueness as an argument for popular participation in pub
lic decisions.

Universal suffrage is for Rousseau primarily

a means of assuring maximum cohesion in the body politic.
He is not concerned with giving the individual considerable
freedom to decide his own role in society.

That role is to

124The Social Contract, bk. IV, ch. VIII:181.
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be defined by the will of the sovereign, from which the
individual is to receive "his life and his being."12^

The

citizens should be "early accustomed to regard their individ
uality only in its relation to the body of the State, and to
be aware, so to speak, of their own existence merely as a
part of that of the State."-*-28
In order for the general will to assert itself,
Rousseau argues, "there should be no sectional associations
in the state."^-2^

What he disapproves of is what Robert

Nisbet calls "autonomous groups," that is, private associa
tions between the individual and the state with some real
autonomy protected in law.128

Such associations, Rousseau

believes, only divert the citizen's attachment from the
state and thus diminish its authority, a view which may be
compared to

that of Edmund Burke that the source of affec

tions for the state is our love for the private groups to
which we belong.

iOQ

The social pact gives to the state an "absolute power"
over its members.

As though fearful of the reactions that

this uncompromising stand might elicit from his contemporaries,
125Ibid., bk. II, ch. VII:84.
i26poiitical Economy, p. 307.
127iphe Social Contract, bk. II, ch. 111:73.
128
See Nisbet, Community and Power.
129surke, Reflections, p. 193.
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Rousseau inconsistently gives his

assurances that

limita

t i o n s on t h e p o w e r o f t h e s t a t e a r e b u i l t into t h e g e n e r a l
will

itself.

o n l y so m u c h

The

individual

o f h i s power,

goods,

concern of the community."
that

"the s o v e r e i g n a l o n e

cern,”
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which,

n e e d s to g i v e u p t o t h e s t a t e

He

and

liberty w h i c h

i m m e d i a t e l y adds,

is j u d g e o f w h a t

in t h e a b s e n c e

is

"the

however,

is o f s u c h c o n -

of constitutional restraints,

is l e a v i n g t h e d e f i n i t i o n to th e m a j o r i t y o f t h e m o m e n t .
P o p u l a r s u f f r a g e c a n b e r e g a r d e d as a m o n g o t h e r
t h i n g s a p r a c t i c a l g u a r a n t e e a g a i n s t t h e s tate v i o l a t i n g th e
higher mission Which belongs
ca n b e d e t e r m i n e d

life h e

Rousseau's
existence

person he alone

i ndividual,

thought the

While

o f the p o l i t i c a l

s overeign,

t h a t t h e r o l e of e a c h h u m a n b e i n g

political authority.

that

is u l t i m a t e l y

t o a s t a n d a r d t r a n s c e n d e n t o f all
The

state can be considered

only to the extent that

the a b i l i t y o f th e c i t i z e n s
ethical conscience.

in

individual person derives his entire

f r o m the w i l l

defined with reference

since

can k n o w to w h a t k i n d

is c a l l e d b y e t h i c a l c o n s c i e n c e .

v i e w implies

legitimate

individual and w h i c h

in t h e en d o n l y b y t h e

as a u n i q u e l y e n d o w e d
of

to e a c h

truly

it r e s p e c t s a n d p r o m o t e s

to r e a l i z e the g o a l k n o w n

S i n c e the

d i r e c t i o n o f a c o m m o n center,

latter pulls men
this

principle

in the

is n o t a n

13QThe Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV:74.
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invitation to anarchy, but it does place the state under a
higher authority by which it can be judged and, as it were,
humbled.
This notion is contrary to Rousseau's political
thought.

Always anxious to preserve the absolute authority

of the state, he rejects what he takes to be the Christian
ity of the Gospel:
. . . far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to
the state, this religion detaches them from it as from
all other things of this world; and I know of nothing
more contrary to the social spirit. -*-3^
The type of "religion" he endorses derives its dogmas from
the political sovereign, and these must "contain nothing
contrary to the duties of the citizen.“132
Rousseau is not satisfied to think that the state
should have some considerable share in ordering the life of
the individual and that the individual himself may regard
this sharing of authority with the state as an important and
necessary means towards achieving the good life.

Rousseau

will admit no division of authority and particularly not any
constitutional recognition of such a division.

He under

stands that if the people is to have unlimited power,
nothing is more dangerous than the idea of a transcendent
moral standard.

If men's ultimate allegiance is to an

131Ibid., bk. IV, ch. VIII: 182.

132Ibid., p. 187.
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ethical conscience beyond and above all political authority,
there is no longer any hope for undivided loyalty to the
state.

It means, as Lester Crocker puts it, that

. . .the individual conscience might at times be morally
superior to the law, or at least consider itself as such.
And then we could bid adieu to the collective, organic unity
of the political b o d y . 133

Nationalism and military virtue
We have noted that in the unity of the public person
i

Rousseau wants to preserve man's natural freedom.
is that cohesion so important?
freedom of the general will?

But why

What is the content of the
One sign that the true will of

the sovereign is actually being expressed, Rousseau argues,
is that "public opinion approaches unanimity."134 conversely,
prolonged debate and dissension is a sign that selfish
interests are uppermost in the minds of the citizens.

Using

these criteria, one wonders how one should view a Nazi mass
meeting where the proposals regarding the destiny of the
German people advanced by the Filhrer— who might conceivably
be considered a modern counterpart of the lawgiver or the
temporary dictator, or some combination of the two— are
greeted with the spontaneous and enthusiastic approval of a

133i.ester G. Crocker, Rousseau's Social Contract. An
Interpretive Essay (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve
University, 1968), p. 11.
134The social contract, bk. IV, ch. 11:151.
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unified assembly.

Whatever the merit of this particular

illustration, there are numerous indications in the Social
Contract and elsewhere that Rousseau's emphasis on political
unity is at least partly based on an association of the gen
eral will with nationalism and even militarism.

"Do we wish

men to be virtuous," he asks.

"Then let us begin by making

them love their country.

135

. .

It is interesting to note that in spite of all argu
ments designed to establish the absolute authority of the
general will, Rousseau never presents it as supra-national.
On the contrary, although he toys with the idea of a federa
tion of states, he views the general will in the inter
national arena as a sectional, particularistic will, some
thing he dreads in the individual state:
The will of the State, though general in relation to
its own members, is no longer so in relation to other
States and their members, but becomes, for them, a
particular and individual will, which has its rule of
justice in the law of nature.136
What concerns us here about this statement is not the clear
contradiction of the interpretation that the general will is
a universal, transcendent moral standard, but the way in
which Rousseau transfers the freedom of the natural man to

3-35political Economy, p. 302.
l3^ibid., p. 290.
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the various public persons in the world. These acquire the
natural freedom that the individual person has lost forever.
It should be carefully noted, however, that in this new state
of nature enjoyed by whole states conditions come much closer
to Hobbes's conception than to Rousseau1s in the Discourses.
The general wills of the states are likely to clash.

Even

among states based on the social contract "the weak are
always in danger of being swallowed up" by the strong.

The

reason is that "all peoples generate a kind of centrifugal
force, by which they brush continuously against one another,
and they all attempt to expand at the expense of their neigh
bours."137

The general will, one is forced to conclude, has

in it an element of nationalistic expansionism.

-It is nec

essary to go further and say that it also has a militaristic
coloring.

The Social Contract contains numerous approving

references to Spartan, military virtues.

One of Rousseau's

main complaints against traditional Christianity is that it
makes the citizens poor soldiers.

The militaristic tendency

is prominent also in other works, such as the First Discourse
and the treatise on the Government of Poland. It is closely
associated with a preference for nationalism.

"It is cer

137The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IX:92.
c h . IX-X, passim.

See also
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tain," Rousseau writes, "that the greatest miracles of virtue
have been produced by patriotism."
The nationalistic and militaristic bias in Rousseau's
political thought is reflected in several of his statements
regarding the goal of the state.

In the Social Contract he

points out, for example, that "the only way in which £men]
can preserve themselves is by uniting their separate powers
in a combination strong enough to overcome any resistance."139
In several places he states as the goal of the state the
self-preservation and protection of the members.'*'4®

He

offers in the latter part of Emile two standards for the
"goodness" of the state.

One is an increase in population.

The other is the distribution of population.

About the lat

ter he writes that two states of equal size and population
may still be very unequal in strength.

"...

the more pow

erful is always that in which the people are more evenly
distributed over its territory. . . . "

The goodness of the

state is here judged by military criteria.1^1

138

Political Economy, p. 301.

139The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI:59-60.
14°See, for example, ibid., bk. Ill, ch. IX:130;
bk. Ill, ch. X:135; bk. IV, ch. 1:149.
141EmiIe, bk. IV:432-33.
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Although Rousseau also speaks of 11freedom and equal
ity" as the goal of the state,

his numerous expressions

of nationalistic and militaristic sentiments would seem to
indicate that this goal is primarily a domestic objective
for the individual state.

The possibility is clearly indica

ted that internationally the freedom of the public person
may entail liberty for the powerful states to expand imperialistically at the expense of the weaker.

Again, the

alleged morality of the general will is placed in a curious
light.
At first sight there would seem to be an irreconcil
able conflict between military and social discipline, on the
one hand, and freedom for man's spontaneity, on the other.
The conflict is removed by what Rousseau conveniently reads
into the general will.

Social unity does not require in

dividual self-discipline,

it is supplied by the inherent

public-spiritedness and cohesiveness of the general will
which, made up as it is of the natural inclinations of the
citizens, is also the first impulse of the people.

By the

nature of its own spontaneity it produces political unity.
To be forced to be free, if that be regarded as an instance
of social discipline, means only to be compelled to yield to
this unpolluted collective manifestation of man's true nature.
142»rhe Social Contract, bk. II, ch. XI: 96.
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In his proclivity for nationalism and militarism,
which culminates in the work on the Government of Poland.
Rousseau appears to be ascribing to the general will a con
tent difficult to reconcile with certain other descriptions
of the same will.

Whether these sentiments are to be

regarded as only an aberration or as an integral part of his
philosophy is probably the wrong question to ask, for at the
root of his thinking is not so much a belief in a pre
existing, transcendent standard, which men are trying to
articulate intellectually, as a passion for unrestrained
freedom, a freedom associated with his own predilections and
preferences.

We may venture the interpretation that

Rousseau's conception of the general will is deeply colored,
if not completely determined, by his own temperament, which
is allowed by him to roam freely.

His nationalistic and

militaristic inclinations may be viewed as one example of
his reading into the general will what his own "heart" hap
pens to be craving.

In certain writings like the Emile

where he is primarily concerned with an ideal for private
life the tendency is anarchistic; in writings like the Social
Contract where he is dealing with collective, political life
his preference for unlimited freedom takes on a Spartan
quality.

In the latter work he brings together a pervasive

hostility to restraint with a wish for discipline, such as
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might be found in an unruly rebel who is called to repen
tance by his own conscience.

Rousseau envisions the subor

dination of the individual to a higher authority.

In all too

characteristic fashion, he does so, however, without putting
man under the painful obligation of actually making a moral
effort.

Men shall achieve virtue by participating in the

general will of the people, which is nothing but the outflow
of their own spontaneous will.

Although the release of that

first impulse in all men may necessitate some constraining
interference with others by those already liberated, moral
ity itself requires of the individual only that he listen to
his heart and yield effortlessly to its pleasant command.

Utopian dreams and harsh realities
It has not been our purpose to deny that Rousseau's
concept of the general will has features which connect it
with the real, transcendent standard of morality of which
most men have some awareness.

We have only tried to show

that in its central inspiration this concept owes more to
Rousseau's utopian-romantic imagination.

What is genuine

ethical insight in his thought, for such there is too, is
subordinated to and vitiated by the spurious, subjectively
inspired tendency of his philosophy as a whole.

To a degree,

subjectivity enters into all intellectual undertakings.

Our
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point is that although offered under the pretentions of
objective philosophical inquiry# Rousseau's thought has in
it too much of that element to provide a strong link between
moral philosophy and democratic theory.
It is difficult to dispel the suspicion that in large
part the general will is a projection on to the people of
Rousseau's unfailing belief in the superior goodness of his
own heart.

He views the will of the sovereign in the light

of what he perceives to be his own divinely inspired spon
taneity.

During his life Rousseau became ever more convinced

of his own moral innocence and the vice and deceit of other
men.

He regarded himself as always inclined towards the

good and thwarted only by various outer restraints from
achieving his worthy goals.

"Never has the moral instinct

deceived me," he writes.143

Late in his life he talks of

giving back to his Author "a host of good but frustrated
intentions."144

It is not surprising that Rousseau would

like to see released in political society the collective
counterpart of the spontaneous goodness which he believes to
have been denied expression in his personal life.

That he

likes to substitute for the imperfect world around him the

1 4 3R e v e r i e s ,

IV, p. 85.

144Ibid., II, p. 46.
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more appealing creations of his own imagination, he freely
admits.

Into nature especially, where he does not have to

contend with the depravity and conceit of society, he finds
it easy to project his dreams and emotions.

His worship of

nature, it may be argued, is in no small part worship of his
own elevated sentiments.

What is it, he asks in a revealing

passage, which always brings him back to the "inanimate
objects" of nature.
. . . what secret charm brings me back constantly into
your midst? Unfeeling and dead things, this charm is
not in you; it could not be there.
It is in my own
heart which wishes to refer back everything to itself.
This, let it be suggested, is the central inspiration also
of the concept of the general will.

Rousseau is reading

into it the imagined morality of his own largely subjective
and historically conditioned preferences regarding the
organization and goal of the state.

He is assuming that he

has full knowledge of man's true nature and that the heart
of all men craves the same political arrangements that his
does.
It should be remembered in this context that Rousseau
does not start from, but emphatically rejects, the notion of
man as a social being.

To him, civil society is in the lit

eral meaning of the word artificial.

The socio-political

145Quoted in Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 233.
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nature of man has to be created.

As he writes in the Social

Contract, "the constitution of a man is the work of nature;
that of the state is the work of artifice [de l'art]."^®
We may regard Rousseau as himself the ultimate artist, the
philosopher with the final remedy for all the ills of exist
ing society.

His general will is a product of his "creative

imagination" rather than an acceptable conceptual rendering
of the pre-existing, universally valid principle of morality.
Regardless of the extent to which Rousseau's tem
perament influences his thinking, it is evident that the
general will is not to be mistaken for the transcendent will
of ethical conscience.

His

concept arbitrarily elevates a

particularistic, national will, moral only by allegation and
with strong totalitarian implications, to a position of
absolute authority.

The common good of political society is

for Rousseau not the imperfect representation of a standard
transcendent of politics, but the immanent manifestation of
perfect morality in the will of the people.
Superficially, Rousseau's thinking in the Social Con
tract is an endorsement of democracy and the people's right
to self-government.

It should be clear, however, that the

people is also an instrument for Rousseau's subjective imag

146The Social Contract, bk. Ill, ch. XI: 135.
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ination.

If his assumptions regarding the spontaneous

direction of the popular will have little to sustain them in
real life, his democratic preferences are meaningless
abstractions, asking to be used by those who want to exercise
power dictatorially in the name of the people.
If Rousseau's conception of the general will grows
out of an essentially utopian view of human nature, he is
also offering an essentially utopian view of how democracy
can be made to respect and promote the ethical life.

The

Social Contract has doubtful value as a theory of democracy
and a source of inspiration for political action,

for unlike

Plato's Republic, for instance, its utopianism does not have
the saving grace of being grounded in an adequate definition
of the fundamental problem of morality.

Plato may be crit

icized for exaggerating man's ability to solve that problem,
but hardly for evading it.

Rousseau’s philosophy, on the

other hand, simply assumes the goodness of human nature and
ignores the need for moral self-discipline in the individual
and the people.

For that reason he may be accused of prepar

ing the way, not for a morally inspired democratic order,
but for political immorality and chaos.

No

amount of uto

pian assurances about the goodness of the spontaneous will
of the people can remove the only too real and persistent
lower inclinations of human nature as we know it in history.
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The idea that man's first impulse is good and will
show itself such on a large scale under the proper political
circumstances is abstract and theoretical in a very question
able sense.

It can be maintained only in the teeth of nor

mal experience.

Rousseau himself admits that to realize the

goals of the Social Contract a new man will be needed, one
bearing little resemblance to the creature of vice and art
ificiality found in actual societies.

Yet, Rousseau offers

no real proof that his psychological premises are anything
more than hopes and dreams.

Insofar

as

Rousseau's per

sonal life is any indication of what kind of man will emerge
when hostility to restraint and conventional social respons
ibility is adopted as a principle of conduct, one is forced
to face the rather striking contrast between the utopianromantic ideal and the real.^^
Experience suggests that m a n 's first impulse is far
from always good.

Indeed, it would seem to be more in keep

ing with the facts to say that it tends in the opposite
direction, towards some kind of selfishness or arbitrariness.
Men acquire some moral virtue and steadiness precisely to
the extent that they become accustomed to arresting the im
pulse of the moment and subjecting it to moral scrutiny
147

Cf. Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, especially
chapters 4-5.
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before acting.

The ethical life, we have argued, needs the

support of sound tradition and custom which help to build
into human action a pattern of habit by which impulse is
restrained and organized with reference to a higher standard.
The purpose of civilization is to liberate m a n 's higher
potential by disciplining his spontaneity, which by itself
tends away from all order.

In Rousseau's view, however, civ

ilization has been an instrument of enslavement: "Our wisdom
is slavish prejudice, our customs consist in control, con
straint, compulsion.
slave.”148

Civilised man is born and dies a

vJhere there should be complete freedom for man's
*

natural inclinations there are inhibiting and perverting
cultural norms.

Whatever "civilization" will be needed in

the true state is apparently expected by Rousseau to flow
out of man as a sort of byproduct of morality once spon
taneity has been released in society.

Granted that there

must be morally questionable elements in any tradition,
Rousseau's blanket denunciation of existing civilization is,
practically speaking, a denial of the need for the formative
guidance of culture in the ethical life.
Viewed realistically, one effect of applying Rousseau's
teaching to life would be to relax or remove the fetters

^ sEmile, bk. I: 10.
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which restrain man's lower nature.

And, as Burke points out,

the less control is exercised by the individual internally,
the more will have to be imposed from without by the state.
Lack of moral self-discipline on the part of a people invites
anarchy and increases the danger of political dictatorship.
To the extent that Rousseau's recommendations were followed,
the general will, which needs to respect no higher moral or
constitutional authority, would in all likelihood turn out
to be a highly arbitrary expression of majority opinion.
Political cohesion would probably be supplied in the end by
i

some disciplined organization, centrally led and claiming to
act for the common good of the people,

in international

affairs, one might expect "the will of the people" to exhibit
the same lack of restraint.

Very possibly, it would turn

out to be nationalistic and expansionistic.
Rousseau's ideas have had an enormous influence.

The

notion that morality is the result of yielding to the good
ness of our first impulse is bound to appeal to man's all
too natural inclination to escape the effort and pain of
actual moral self-improvement.

Placing the blame for all

social ills not really on man himself but on his environment
has also won Rousseau many followers.
is more flattering than realistic.

His political thought

Unfortunately, his in

fluence as a theorist of democracy is partially due precisely

to the fact that he ignores certain unpleasant truths, which
reduce considerably the optimism with which popular rule may
be contemplated.

The achievement of the common good and,

more comprehensively, of the good life, he thinks, is not
dependent on a difficult process of moral self-reform,
involving protracted cultural assimilation, by which the
citizens develop a measure of political responsibility
grounded in respect f o r •a transcendent ethical standard.
Neither does it require that this responsibility be promoted
and protected by constitutional laws, written or unwritten.
On the contrary, the good of society is best served by
removing all restraints on the momentary will of popular
majorities.

This belief, we may say in conclusion, is in

essence a utopian dream sustained by large doses of moral
conceit.

It is evident that an adequate theory of the

reconciliation of democracy with the ethical life must rest
on a more realistic assessment of human nature and politics.

IV. THE ETHICS OP CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

So far we have sought to determine whether popular
self-government can be made compatible with the needs of the
ethical life mostly by elimination.

We have tried to show

that Rousseau's influential theory of democracy does not
come to grips with man's moral predicament.

Only because he

denies that man's baser inclinations are apart of the essence of
human nature and assumes the morality of the spontaneous
popular will, can he advance his notion of plebiscitary rule,
according to which the majority of the moment is allowed to
set public policy.

If it is true as we have argued that man

is not spontaneously propelled in the direction of morality,
democratic theory must instead concern itself with the need
for ethical self-discipline and look for the political means
by which such discipline can be promoted.

We have intimated

that some form of constitutionalism is called for.

The American Constitution
Constitutional democracy we have defined broadly as
popular rule under legal restraints which cannot be changed
or removed without the support of a qualified majority over
an extended period of time.

Our analysis of this concept

may be brought into closer contact with the institutional
195
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problems of democracy by using the American Constitution as
an illustration.

In so doing we are not suggesting that its

particular provisions are necessarily the best available
example of this type of democracy, only that they offer a
good practical illustration of the general principle.
One of the rules generally regarded as essential to
the definition of democracy is that with some possible excep
tions all adults should have the right to affect government
policy through voting and be eligible for public office. The
authors of the American Constitution did not envision "uni
versal suffrage" in the modern sense of the word.

They left

the qualifications for the right to vote up to the individ
ual states, assuming only that popular participation would
be comparatively widespread, as it was already at the time
of the adoption of the document.

Perceived from the begin

ning as more democratic than the governments of the leading
European countries and soon viewed by foreign observers like
Alexis de Tocqueville as the very embodiment of popular rule,
the American constitutional system has only had its democra
tic reputation enhanced by the extension of popular suffrage.
Although this development was not prescribed in the original
document, one is clearly justified in thinking of the system
of government it regulates as democratic with regard to pop
ular participation.
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Does it follow that we must accept Abraham Lincoln's
description of American government as government for the
people, by the people, and of the people? Curiously, from
the point of view of much modern democratic theory, this
allegedly democratic form of government is not designed to
maximize the influence of popular majorities.

Indeed, the

founding fathers had no wish to create a "democracy," claim
ing instead that the Constitution established a "republic."
One might even say that through its system of checks-andbalances it tends to thwart the will of a momentary national
majority.

In fact, the people, viewed as an undifferentiated

mass, is not even given constitutional recognition.

There

is no institutional channel through which a mere numerical
majority can work its will.

The "people" of the Constitu

tion is made up of a number of overlapping, subdivided elec
torates.

Not even the President is chosen by a national

majority.

He is selected by a majority of the Electoral

College, a body chosen by pluralities in the various States
and according to a formula which further ignores the national
majority by giving overrepresentation, by numerical standards,
to the smaller States.

The members of the Senate and House

are elected by pluralities of yet other electorates
ate originally by the State legislatures).

(the Sen

To the extent

that the undifferentiated mass of the people or a majority
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thereof can be said to have a unified political will, there is
no one point in the American system of government where that
will can be applied.

The electoral processes of American

democracy are far removed from what might perhaps be regard
ed as the plebiscitarian ideal, the national referendum on
public policy.
The same anti-plebiscitarian slant marks the process
whereby policy is made by the Federal government.

The Con

stitution prescribes a division of power between an exec
utive, legislative, and judicial branch.

In order for a

bill to get passed it must not only be approved by both
Houses of Congress, which are made up of members beholden to
different electorates in their home States, but signed by
the President.

The chief executive in turn is required to

get the approval of the Senate for certain important acts,
such as the appointment of high-level officials in the exec
utive branch.

In its implied power of "judicial review,"

that is, of passing on the constitutionality of acts of the
other branches of government, the Supreme Court is a check
on each.

The Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by

the President with the approval of the Senate and could be
removed only under unusual circumstances by the Senate, after
a vote of impeachment in the House of Representatives, a
congressional power of last resort hanging also over the
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head of the President.

Another important feature of the

elaborate system of checks-and-balances, of which we are
only giving a very general and incomplete account, is the
division of power between Federal and State government, the
Constitution designating the proper role of each,

in the

central area of constitutional amendment, that of two avail
able procedures which has actually been used requires con
currence between a large majority of the States and the Fed
eral congress.
Since no merely temporary majority of the people,
however large, can acquire control over all the levels and
branches of government, its power is severely limited.

It

is possible to imagine a presidential election year in which
popular passions run so strongly in a definite direction
that the result is not only the election of a President
favorable to the cause, but a staggering and equally favor
able majority in the House of Representatives and among those
winning the third of the Senate seats to be filled that year.
Even that is not enough to assure the full public implementa
tion of the popular demand in question.

The Senators who

make up the two thirds of the Senate previously elected will
not necessarily concur in the sentiments now sweeping the
country.

And their independence is protected by the Con

stitution, as is that of any popular representative at the
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Federal level— be it a Senator, a member of the House, or a
President.

Provided that a majority of the Senate, or even

a very powerful two thirds of that body, does not acquiece,
the attempt to implement the popular will of the moment has
been thwarted.

And even if the necessary votes are avail

able in the Senate, the Constitution itself is still in
effect, prescribing the procedures by which government pol
icy has to be determined and at the same time limiting its
scope.
The idea of representation associated with American
government deserves special attention.

According to "Pub

lius" in the Federalist Papers, the representative institu
tions provided for in the Constitution are not intended to
be mere reflectors of public opinion.

They are supposed to

contribute to the "refinement" of the will of the people.
According to Federalist Paper number 10 (Madison), the del
egation of authority to representative institutions is
designed to
. . . refine and enlarge the public views by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations.

lHamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist Papers,
intro, and ed. by Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor Books,
1961), No. 10, p. 82.

201

It should be noted that by giving many of the popular rep
resentatives very substantial terms of office— as long as
six years for Senators and four years for Presidents— the
Constitution relieves them to a considerable degree from
popular pressure.

Their staying in office is not dependent

on being always in tune with public opinion.

They have the

opportunity to follow their own best judgment

even when it

might be in sharp conflict with the wishes of the people.
They can do so in the hope that by the time their electors
are to pass on their performance at the polls, their stand
will have been vindicated or their integrity will have
earned them the respect of erstwhile opponents.

The same

freedom to deviate from or even defy public opinion of the
moment is available to members of the House of Represent
atives, although their inclination to exercize independent
judgment may not be quite as strong, since their relatively
short term of office does not offer the same protection
against popular dissatisfaction and electoral censure.

On

the whole, the nature and role of representative institu
tions in the United States tend to make elections not so
much referenda on specific policies as opportunities to
elect individuals believed to have the qualifications to
make decisions on their own in their constituents' behalf.
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In the case of the Supreme Court, popular control is
at a minimum.

The voting public affects the composition of

the Court only by electing the President and the Senate, in
the first instance indirectly, in the second instance direct
ly (since 1913).

These together appoint the Justices.

Once

on the Court, moreover, a Justice cannot be removed, except
under extreme conditions.

Obviously, this gives him a

marked independence in relation to public opinion, if he
chooses to exercise it.
The American form of government places ultimate polit
ical authority in the hands of the mass of the people.

But

the people in that sense is not given the power to do what
it pleases in the short run.

The current majority is always

subject to the restraints of checks-and-balances.

Only a

majority which is, or becomes, both persistent and over
whelming can work its will completely, to the point of re
moving constitutional obstacles which stand in the way of
the full realization of its wishes.

The net effect of these

legal restraints is to put on the momentary majority the
burden of proof.

In order to acquire decisive power it must

become more than a momentary, merely partisan majority.

It

must prove itself over time as having a will worthy of com
mon support.

In the words of Willmoore Kendall:
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The American political system is not and never has been
a system for the automatic acceptance of majority man
dates by the minority. It is not and never has been a
system for the large-scale coercion of the minority. . . .
Under the American political system the majority bides
its time until it can act by consensus. . . ,2

The idea of popular sovereignty
But is not this to make a mockery of the democratic
ideal?

Must not a true democracy always promote the maximum

of popular control over public policy?

Does not popular

suffrage in the American form of government just barely con
ceal the authoritarian nature of the system as a whole?
Surely, this elaborate thwarting of the will of the people
is incompatible with the idea of popular sovereignty.

The

objection brings us to the heart of the fundamental issue
which has to be decided by democratic theory.

Granted that

popular sovereignty may be basic to democracy, what are we
to understand by it?
It would seem that when we attribute to the people
the right of self-government, we can mean one of two things.
One is that the people should be free at every turn to act
as it pleases.

The other is that the people may act only

under certain restraints.

To say that only the first mean

^willmoore Kendall, Contra Mundum, ed. by Nellie D.
Kendall (New Rochelle, N. Y . : Arlington House, 1971),
pp. 277-78 (emphasis in original).
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ing is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h th e i d e a o f p o p u l a r s o v e r e i g n t y is
e i t h e r to fall int o self-contradiction or u t o p i a n thinking.
If t h e

idea m e a n s

complete

f r e e d o m for t h e p e o p l e t o act,

it

d o e s n o t r u l e o u t t h e a b o l i t i o n o f d e m o c r a c y a n d th e e s t a b 
lishment of dictatorship.

T h a t would turn popular sovereign

ty into a mea n i n g l e s s concept.
p e o p l e m a y d o as

The p r o p o s i t i o n that the

it pleases c a n n o t be sa v e d b y saying that

of course the people must n o t give up the democratic
government,

for t h a t is t o a d o p t the s e c o n d p r o p o s i t i o n ,

namely that popular sovereignty

involves

people's

to d e f e n d

freedom.

The only w a y

take a R o u s s e a u i s t i c approach,
under certain circumstances

shown,

l i m i t i n g the
it would be to

attempting to prove that

it wi l l always please the people

to a c t so that popular c o n trol
have

form of

is p e r p e t u a t e d .

n o t e v e n R o u s s e a u is u n e q u i v o c a l

B u t as w e

in h i s a s s e r 

t i o n o f t h e a s cendancy o f t h e g e n e r a l w i l l o v e r the d e s t r u c 
t i v e a n d e v e n t y r a n n i c a l w i l l o f a l l in h i s

i d e a l state.

Unless we are to m ake certain blatantly unrealistic a ssump
tions about the necessary and powerful p r e s e n c e of d e m o c r a 
ti c p r e f e r e n c e s

in the people,

w e are

left w i t h the p r o p o s i 

tion that limitations on the popular will are not only
c o m p a t i b l e w ith,
ular

sovereignty.

but actually

i m p l i e d in t h e n o t i o n o f p o p 

W h a t we m i g h t regard as

ciple of constitutionalism would

the general p r i n 

thu s s e e m t o b e

inseparable
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from the concept itself.

The question becomes: By whom are

these limitations to be determined in scope and by whom
applied?

In a democracy, presumably, the answer must be, by

the people.
Paradoxically, insofar as popular rule is a real con
cept and not just some utopian dream, it refers to govern
ment by the people under self-imposed restraints.
ing of the latter idea must be carefully analyzed.

The mean
Since it

is our purpose to investigate the compatibility of democracy
with the needs of the ethical life, we shall be primarily
interested in exploring its ethical dimension.
Rousseau's

ideal

is a p e o p l e o f o n e p o l i t i c a l w i l l .

He can entertain it because he is assuming the essential
unity of human nature.

If we do not have recourse to his

type of imagination, however, but base our thinking on what
can be observed in actual societies, we are forced to recog
nize the existence of a chronic conflict of wills, in large
matters and small,

widespread agreement between the citizens

is sometimes achieved and maintained in certain areas, but
the unlikelihood of popular unanimity in politics explains
the prominence in democratic theory of the concepts of
majority and minority.

Just as there are different polit

ical wills at work in a people at any particular time, there
are different wills at work over time.

Public opinion
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presents an ever-changing constellation of views and senti
ments.

There are continuous shifts of emphasis and varia

tions in intensity.
edly redrawn.

The lines of confrontation are repeat

Majorities are transformed into minorities,

minorities transformed into majorities.

To what in this

varied stream of popular opinion is sovereignty to be
attached?

We have already seen that it does not belong to

just any expression of will.

An answer may be suggested by

drawing on the ethical philosophy we have advanced.
We have argued that man is a creature of two worlds.
His life is a tension between a perpetual and always chang
ing flow of impulses and a sense of higher purpose.

When

ever affirmed by man, this higher will disciplines and
structures his wishes of the moment with a view to the
enduring moral good.

It builds into his life a measure of

unity and harmony, a certain correspondence between human
imperfection and transcendent Perfection.

Except in the

sense that ethical conscience reveals itself to every person
in unique circumstances, it is not some private guide to the
goal of life. It wills the universal End for man, whose
worth is not derived from subjective advantage.

We have

referred to this self-justifying goal as "harmony," "hap
piness," and "community," using words which describe aspects
of the same transcendent reality.

The ultimate end of pol
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itics may be defined as community.

By this word we mean a

special type of association, a civilized living together in
which the intellectual, aesthetical, and economical life of
society serves the sacred destiny shared by all.

In reli

gious terminology, this destiny is community with God.
Referring to the partial realization of this goal which lies
within the reach of politics, Aristotle speaks of "the good
life."
Just as an individual is always under an obligation
to act morally in his "private" affairs, so is he under an
obligation to act morally when he is performing "public" or
"political" acts, such as casting a vote in an election. The
term "people" used in democratic theory does not signify
some mysterious, independent entity hovering, as it were,
over the heads of the individual citizens.

It is the collec

tive name for those same individuals acting in their capacity
as political participants.

Ethical conscience wills the

same goal in all men, the widest possible sharing in commun
ity.

Just as each person has a higher self, therefore, a

whole people, made up as it is of individual citizens, also
has a higher self, namely ethical conscience as it relates
to "public" or "political" matters.

As the common self of a

people organized for the purpose of conducting their common
affairs, it seeks, not the partisan advantage of any person
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or group, but the kind of political order which is conducive
to the spiritual elevation of society.

Against this higher

will, in need of no special pleading, stands an infinite num
ber of possible factional popular wishes which detract from
the moral goal and can be defined in contradistinction as
the people's lower will.
A people can thus be said to have two selves, one
which always wills the same, the furtherance of community in
given circumstances, and one with an always varying content
tending by itself to divert the political order to merely
partisan objectives.

But then we must ask this question

about the idea of popular self-rule: What self is to rule?
Our analysis does not leave any alternative.

The only mor

ally defensible answer is that it must.be the higher self of
the people, or, if that phrase has too much of a metaphys
ical ring, the will to community in the individual citizens.
Since in our analysis of Rousseau and in other places we
have emphatically rejected the idea of identity between
morality and politics, we obviously are not suggesting that
democracy becomes acceptable only if the people can be
expected to decide everything in accordance with ethical
conscience.

What we are contending is that the concept of

democracy is ethically defensible only if it conceives of
popular self-rule as designed in such a way as to promote

209

the application of ethical conscience to political issues.
Whatever other types of self-imposed limitations are implied
in the idea of popular sovereignty, the people has to impose
some moral discipline on itself.

In other words, popular

sovereignty must be defined with reference to an ethical
standard.
But is there not something undemocratic about this
notion that the people must subject itself to a superior in
the form of an ethical purpose?

Granted that the majority

must not suddenly decide to abolish the democratic rules of
the game, is not that view in reality hostile to the whole
idea of popular self-government and freedom?

That would be

true only if one would also have to say that a person is not
governing himself, but resigning his freedom, who is seeking
to guide his behavior by ethical conscience.
cipline is self-imposed.

But this dis

It is the willing affirmation of

the universal standard of good.

The structuring role of eth

ical conscience is not viewed by the individual as some
alien, external interference with his life, but as something
necessary to the fulfillment of his own true humanity.

To

call it a curtailment of freedom is to transform the idea of
freedom into a formula for immorality and unhappiness.
Freedom, we have argued in some detail earlier, can
be adequately understood only in conjunction with the moral
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worth of chosen goals, so that a person is free in the
strict philosophical sense only to the extent that by his
actions he enriches and fulfills his life as defined by the
spiritual harmony of happiness. Community being the highest
value, a meaningful existence cannot be distinguished from
the widest possible sharing of the good life with others.
Freedom, therefore, is properly the ability to act with con
cern for what promotes the spiritual well-being of all
affected.

A people can be said to be exercising freedom in

governing itself only when it is genuinely trying to realize
the conditions of community.
Democratic "freedoms"— freedom of expression, of
association, etc.— are appropriately labelled such, for in a
world of finite insight and endless change and diversity,
they give recognition to the need for constant examination
and reexamination of means and to the need for protection of
the uniqueness of mission belonging to each individual by
virtue of his special spiritual and physical gifts and cir
cumstances in life.
selves.

Political freedoms are not ends in them

When their exercise is detached from a concern for

the common good, they degenerate into opportunities for pri
vate aggrandizement and licence.

They become an endorsement

of the politically and morally destructive forces of society.
Popular majorities feeding on that type of "freedom" and
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wedded only to selfish advantage are in effect conspirator
ial groups seeking to expand at the expense of competitors.
To extend the concept of popular sovereignty to include this
kind of popular will is to include in the definition of
democracy what is inherently destructive of the very exis
tence of this and other forms of government.

Constitutionalism and ethical conscience
Insofar as it is compatible with the needs of the
ethical life, democracy seeks to promote a certain quality
of popular will.
tion.

This leads us to the role of the constitu

It may be viewed in analogy with the rules or prin

ciples which the individual person adopts for his private
behavior.

Aware of his own moral and other weaknesses, he

does not give sovereignty to his impulse of the moment, but
to standards of conduct which he has pledged not to change
or abrogate on whim or under the pressure of passion, but
only after careful and sober deliberation.

A constitution

serves a similar function in the public realm.

It is a

standard of political behavior which is not supposed to be
changed on the spur of the moment, but only through an elab
orate procedure which enhances the likelihood that the deci
sion be made when the emotions are calm and respectable
motives uppermost.

Needless to say, only people of high
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moral culture will subject their political wishes to con
stitutional restraints for the specific purpose of advancing
the ethical goal of community.

Where citizens are lacking

in this respect they will accept restraints, if at all, only
as a way of advancing their own personal advantage.

They

may endorse the constitutional objective of leaving an
appeal from the people drunk to the people sober, but then
as a means of promoting enlightened self-interest as distin
guished from unenlightened, short-sighted self-interest.
There is a certain similarity between constitutionalism
inspired by moral motives and constitutionalism inspired by
mere sophisticated egotism.

Both have the effect of curbing

the expansiveness of the lower will of individuals and
groups.

We have argued previously that men's ability to

discern what is in their own enlightened self-interest
depends in the end on their having some notion, however
vague, of what transcends the calculus of private advantage.3
But in order to establish the ethical necessity of
constitutionalism we need to state with more precision its
relation to ethical conscience.

A constitution, it may be

said in general, is a recognition of the need to put checks
on the tendency of individuals and groups to impose their

3See chapter I, pp. 28-29.

own idea of What is politically desirable on others.

It is

an attempt to purge politics of blatant arbitrariness.
Specific designations of power and various procedural
requirements# whether prescribed by long-honored precedence
or a written document, counteract the inclination to proceed
with disregard for the rest of society.

The requirement to

follow a fundamental law gives a measure of impartiality to
the formulation and implementation of public policy.

It

tends to promote a detachment of government from various
competing special interests.
will, is sovereign.

The law, not any particular

Short of destruction of the political

order, the strong are not free to crush the weak.
ter are left an appeal against raw power.

The lat

The very opposite

of arbitrariness in politics would be correspondence between
the political influence of individual citizens and groups
and their contribution to community.
accomplish this goal.

No constitution can

It is an attempt to limit the in

fluence of selfish interest, not by eradicating it, which is
impossible, but by taming it.

In the context of democracy,

that means that the majority of the moment is not given
total freedom to dictate policy.

To do so would be to max

imize the influence of the tendency, present to some degree
in all expressions of political will, to disregard the good
of the whole.
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To become an effective regulating force a constitu
tion must have the support of the community. Since the moral
capacity of a people is limited, this support must also be
found elsewhere.

For an elaboration of this point we may

draw on one of the most original of American thinkers,
John C. Calhoun.

His constitutional reasoning is of interest

here because it recognizes the existence of a common good in
the moral sense while being adjusted to the preponderance of
self-interest as a motivating force in politics.

Calhoun is

reconciled to the fact that the latter state of affairs can
not be drastically changed and that therefore self-interest
must somehow be turned into the service of the common good,
a need to which we have previously alluded.4
Concern for merely private advantage, Calhoun
believes, must be restrained by constitutional checks.

The

only way that these checks can be made effective, however,
is for the provisions of the constitution to give power to,
and thereby become aligned with, various major interests
which can help to enforce them in practice.

The self-

interest of each portion of the community which is recognized
by the constitution will restrain the self-interest of the
others.

4See chapter I, pp. 25-26, chapter II, pp. 108-109,
and chapter III, pp. 138-140.
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It is this negative power— the power of preventing or
arresting the action of the government, be it called by
what term it may, veto, interposition, nullification,
check, or balance of power— which in fact forms the con
stitution. . . .
Without this there can be no negative,
and without a negative, no constitution.^
The American Constitution with its elaborate system
of checks-and-balances exhibits at least the likeness of the
kind of "negative" on government which Calhoun is describing.
It has a general effect of great ethical interest.

The Con

stitution makes a consideration of the needs and wishes of
numerous groups a requirement fora majority that wishes to
achieve any part of its program.

The approximation of a

consensus is needed before government policy can be made.
Competing groups, whether in the majority or the minority,
are induced from the very start to adopt a politically
inclusive perspective.

To further their own cause in pol

itics that same cause must be defined with a view to making
it acceptable to other groups which might otherwise "veto" it.
This built-in inducement to consider the wishes of
other groups, we must emphasize, will not necessarily, and
indeed only in exceptional cases, lead to the adoption of a
genuinely moral point of view, that is, to a subordination
of private advantage to the needs of the common good.

But

5John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and
Selections from the Discourses, intro, and ed. by C. Gordon
Post (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953), p. 28 (hereinafter
referred to as Disquisition).

I
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it does tend to reduce the element of blatant self-seeking
and thus give some support to the moral aspirations also
present in the people and its representatives.

The self-

restraints suggested by mere enlightened self-interest, it
should be carefully noted, do not in themselves have any
moral worth.

Their motive is egotism of some kind.

But

paradoxically they greatly facilitate the task of those who
are striving to give politics a higher direction.

These

citizens can to some extent enlist the selfishly inspired
restraint of others in support of the moral end.

They may

even be able to transform it by an appeal to ethical con
science.

Since politics is not normally, if ever, a sphere

of morally elevated activity, the ethical importance of this
point can hardly be exaggerated.

What might perhaps be

called the Hobbesian intellectual tradition goes too far in
making egotism the sole structuring principle of politics.
There is as great a need, however, to guard against concep
tions of politics which are based on unrealistic or even
naive expectations about the degree to which morality can
take the place of self-interest.
Our reasoning ties in with Calhoun's argument in
favor of government by "concurrent majority."

We may cite

his description of the contrast between that form of gov-
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ernment and one of simple majority rule, by "numerical
majority" in his terminology.
The same cause which in governments of the numerical
majority gives to party attachments and antipathies such
force as to place party triumph and ascendancy above the
safety and prosperity of the community will just as cer
tainly give them sufficient force to overpower all
regard for truth, justice, sincerity, and moral obliga
tions of every description. . . .
In the government of
the concurrent majority, on the contrary, the same cause
which prevents such strife as the means of obtaining
power, and which makes it the interest of each portion
to conciliate and promote the interests of the others,
would exert a powerful influence toward purifying and
elevating the character of the government and the people,
morally as well as politically.6
What is of interest to our present argument is not so
much whether the specific institutional suggestions offered
by Calhoun will accomplish the stated goal, but the principle
itself: In a government of concurrent majority self-interest
is checked by self-interest in such a way that, willy-nilly,
it becomes a potential support for moral aspirations.

The

extent to which a constitution will actually promote distinc
tively ethical restraints, however, will depend entirely on
the extent to which the perpetual conflict of interests is
leavened by the motive of community among the political
participants.

To serve the higher goal it must be rooted

in considerable moral culture.

6Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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A constitution, then, is an attempt to purge politics
of the kind of political egotism which would crush every
thing in its way.

Insofar as it is inspired by the moral

motive, it aims even further, to the substitution of ethical
conscience for enlightened self-interest as the ordering
principle of politics.

It then becomes the institutional

embodiment of the rejection, not only of the kind of
arbitrariness which threatens the peaceful balancing of
group interests, but of every form of arbitrariness.

Its

provisions become a means of lifting politics in the direc
tion of fulfillment of a higher law.

As Walter Lippmann

writes:
Constitutional restraints and bills of rights, the whole
apparatus of responsible government and of an indepen*i
dent judiciary, the conception of due process of law in
courts, in legislatures, among executives, are but the
rough approximations by which men have sought to exorcise
the devil of arbitrariness in human relations.7
Although always imperfect and less than successful,
constitutions serve their highest purpose by allowing the
censuring of "caprice and willfulness" with a view to the
moral end.
But if it may thus be said that the principle of con
stitutionalism i3 disapproval of political power exercised

7Walter Lippmann, The Good Society (New York: Grosset
& Dunlap, 1943), p. 346.
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for only particularistic ends, it is similar to the ultimate
principle of morality itself.

What is ethical conscience

but the higher will in man which censures, and thereby
defines, the arbitrary?

Indeed, can it not be argued that

to the extent that the principle of constitutionalism is not
just the name for the flawed impartiality of enlightened
self-interest, it is identical with ethical conscience?
Clearly, whatever the apparent correspondence or proximity
of self-interest and morality in some particular cases,
man's ethical will is always in tension with the motive of
selfishness.

It cannot be said, therefore, that constitu

tionalism of every hind has moral worth.

But as an activity

by which men direct their common affairs, politics bears
heavily on the achievement of the conditions of community.
As such it is very much the concern of ethical conscience.
What we are suggesting is that constitutionalism is just
another term for man's moral will applied to the organiza
tion of political activity.

Constitutionalism is demanded

by ethical conscience because it is necessary to the achieve
ment of the moral goal.

In its political aspect, man's

higher will may be called the "spirit" of constitutionalism.
To develop this concept we need to remember that the words
"government" and "constitution" are not names for something
existing apart from the citizens.

Those who participate in
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politics under the rules of a constitution accept it as a
guide for their personal behavior, so that strictly speaking
the constitution as a practical force is identical with the
political activity of the individuals who assent to its pro
visions and supply or withhold the spirit of constitutionalism.
If the good life is to be approached, men's lower
inclinations have to be disciplined in some way.

According

to Edmund Burke,
Society requires not only that the passions of individ
uals should be subjectedd but that even in the mass and
body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of
men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled,
and their passions brought into subjection. This can
only be done by a power but of themselves; and not, in
the exercise of its function, subject to that will and
to those passions which it is its office to bridle and
subdue.8
In its moral dimension, this restraining power is in
a certain sense external to individual persons as Burke
writes.

It transcends man.

It is not a part of his lower

self of unprincipled impulse, but disciplines it from the
outside.

But in another sense, which Burke does not here

recognize, it is also in man.

It is man's own ethical con

science, the principle of true humanity he shares with others.
The "private" habits by which the individual tries to
lift himself out of the ever-present inclination to yield to

®Burke, Reflections, pp. 57-58 (emphasis in original).
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morally unexamined impulse cannot be sharply distinguished
from those of his habits which he tries to follow for the
same purpose in his "public" or "political" life.

They are,

in fact, only two aspects of one and the same attempt to
achieve the moral end.

Since the end itself is social but

its attainment dependent on individual effort, the prereq
uisites are both "private" and "public."

In the "public"

sphere, ethical conscience demands a special type of coop
eration with others, namely one which minimizes the in
fluence of arbitrariness.

It applies to a broader context a

question which describes all moral deliberation: "Is this
contemplated action good?"

As entertained by the individual

in politics the same question may be formulated thus: "Is
this contemplated

'public' action of the kind that contrib

utes to community?"

Although concerned with "public"
*
affairs, it puts a moral obligation on each citizen. The
shared habit of asking this question is the moral dimension
of constitutionalism.

It is translated by practical neces

sity into a call for specific institutional restrictions
binding on all.

The higher will in man does not work in a

vacuum but on the concrete material of political reality.
Given men's selfish and otherwise flawed behavior and their
unavoidable clashes of interest, the political advancement
of community is not possible without common assent to some
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superior coordinating rule.

The willingness to subject one

self to this kind of restraint out of concern for the moral
end, therefore, is indistinguishable from ethical conscience
itself.

All actual constitutions are transcended by man's

ethical will, but the demand for them is directly rooted in
it.

Applied to the conduct of public affairs, that will can

indeed be described as the spirit of constitutionalism.
In a democracy, constitutional provisions are imposed
by the people on itself.

That does not mean that they will

all meet with the full approval of every citizen*

While a

person may be critical of various parts of his country's
constitution, he may still respect it, in the spirit of con
stitutionalism.

He may recognize, in other words, that the

continued curbing of political arbitrariness requires of him
that he should abide by the provisions of which he dis
approves as long as they are in effect, and try to change
them, not by stretching or distoring their meaning, but
through the process of revision prescribed by the constitu
tion.

He may also be on his guard against the possibility

that his own view of how the ethical end can be promoted by
government is mistaken.

In its denial of all arbitrariness

ethical conscience is a warning against premature certainty
regarding the moral worthiness of concrete political
proposals.

There is a crucial distinction to be made
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between support for specific constitutional rules and the
willingness itself to accept such rules, even when they may
not seem wholly appropriate, in the interest of the higher
goal.
A constitution may be viewed as forming a part of the
varied cultural habits by which men direct their behavior
towards the form of intrinsically valuable association which
is community.

These habits help to restrain the centrifugal,

disruptive inclinations always present in society.

They are

tentative directives transcended by the directing principle
itself.

It is incompatible with the moral purpose of life

to regard these habits as final, in no need of revision or
improvement.

The spirit of constitutionalism demands not

only respect for the fundamental law, but the possibility to
change that law on the basis of insight into how it could
better serve the enduring goal.
are subject to a higher law.

Particular constitutions

"To those who ask where this

higher law is to be found," Walter Lippmann writes, "the
answer is that it is a progressive discovery of men striving
to civilize themselves, and that its scope and implications
are a gradual revelation that is by no means completed."9
It has been one of our contentions that ethical con
science is better described as a principle of censure or
9Lippmann, The Good Society, p. 347.
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self-examination than as a positive command to perform this
or that act.

Although moral conduct is attended by a sense

of higher purpose, it never completely fulfills that purpose.
The ultimate standard of good is always felt to have been
betrayed to some extent.

We may relate the idea of ethical

conscience as a principle of censure to our discussion of
constitutionalism by putting out own interpretation on the
following compact statement by Calhoun:
It is, indeed, the negative power which
stitution, and the positive which makes
The one is the power of acting, and the
of preventing or arresting action. The
make constitutional governments.1°

makes the con
the government.
other the power
two, combined,

Against the background of our previous ethical anal
ysis, these sentences may be read as a general description
of man's moral life.

The "negative power" would be the cen

suring, structuring activity of ethical conscience.

The

"positive power" we may understand as concrete human inten
tions.

"The one is the power of acting," Calhoun writes,

calling to mind our notion of impulse as the force which
carries human action.

The other is "the power of preventing

or arresting action," he goes on, giving a description also
of the role of ethical conscience in regard to impulse. "The
two, combined, make constitutional governments."

We may

l0Calhoun, Disquisition, p. 28 (emphasis in original).
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take that to mean that positive action, structured or dis
ciplined by ethical conscience, is morality. This reading of
the passage obviously strains Calhoun's meaning.

He is

referring in this statement not primarily to a moral "neg
ative" on government.

But since politics is largely the

pursuit of partisan goals, the demands of ethical conscience
in regard to the procedural rules tend to run parallel to
those of enlightened self-interest.

The moral goal can be

advanced only through a pragmatic adjustment to the stubborn
reality of political self-seeking.

In relation to the lat

ter, ethical conscience has to be a "negative."

consequent

ly, it is possible to use Calhoun's words to illustrate our
point:

The spirit of constitutionalism, as distinguished

from actual constitutions, written or unwritten, is iden
tical to ethical conscience as applied to the organization
of political life; it advances community by seeking to curb
political inclinations incompatible with the goal.
We are probably well-advised to pause briefly at this
juncture to recapitulate some of our previous reasoning. Our
rendering of the relationship between ethical conscience and
constitutionalism might seem to put an undue emphasis on the
negative aspect of morality.
positive side.

Surely, morality also has a

While this is certainly true, words must not

take the place of precise analysis of the underlying meaning.
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We have explained before in some detail in what sense eth
ical conscience should be regarded as an "inner check," but
to avoid misunderstanding in our present context a few addi
tional remarks may be called for.
It might be objected to our argument about the spirit
of constitutionalism that quick and spontaneous decisions
are often moral, and that decisions based on careful delib
eration could well be immoral.

The latter part of the

objection need not detain us, since it is simply a restate
ment of our own explicit position: An attempt to protect
deliberation through constitutional provisions may have no
other motive than a morally oblivious wish to facilitate
bargaining between factional groups.

Constitutional restric

tions in themselves are no guarantee that morality will be
promoted.
But what about the other assertion, that spontaneous
acts may sometimes be moral?
clarity.

First of all, it is lacking in

If what is meant is that impulse somehow defines

morality, it is clearly false, for particular intentions are
always transcended by the ultimate standard of good.

To

argue that there may emerge out of man certain impulses
which are a perfect expression of morality is to claim that
man can be God.

If what is meant, however, is that impulse

may come to participate in

and thus advance

the good, we
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are again entertaining a restatement of our own position:
Ethical conscience gives its sanction to certain impulses by
withholding its censure and, as it were, aligning itself
with them.
Most likely, the mentioned objection is the result of
skipping over the essential question of just how impulses
might acquire moral worth.

It is a failure to subject this

question to rigorous philosophical analysis which lends some
credence to Rousseauistic ethics.

Leaving aside the case of

spontaneity which has moral consequences by mere chance,
every moral act is by definition sanctioned by ethical con
science.

But as we have argued at some length that higher prin

ciple itself is never identical to the impulse calling for
action.
the Good.

The finite reality of human acts is transcended by
In the strictest sense, therefore, moral virtue

is always associated with a type of restraint.

There is a

never-ending tension between the imperfection of everything
human and the standard of perfection.

Man is under a per

manent censure which loses some of its sharpness to the
extent that he lives up to his higher self.

Ethical con

science is indeed a sense of purpose, but in a world of
flawed intentions and acts that purpose i3 revealed either
through censure or a qualified withholding of censure.

In

the latter case, the specific act is attended by moral reassurance.
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If we say that spontaneous acts are sometimes moral,
we are describing in one highly ambiguous word what i3 in
fact a dualistic experience, namely impulse and the struc
turing role of ethical conscience.

The wording is accept

able only if it is understood that what is called a spontan
eous moral act is one involving no extended ethical delib
eration.

Whether we take as an example a person whose

character has already been morally structured, so that there
is a certain moral momentum built into his impulsive life,
or a situation in which the moral course is so clear that
there might be said to be an "impulsive" inclination to fol
low that course, it is only after an impulse has been
arrested for ethical scrutiny, however quick, that the
individual can recognize it as good and thus become jus
tified to act on it.

Moral conduct presupposes the inter

ference of the question, "Is this moral?," which is the
particularized embodiment of ethical conscience.
This analysis in no way contradicts the idea that
ethical conscience reveals a positive purpose.

It is only a

reminder that in relation to human finitude in general and
human evil in particular this purpose is necessarily felt as
an"inner check."

This point deserves special emphasis in a

discussion of constitutionalism, for politics is predominant
ly the pursuit of selfish interests.

Moreover, although it

I
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is true that individual persons sometimes act morally "on
impulse," a theory of democracy must concern itself with the
question of how a certain type of collective activity is to
be organized, if it is to respect and promote the moral end.
If the spirit of constitutionalism is a rejection of
the arbitrary, it is also an affirmation of the good life as
it is advanced by politics.

It negates because it affirms.

To say that it demands institutional restraints on partisan
ship is to say that it promotes the moral opposite, the sub
stance of which in changing circumstances is the discovery
of men trying to achieve community.

The belief that ethical

conscience sanctions positive acts by government is fault
less.

But there is always a tendency among men of all

political persuasions to exaggerate the moral purity of the
causes they happen to advocate.

And even when the motive is

pure, as far as that is possible, the political wisdom of
its translation into practical proposals may be questionable.
The spirit of constitutionalism responds to human imperfec
tion and depravity, on the one hand, and the need for gov
ernment action, on the other.

As a constant reminder of

man's shortcomings, it casts a doubt on the moral worth of
all political wishes.

As an aspect of the principle of

community, it is also what gives to politics its higher
direction and final justification.
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We have rejected Rousseau’s idea of plebiscitary
democracy, because it ignores the need for moral restraints
in the individual and the people.

Could it not be objected

that what is wrong with his democratic theory is not his
rejection of constitutionalism but his failure to recognize
the need for the moral self-discipline which could make his
ideal of plebiscitary rule practicable?

This is not really

an objection to our argument, but actually a somewhat con
fused confirmation of it.

Rousseau regards self-discipline

in our sense of the term as the very root of evil.

Morality

is served, he believes, by uninhibied spontaneity.

What

should be understood is that had he seen the moral necessity
of self-restraint, he would have had to drop his ban on con
stitutionalism.

The reason is that when men are engaging in

political activity under the type of restraints which serve
the common good, they are by that token also acting con
stitutionally.

The goal requires that they order their

behavior with reference to a common standard not subject to
instantaneous repeal.

The distinguishing mark of constitu

tionalism is not so much the laying down of written provi
sions, as is the belief of Thomas Paine, for i n s t a n c e . I t

^According to Paine, wherever a constitution
be produced in a visible form, there is none. . . .
then Mr. Burke produce the English Constitution? If
not, we may fairly conclude, that though it has been

"cannot
can
he can
so much
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is rather the willingness for the sake of a higher goal to
subject present political wishes to scrutiny according to a
set of rules not itself resting on the preference of the
moment.
Just how maximum room is to be made for moral consid
erations in the making of government policy is a matter of
applying the acceptance of restraints to difficult practical
problems.

The formulation of specific constitutional provi

sions, including sanctions which assure adherence to them,
will have to be adjusted to the circumstances.

In a democ

racy, this task is in the hands of the people and its rep
resentatives, the implication being that the common good is
best served by the broadest possible participation in the
process.

Given the preponderance of selfish motives in pol

itics, the goal of community cannot be advanced, except by
some lucky coincidence, by simply implementing the most
recent expression of majority will.

There is need for an

element of pause, of deliberation under the guidance of
moral motives.

Whatever the constitutional arrangements

which are best designed to encourage such an examination of

talked about, no such thing as a constitution exists, or
ever did exist, and consequently that the people have yet a
constitution to form." Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, intro,
and ed. by Henry Collins (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1971), pp. 93-94.
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intentions before they can become government policy, those
arrangements are demanded by ethical conscience.
To suggest that perhaps Rousseau's ideal of plebis
citary democracy could be realized through moral selfdiscipline on the part of the citizens is to get involved in
a contradiction in terms.

If plebiscitary democracy means

an absence of constitutional inhibitions on the people, but
such inhibitions are necessarily present whenever the cit
izens are coordinating their political activity with a view
to the achievement of community, the concept of ethical
restraints in politics and the concept of plebiscitary
democracy are incompatible.

Constitutionalism vs. plebiscitary impatience
It is not our purpose here to develop a set of con
stitutional prescriptions.

We have used the American Con

stitution to illustrate a general principle and not to
assert that in the American context its provisions offer the
practical solution to the problem of making democracy compat
ible with the needs of the ethical life.

The Constitution

does tend to restrain temporary popular majorities in a way
conducive to the emergence of government by "consensus."

It

does so without giving tyrannical veto-power to a selfseeking, dedicated minority.

A majority which is not merely
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transitory and partisan, but capable of putting sustained or
even mounting pressure on the various bodies of government,
can overcome the resistance of a merely partisan minority,
with its built-in premium on deliberation the American Con
stitution provides an opportunity for putting ethical checks
both on the people's representatives and on momentary elec
toral majorities.
We may add some perspective to our thesis about the
moral necessity of constitutionalism and at the same time
give more attention to the institutional problems of democ
racy by putting the American Constitution alongside an old
and recurrent criticism of that document Which has given a
strong element of ambiguity to the American political tradi
tion.

We are referring to a general impatience with rep

resentative institutions as set up by the Constitution. This
dissatisfaction, which has marked plebiscitarian overtones,
is exemplified in the thinking of Thomas Jefferson.

In this

Enlightenment figure of eclectic and often poorly integrated
views one finds an unresolved strain, reflected in American
politics to this day, between the constitutional temperament
as understood in our discussion, and a rather different
temperament, more akin to that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

It

should be made clear that in concentrating for our purposes
on Jefferson's strong plebiscitarian tendency, we are not
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claiming to be analyzing more than one side of his thought.
Not only are some of his arguments to which we will refer
contradicted or modified by other of his statements.

It is

also possible to argue that his theory was often contradic
ted by his practice.
Although Jefferson finally came around to endorsing
the American Constitution, one need not study his political
thought for long to discover reasons for regarding his
approval of constitutionalism in general as qualified and
ambiguous.

It should be noted at the outset that when

Jefferson comes down most clearly on the side of constitu
tional restraints, as in the case of his insistance on a
Bill of Rights, he is usually more concerned about protect
ing the people against their governors than the other way
around.

Although by no means blind to the shortcomings of

the common man, his admitted inclination is to entrust the
public interest to the mass of the people or a majority
thereof rather than to popular representatives.

It is

significant that his democratic sentiments are of a kind
that tends to undermine the principle of constitutionalism.
He speaks of the ideal, regarded by him as unfortunately
unattainable in practice, that "every form of government
were so perfectly contrived, that the will of the majority could

always be obtained, fairly and without i m p e d i m e n t . T h e
best available type of government, which he terms "repub
lican, " is repeatedly described by him as one that allows
for the most direct and faithful execution of the people's
will.

In its purest form, it would be "a government by its

citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according
to rules established by the majority."

Negatively, the

principle is stated thus: "The further the departure from
direct and constant control by the citizens, the less the
government has of the ingredient of republicanism. . . . 1,13
Jefferson's majoritarianism is most clearly spelled out in
his call for "absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the
majority— the vital principle of republics."^
Jefferson's plebiscitarian propensity brings him into
collision with the idea of representation developed by
Edmund Burke in his famous speech to his constituents in
Bristol.

Applying this Burkean idea to democracy we may

take it to mean that elected officials should not be mere
executioners of shifting popular wishes.

The mass of the

people should have the ultimate political power, but not
instant, unquestioned authority to dictate government policy.
^Thomas Jefferson, The Life and Selected Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, ed. by Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New
York: Modern Library, 1944), p. 492.
13xbid., p. 670.

14Ibid w

p.

3 2 4

.
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Popular representatives should have the opportunity to act
independently to check and refine popular opinion.
should act as the people's "higher self."

They

Jefferson, how

ever, in many places expresses deep suspicion of a concep
tion of representation that might violate the principle of
direct and immediate popular control.

He applauds a trea

tise on the American Constitution by fellow Virginian John
Taylor, which, in Jefferson's view, "settles unanswerably
the right of instructing representatives and their duty to
obey."

15

Since direct popular participation or control is

impossible at the national level, Jefferson settles for "the
nearest approach to a pure republic, which is practicable, "
namely government through "representatives chosen either pro
hac vice, or for such short terms as should render secure
the duty of expressing the will of their constituents."

16

Jefferson the plebiscitarian wants the removal of
obstacles to the full and instant implementation of the
people's will.

Throughout he remains critical of important

features in the American Constitution which tend to thwart
that goal.

As might be expected, there is only one body in

the national government of the United States that Jefferson
is prepared to call "mainly republican" ^ — the House of RepISibid., p. 669.
16Ibid.t p . $70.
17ibid., p. 671. We are relying in this paragraph pri
marily on Jefferson's illuminating letter to John Taylor of
May 28, 1816.
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resentatives.

The reason is that because the members of

that body have a relatively short term of office they can be
expected to listen carefully to their constituents or else
be rather promptly ousted.

The Senate, the Presidency, and

the Supreme Court are all criticized by Jefferson for being
too far removed from the control of the people, by the length
of their terms of office or by the fact that they are chosen
or appointed only indirectly by the people.

What arouses

his dissatisfaction is the very real possibility of a gov
ernment policy which does not always meet with the approval
of the majority.

The logical extension of Jefferson's line

of argument are such devices as recall and referendum, which
have played some role in the American political tradition.
But perhaps the most striking example of Jefferson's
anti-constitutional temperament is his belief that no coun
try should go long without a revolution.

"I hold it, that a

little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as nec
essary in the political world as storms in the physical."^®
At the bottom of this lack of concern for the orderly pro
cess of government as a protection against arbitrariness
lies a belief in the soundness or even goodness of the un
inhibited popular will.

18 Ibid., p. 413.
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In view of our previous analysis of the relation
between ethics and politics, it is not surprising that

Jef

ferson's view of man and ethics should bear a strong resem
blance in important respects to that of Rousseau- His view of
human nature, like Rousseau's, is monistic.

It comes in

Jefferson's case steeped in an emphatic materialism and
sensationalism. 19

Man's moral sense is not conceived by him

as introducing a tension between immanent and transcendent
in man's inner life.

He describes it as a spontaneous force,

an "instinct" which puts man on the moral course.

Knowingly

or unknowingly echoing Rousseau, he describes it as a pleas
urable feeling of benevolence towards others which "prompts
us irresistibly to feel and to succor their distresses."2®
For Jefferson the plebiscitarian, we may state in
conclusion, government does not have the purpose of
restraining the momentary will of the people with a view to
some higher moral standard.

The wish of the majority at any

moment is itself the only reliable expression of the public
good.

The best form of government is one which respects the

principle that "the will of the majority is in all cases to
prevail.
19"0n the basis
may erect the fabric of
need." Ibid., p. 700.
many other respects is
2®Ibid., p. 638.

of sensation, of matter in motion, we
all the certainties we can have or
Jefferson's thinking in this as in
influenced by John Locke.
21Ibid., p. 322.
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The plebiscitarian tendency in the American political
tradition, contradicted in Jefferson's case by other el
ements, recurs in more recent expressions of impatience with
constitutional restraints on the majority.

A good example

is the criticism directed against the so-called "deadlock of
democracy" by James MacGregor Burns.

The American constitu

tional system. Burns complains, is defective in that it
"requires us to await a wide consensus before acting."22

It

will not allow the speedy and effective implementation of
the will of the majority, which should be the purpose of
democracy.

The basis of the presumption against simple

majority rule in the Constitution, Burns observes,
. . .has been a pervading distrust of the people when
organized in a national block or party. The people,
yes— but only in their separated, federalized, localized
capacities. Popular government, yes— but not really
popular rule by hungry majorities.23
The latter kind of government ought to be established, Burns
argues, by revising the American form of government in
accordance with what he calls "the Jeffersonian model." This
model he draws from Jefferson the practical politician, whom
he regards as wedded to the ideal of vigorous government
action supported by a national majority coalition. Jefferson-

22James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 323.
23Ibid., pp. 334-35.
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ian majority rule. Burns contends, has "a more popular, egal
itarian impetus than the Madisonian.11^

Burns proposes sev

eral reforms designed to create a new form of government,
such as abolition of the Electoral College, Federal control
over elections to the national government, uniformization of
congressional districts, removal of procedures which dis
courage popular voting, centralization of the political par
ties, and removal of traditional congressional practices
which undermine party discipline.

What he wants is a system

in which decisive power belongs to the numerical national
majority and in which political candidates are members of
national parties with distinct, well-defined platforms, so
that elections can in effect become national plebiscites on
alternative government policies.
What is of immediate concern to us here are not the
specific reforms suggested by Burns, but the temperament
that inspires them.

According to Burns, the majority prin

ciple joined to a system of national party competition is
not enough to make possible the sweeping governmental action
that must be available to the majority in a more democratic
America.

It will take determined, central leadership.

decisive role must be played by the President.

2^ibid., p. 41.

He must
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"assume full responsibility, in the priority areas, for the
functions and effectiveness of the whole governmental systern."

25

When the power of the Presidency "is exercised most

responsibly it is not confined to mere t i n k e r i n g . T h e
man holding that office must be able and willing to cut
through the separation-of-powers apparatus in order to get
things done.

For example, he has to "ignore the absurd

'rule'. . . that the President does not interfere in the
legislative department.

He must interfere, and openly so.

In his approving analysis of Jefferson's leadership in
broadening executive power on the basis of a mobilized
national majority, Burns observes that
. . . the high point of Jefferson's majoritarianism
. . . came in the Louisiana Purchase. When the chips
were down, when a great decision had to be made and
pressed quickly, Jefferson violated congressional rights,
by-passed accepted constitutional processes, refused to
go through the long process of a constitutional amend
ment, and threw himself and his party on the mercy of
the new popular majority, that he was building up.28
Whatever the accuracy of this interpretation of
Jefferson's action, it is apparent that Burns sees a need

25]3urns, Uncommon Sense

(New York: Harper & Row, 1972),

p. 129.
26Ibid., p. 173.
2^Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy, p. 338.
28ibid., pp. 39-40.
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for executive leadership that is willing to bend or even
break the rules when it is necessary to serve the presumed
interests of the majority.
The great political leader is not content to whittle
down his goals to what he thinks he can achieve through
the existing structure of political forces. Rather he
seeks to enlarge and vivify the structure so that the
goals can be realized as fully as possible. He knows
that archaic governmental routines cannot always be bro
ken up by adjustment and adaptation but, as Burnham says,
by "the application of overwhelming external force."29
Burns impatience with constitutional obstacles to
instant and sweeping change does not quite amount to a
repudiation of the idea of constitutionalism.

Whether for

tactical or other reasons, he does not attack it head on.
But he undermines it by advocating an exercise of power not
overly sensitive to the intent or spirit of constitutional
provisions.

If he sees the danger of political arbitrar

iness, he is apparently less disturbed by it than by the
risk that the popular majority might not get its way.
It has been suggested by critics that Burns's unwill
ingness to accept the restraints of the American Constitu
tion is rooted in frustration over the fact that at this
time in American history those restraints happen to reduce
the likelihood of public implementation of the particular

^ 9 Burns, Uncommon Sense, p. 175.

policies that he believes to be m a n d a t o r y . A s s u m i n g , how
ever, that his arguments for the empowering of numerical
national majorities is not just a case of intellectual
opportunism, we must take him to mean that there is some
thing about the uninhibited will of the mass of the people
which entitles it to a decisive influence over government
policy.

If Burns is to retain the idea that democracy can

be defended on ethical grounds, the presumption must be that
this type of popular will is somehow morally superior to
other types.

He would be leaning then in the direction of

the Rousseauistic belief in the morality of spontaneous pop
ular wishes as they emerge, hot from citizens in their
capacity as members of social groups, but in their capacity
as members of the undifferentiated mass.

Although Rousseau

does not advocate strong executive leadership by one individ
ual for normal circumstances, it is difficult not to see the
affinity between his pervasive hostility to inner and outer
restraints and Burns's belief that "the presidency at its
best seeks to liberate American society as a whole from what
ever binds i t . " T h e

premise at work would seem to be that

30willmoore Kendall writes, for instance: "Since
Burns and his friends cannot win under the existing rules,
he asks us to change the rules so that he and his friends
can win." Contra Mundum, p. 273 (emphasis in original).
^Burns, Uncommon Sense, p. 173.
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only if the people is free to cast off all institutional
shackels can true democracy be realized.
It would be possible to question the democratic
claims of Burns's brand of plebiscitarianism by arguing that
it enhances the danger of popularly supported despotism, or
"Caesarism" in James Burnham’s term.

32

It is worthy of note

that insistance on the unlimited authority of the popular
will often tends to go together with a preference for highly
centralized, or even totalitarian,

forms of government.

What is of primary concern to us here, however, is the fun
damental ethical issue of popular rule with or without con
stitutional restraints.
Although not entirely clear-cut, Burns's theory of
democracy exhibits a general tendency whose ultimate ethical
and political implications are brought out in the thought of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Burns and other theorists of democ

racy of the plebiscitarian bent may not actually be self
admitted disciples of Rousseau and, needless to say, they
are likely to differ with him in many particulars.

They do

share with him an impatience with constitutional restraints
and a related presumption in favor of the spontaneous pop-

3 2 Cf. James Burnham, CongresB and the American Tradi
tion (Chicago! Henry Regnery Co., 1965), especially chap
ter XXV.

245

ular will.

In the final analysis, their type of democratic

theory must be defended at the ethical level.

They may not

all have recognized the full implications of their plebiscitarian preferences, but the logical ethical basis for
those preferences is supplied by Rousseau.

And if our anal

ysis of that archetypal plebiscitarian is generally correct,
they do not withstand critical examination.

We are just

ified, therefore, in approaching the institutional prescrip
tions of these theorists with considerable scepticism.
A theory of democracy which does not recognize the
paramount need of constitutionalism evades the realities of
man's moral predicament.

An attempt to carry the plebis

citarian ideal into practice will tend, in the long run at
least, to defeat the ethical purpose of community and there-,
by also to undermine popular rule itself.

Plebiscitary

democracy, it may be suggested, is not a real political con
cept, but a quasi-concept.

It is not based on a realistic

assessment of the possibilities open to man, but on some
highly dubious assumptions:

Assuming that political man is

not predominantly or even partially motivated by selfish
ness; assuming that he is instead spontaneously propelled in
the direction of morality; assuming that the popular majority
of the moment is most likely to give expression to the com
mon good— assuming all of this, plebiscitary democracy
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becomes a concept descriptive of human potentiality.
these things, we have tried to show,

cannot

But

be assumed.

They actually run counter to concrete experience.

Few

modern democratic theorists embrace plebiscitarianism in the
pure Rousseauistic form, but many lean in its direction.

To

that extent they give to democratic theory a utopian slant
inimical to a realistic consideration of the institutional
problems of popular rule.
That is not to say that each proposal for changing
the American political system which is advanced by thinkers
like Burns is necessarily destructive of the moral goal of
politics.

Precisely what constitutional arrangements will

help to make democracy compatible with the needs of the eth
ical life under some particular historical circumstances is
not just a matter of motive but of political prudence and
imagination.

Obviously, constitutional restraints are not

an end in themselves.
serve the higher goal.

They are desirable insofar as they
For many reasons even the most nobly

and skillfully conceived constitution may at some time begin
to defeat its original purpose.

Profound social and polit

ical changes may necessitate constitutional amendment or
even transformation.

A sound constitution recognizes that

fact and provides the means for its own revision.

The point

to be made about Burns's recommendations is that whatever
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merit may be found in some of them belongs to them not
because of, but in spite of his plebiscitarian leanings.
We may perhaps sum up our argument regarding the two
available concepts of popular rule by drawing a parallel
between two types of citizens and two types of democracy.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau asks us to picture an individual who
always acts spontaneously.

To this type of citizen cor

responds a form of democracy which gives complete freedom to
the spontaneous popular will.

This plebiscitary notion of

democracy is not founded in reality but in an imaginary
world.

We may oppose to this parallel another, which pic

tures an individual who acts under self-imposed moral
restraints.

To that kind of citizen corresponds a form of

popular government under constitutional limitations designed
to promote a certain quality of popular will.

Only this

type of democracy recognizes man's real moral predicament.
It allows an opportunity to temper the centrifugal forces of
political self-seeking by considerations of the common good.
It can be joined to and sustained by man's sense of higher
purpose,

constitutional democracy at its best, we may con

clude, would be popular self-rule in the cause of community.
To the extent that democracy approaches this high standard,
it can be supported on moral grounds.

Going a step further

than is really warranted by our argument, it may perhaps
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even be said that in this concept of democracy we have the
noblest idea of politics.

Democracy, leadership, and culture
Just because popular rule without constitutional
restraints is an ethically unacceptable notion, popular rule
under such restrictions offers no guarantee that ethical
motives will be promoted.

Constitutional restraints are a

necessary but not sufficient condition for the furtherance
of community.

Everything turns on the absence or presence

of what we have called the spirit of constitutionalism.

It

will emerge only in a people of advanced spiritual culture.
Referring to the United States but making a general
observation. Rene de Visme Williamson argues that "the Con
stitution functions as a mirror for the national conscience." 33

The constitutional norm serves as a constant

reminder of the contrast between the values endorsed by the
people in its better moments, when it looks at politics in
the light of the moral End, and the imperfect, sometimes
degrading practice of day-to-day politics.
a moral function.

The law thus has

John Middleton Murry writes:

^•^Rene de Visme Williamson, Independence and Involve
ment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964),
pp. 126-27.
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Just as the democratic society freely chooses its gov
ernment, so the democratic citizen must freely choose to
do his duty to the commonweal. He puts his conscience
in control of his actions. He obeys the law, not as an
external command, but as the expression of his own better
self, which wills to act in obedience to a law which its
reason recognizes to be n e c e s s a r y . 34
Representative institutions, which are central to any
constitutional system, do not by themselves assure the moral
dignity of democratic politics.

The people must not only be

able to recognize but also willing to give their support to
leaders who have a genuine concern for the common good.
That presupposes a measure of moral attainment and perspicac
ity as well as trust.

According to Williamson,

have no ideals can have no representatives."

35

"people who
Representa

tion in the morally significant sense implies a shared under
standing of the ultimate goal of life and also an awareness
that some men are better equipped for leadership than others.
The true criterion is not wealth, position, or birth, but a
special type of ability.

The good representative is able to

represent not the lower, partisan selves of his fellow cit
izens, but their will to community.

The willingness to put

this kind of trust in elected leaders, to the point of
respecting their judgment when it goes contrary to one ’s own

^ Q u o t e d in John Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 124.
3 5 Williamson, Independence and involvement, p. 198.
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wishes of the moment, is essential to the fulfillment of the
higher goal of politics.

To be worthy of such trust, a pop

ular representative cannot be just an average, ordinary per
son.

In addition to political prudence and skill, he must

have in even greater measure than the people who elect him a
sense of the moral purpose of politics.

In a position to

lead and not only follow, he must be able to rise above the
popular passions and biases of the hour and of his own
period in history.
Let there be no hedging or equivocation on this point:
Constitutional democracy implies leadership.

Contrary to

various utopian dreams, every possible form of government
will have its "elites."

The democratic ideal is not to do

away with leaders, but to make them as numerous as possible
and to create the circumstances in which a commitment to the
common good is encouraged among them.
ism plays an important role.

Here, constitutional

It places restraints on the

inclination to misuse power both among elected leaders and
the electorate.

But these restrictions in themselves will

be morally ineffective unless they form part of a whole pat
tern of high aspirations in the people.

The emergence and

maintenance of an elevated general sense as to the proper
end of the political order requires both assimilation of
mankind's noblest traditions of spiritual culture and
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creativity in their application to new circumstances. Polit
ical morality is dependent on what is contributed by up
bringing and education in the family, by schools and univer
sities, churches, artists and authors, and, perhaps more
than anything else, the personal example of good men.
True leadership, like the spirit of constitutionalism,
is incompatible with spiritual arrogance.

Although the pop

ular representative must in a sense seek to put himself
above his constituents, the proper standard for so doing
puts even his best efforts in a humbling light.

According

to Irving Babbitt,
A man needs to look, not down, but up, to standards set
so much above his ordinary self as to make him feel that
he is himself spiritually the underdog. The man who
thus looks up is becoming worthy to be looked up to in
turn, and, to this extent qualifying for leadership . ^ 6
A sense of humility, a sense of the contrast between
man's sacred destiny, as reflected in the highest standards
of conduct known by civilization, and man's actual attain
ments, Babbitt regards as inseparable from all true leader
ship.

This qualification, we may add, has particular

application to democracy,

for in that form of government

each adult is to some extent supposed to be a leader of
others.

To be worthy of that leadership, the citizen must

^Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 257.
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be the beneficiary of moral culture*

The success of democ

racy depends on the widest possible sharing in the accom
plishments of civilization.

In addition to prudential and

intellectual virtues, the citizens must have some commitment
to the morally mandatory but never fully reachable goal of
community.

In the West, we are heavily indebted for our

understanding of this supreme social value to the classical
and Judaeo-Christian tradition.

Christianity, especially,

with its inclusive view of who are to contribute to and
participate in community provides indispensable support for
democracy.

By giving his ultimate loyalty to a cause which

transcends his own time and place and the merely partisan
wishes of his own people, the democratic citizen does not
betray the idea of popular self-rule, but, on the contrary,
affirms the unifying principle which alone can sustain it in
the long run and give it moral worth.
We can see that the simultaneous awareness of human
limitations and potentialities, an awareness growing out of
several thousand years of spiritual experience and intellec
tual effort, is also the very root of constitutionalism in
the higher sense.

We subject our political behavior to the

restraints of a common legal authority because we know that
premature certainty, self-seeking, and even positive evil
always threaten to infect our actions.

Pledging to respect
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a constitution conceived with real concern for the common
good of community, we recognize both our depravity and our
sacred destiny.
It is possible that our interpretation of democracy
will leave some dedicated Christians, for instance, with the
feeling that we have not gone far enough in relating our
concept of the spirit of constitutionalism to the theolog
ical concept of the Holy Spirit and to specific principles
of Christian ethics.

We have intentionally avoided associa

ting our theory too closely with a particular theology in
order not to spur inferences which might unnecessarily com
plicate acceptance of our argument by those without definite
religious convictions.

We have chosen a largely "formal"

approach, trying to show that already in the form or struc
ture of ethical deliberation, as distinguished from the sub
stantive content of morality in specific cases, lie some
far-reaching implications for popular government.

From an

analysis of man's moral predicament and of the way in which
he approaches the ethical end, we have been able to derive a
recommendation of constitutional democracy.

This movement

from description to prescription has been possible because
the "form" taken by moral choice is also an aspect of the
substance of morality.
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The value relativist or nihilist, on the other hand,
is likely to feel that in asserting the intrinsic superior
ity of the concept of constitutional democracy over the con
cept of plebiscitary democracy we have gone further than is
intellectually meaningful.

Our analysis of man's moral life

has been centered in the notion of ethical conscience.

Up

to a point, this notion can be clarified by intellectual
discourse.

It becomes finally comprehensible, however, only

as it finds, the proper referent in personal experience.

To

the person who in his search for the meaning of life has
been able to find nothing sacred or transcendent, it must
remain disturbingly abstract.

What we may hope is that to

the extent that persuasion is dependent on argument, our
attempt at a philosophy of popular rule has some merit.
Speaking about a higher will in man to which democ
racy, like all other forms of government, owes its final
allegiance, we may have seemed at times to have given the
standard of morality a human source.

And that it has, in a

sense, for ethical conscience is most certainly a will in
man.

Moral obligation does not await adoption of a theology.

But as we have emphasized, ethical conscience also transcends
the human.

It is ultimately divine.

While we have refrained

from introducing specifically religious lines of argument, a
non-secular conception of man has informed our reasoning.

When we contend that constitutionalism is a necessary polit
ical condition for the fulfillment of man's true humanity,
we are thus only affirming in other words that the human
purpose, in politics as elsewhere, is to glorify God.
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